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Abstract 
This thesis examines the interaction between monetary policy, inflation and asset 
prices. The role of asset prices in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy via 
consumption wealth effects and investment balance sheet effects is receiving a growing 
degree of attention nowadays. Financial asset prices respond quickly to new information 
about monetary policy shifts, while the transmission of policy actions to output and 
inflation exhibits significant lags. Therefore, it is important to examine the feedback 
between interest rates and asset prices, since it will provide important insights for central 
bankers and investors alike. This area of the literature draws from both the monetary 
economics and financial economics disciplines and has become quite important given the 
new challenges for monetary policyrnakers in the context of fundamental changes in the 
underlying financial and macroeconomic framework. In this respect, we are interested in 
three main issues: first, to investigate the impact of the, nowadays prevalent, inflation 
targeting monetary policy regime on average inflation and the related inflationary 
uncertainty (Chapter 2); second, to establish quantitatively the existence of a transmission 
link from changes in the monetary policy stance to the stock market (Chapter 1); third, to 
examine the monetary policy reaction to asset price fluctuations (Chapters 3-5). 
Chapter 2 looks at the significant changes that occurred in the inflation process over 
the 1990s using British data. We show that post-targeting, inflation is lower, less persistent 
and less volatile. In chapter 3, we use data from the UK and the US and find that lower 
expected inflation allows monetary policy to relax by decreasing short-term interest rates. 
In chapter 1, international evidence suggests that decreases in interest rates exert a 
significantly positive impact on stock prices in the majority of the countries under 
investigation. Hence, the empirical evidence in chapters 1-3 is consistent with the scenario 
underlying the so-called 'new environment' hypothesis. Inflation targets were successful in 
anchoring inflation expectations and subsequently boosting stock prices due to lower 
interest rates. In chapters 3-5 we focus on the role of asset prices for monetary policy 
formulation. We present empirical (chapter 3), theoretical (chapter 4), and simulation 
(chapter 5) evidence indicating that monetary policy has responded and should, in 
principle, respond to asset price fluctuations. Particularly, in chapter 3 we augment the 
standard forward-looking Taylor rule with the change in asset prices (house prices, stock 
prices) and find that there is a positive and statistically significant weight attached to asset 
price fluctuations in both the UK and the US. The estimates suggest that policyrnakers in 
the US are more concerned about stock market developments, while in the UK about house 
market developments. In chapter 4, we utilise a structural backward-looking economic 
model, augmented for the effect of asset prices on aggregate demand, that allows us to 
derive the optimal interest rate rule via dynamic minimisation of the central bank's loss 
function. We show that under certain assumptions about the asset price evolution, monetary 
policy should react to asset price misalignments from their fundamental value. Finally, in 
chapter 5 we simulate a forward-looking model to examine the impact on macroeconomic 
volatility from reacting, or not, to asset price misalignments. We find that a policy reaction 
that is aggressive with respect to inflation, and mild (but not zero) with respect to asset 
price misalignments is able to promote overall macroeconomic stability. 
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Introduction 
The 1990s were characterised by significant shifts in monetary policy frameworks 
as well as investors' valuations in many advanced economies. In particular, following the 
failure to control inflation through money supply and exchange rate anchors during the 
1970s and the 1980s, a growing number of central banks turned to inflation targeting 
regimes ever since the early 1990s. Central banks were endowed with clear mandates to 
maintain price stability and with the necessary autonomy to pursue them. These monetary 
policy regimes proved to be a success so far, since inflation rates became lower and less 
volatile implying ý that the significant economic costs associated with high and variable 
inflation have been largely subdued. During the same period, especially after the mid- 
1990s, both stock prices and house prices appreciated to record levels. The excessively 
exuberant stock market valuations, closely related with the claims about permanent profit 
increases due the 'new economy' and the 'dot com' boom of the 1990s, reversed sharply in 
early 2000. Since then, house prices have continued to appreciate, creating an extra source 
of uncertainty for policymakers regarding a possible correction in the property market, 
given the significance of property holdings for the average household's portfolio. The 
recent volatility in asset price markets has generated an intense debate in academic and 
policy circles regarding the appropriate monetary policy response to such dramatic shifts. 
According to the 'new environment' hypothesis the two main macroeconomic and 
financial developments of the 1990s, low and stable inflation along with asset price boom 
and bust cycles, are inherently interrelated forming a new background for monetary policy 
to operate. Exponents of this hypothesis suggest that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, 
lower and less volatile inflation may be associated with higher financial instability. This is 
due to the fact that the decline in inflation leads to a similar decline in interest rates, thereby 
decreasing the cost of borrowing for consumers and firms. Such expansive monetary 
policies are typically associated with higher asset prices given the lower discount rate and 
the expectation of higher cash flows in the future. During the boom period, credit expands 
to accommodate the increasing levels of debt on the expectation of further increases in asset 
prices, whilst the assets themselves serve as a collateral. However, when asset prices 
eventually reverse, both consumers and firms cut back their spending in order to restore 
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their balance sheets. In such an environment, the absence of obvious inflationary pressures 
adds to the sustainability of the boom and consequently magnifies the negative 
consequences of the bust. Hence achieving and maintaining price stability is not a sufficient 
condition for financial stability. In fact, the new environment hypothesis points out that low 
and stable rates of inflation may even foster asset price bubbles by generating excessively 
optimistic expectations about the future economic development. 
There is a growing recognition that asset prices play an important role in the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy via consumption wealth effects and investment 
balance sheet effects. It is also well known that significant lags do exist in the transmission 
of policy actions to output and inflation, while financial asset prices respond rather quickly 
to new information about monetary policy shifts. Therefore, it is important to examine the 
feedback between' interest rates and asset prices, since it will provide important insights for 
central bankers and investors alike. This thesis is motivated by the aforementioned 
arguments and attempts to examine the interaction between monetary policy, inflation and 
asset prices. This area of the literature draws from both the monetary economics and 
financial economics disciplines and has become quite important given the new challenges 
for monetary policymakers in the context of fundamental changes in the underlying 
financial and macroeconomic framework. 
In this respect, we are interested in three main issues: first, to investigate the impact 
of the, nowadays prevalent, inflation targeting monetary policy regime on average inflation 
and the related inflationary uncertainty (Chapter 2); second, to establish quantitatively the 
existence of a transmission link from changes in the monetary policy stance to the stock 
market (Chapter 1); third, to examine the monetary policy reaction to asset price 
fluctuations (Chapters 3-5). Chapter 2 looks at the significant changes that occurred in the 
inflation process over the 1990s using British data. We show that post-targeting, inflation is 
lower, less persistent and less volatile. In chapter 3, we use data from the UK and the US 
and find that lower expected inflation allows monetary policy to relax by decreasing short- 
term interest rates. In chapter 1, international evidence suggests that decreases in interest 
rates exert a significantly positive impact on stock prices in the majority of the countries 
under investigation. Hence, the empirical evidence in chapters 1-3 is consistent with the 
scenario underlying the new environment hypothesis. Inflation targets were successful in 
anchoring inflation expectations and subsequently boosting stock prices due to lower 
interest rates. In chapters 3-5 we focus on the role of asset prices for monetary policy 
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formulation. We present empirical (chapter 3), theoretical (chapter 4), and simulation 
(chapter 5) evidence indicating that monetary policy has responded and should, in 
principle, respond to asset price fluctuations. 
As we already argued, in chapter 2 we document the impact of inflation targeting on 
the distribution of price changes using UK data over the period 1972-2002. Friedman 
(1977) suggests a positive correlation between the level of inflation and inflation 
uncertainty, with higher inflation leading to greater uncertainty and lower output growth. 
Ball (1992) formalises Friedman's argument in the context of an asymmetric information 
game between the public and the policy maker. The empirical evidence on the relationship 
between average inflation and inflation uncertainty largely accepts the Friedman-Ball 
prediction. Thus, policies that lower average inflation, such as inflation targeting, lead to 
lower inflation uncertainty with apparent economic benefits. A key issue in this literature is 
whether explicit targeting leads to a greater decrease in inflation uncertainty, as compared 
to the case where formal targets are not announced and the central bank is not officially 
obliged to act so that to keep inflation at the target (or in the range) within some specified 
time horizon (implicit targeting). Targets have an independent role if they help to anchor 
inflation expectations and to produce an additional decline in inflation uncertainty. In 
chapter 2 we employ a variety of GARCH related models (symmetric, asymmetric, 
component-GARCH) to proxy inflation uncertainty with the estimated conditional 
volatility. Our main contribution to the existing literature is that even if we take into 
account the indirect effect of lower average inflation throughout the 1990s the adoption of a 
formal inflation target in the UK on October 1992 directly decreased long-run inflation 
uncertainty. In line with previous evidence by Siklos (1999), we also find that post- 
targeting inflation has been less persistent. Therefore, high inflation countries and 
implicitly targeting countries should consider the extra benefits associated with explicit 
targeting. 
The increased aversion of monetary authorities to inflation and its variability over 
the 1990s eventually brought credibility gains, allowing interest rates to successfully 
control inflationary pressures even after climbing down the double-digit levels experienced 
during the 1970s and 1980s. This had important implications for the evolution of stock 
prices, since according to the discounted cash flow model stock prices are equal to the 
present value of expected future net cash flows. Expansive monetary environments are 
commonly viewed as good news for the stock market because such periods are associated 
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with low interest rates, increases in economic activity and higher earnings for the firms in 
the economy. Hence, monetary policy plays an important role in determining equity returns 
either by altering the discount rate used by market participants or by influencing market 
participants' expectations of future economic activity. Chapter I investigates the impact of 
changes in monetary conditions on stock returns using international data from 13 OECD 
countries over the period 1972-2002. Given the disagreements on the use of money 
aggregates as indicators of monetary policy, we adopt the nowadays standard approach of 
measuring policy with interest rate variables. Our results indicate that shifts in monetary 
policy significantly affect stock returns, either concurrent returns, or expected returns. In 
particular, tighter monetary policy stance exerts a negative effect on the stock market, while 
expansive policies boost equity returns. Our contribution with respect to previous work is 
threefold. First, we show that our findings are robust to various alternative measures of 
stock returns, such as returns that include dividend payments in their calculation. Second, 
our empirical estimates are adjusted for the non-normality exhibited by stock returns data. 
Third, we also take into account the increasing co-movement among international stock 
markets. The sensitivity analysis indicates that the results remain largely unchanged in the 
majority of our sample countries. 
Following the establishment of a link between monetary policy conditions and stock 
market valuations in chapter 1, in chapter 3 we focus on the determinants of policy 
decisions. The main objective of chapter 3 is to provide some further insight into the 
interest rate setting behaviour of central banks. We use data over the period 1992-2002 
from the UK (explicit inflation targeting) and the US (implicit inflation targeting) and 
estimate forward-looking Taylor rule reaction functions. Our contribution to the empirical 
Taylor rules literature stems from the fact that we condition nominal short-term interest 
rates not only upon expected consumer price inflation and the output gap, but also upon 
stock price and house price inflation. Changes in asset prices are allowed to enter the 
monetary policy reaction function due to their effect on aggregate demand and inflation. 
The results crucially indicate that asset prices play an important role for monetary policy 
formulation above and beyond their information content as instruments in the GMM 
estimation. We find that monetary policy has reacted to asset price fluctuations with a 
higher weight being attached to house price inflation in the UK, and stock price inflation in 
the US. We also show that the Bank of England has become more averse to inflation 
4 
deviations from the target after being awarded operational independence in setting interest 
rates on May 1997. 
In chapter 4 we revisit the relationship between monetary policy and asset prices in 
the context of optimal policy rules. Feedback rules for interest rates of the type advocated 
by Taylor (1993) have been extensively analysed in the theoretical literature. Many studies 
show that such rules are optimal in that they derive from the first order condition for the 
optimisation of the central bank's objectives. Typically, such objectives are characterised 
by a quadratic loss function penalising deviations of inflation from its target value and 
output from its potential level. We also follow this approach and start from a backward- 
looking aggregate supply / aggregate demand model in the spirit of Ball (1997) and 
Svensson (1997). The backward-looking nature of the model allows for the derivation of 
analytical solutions and is largely consistent with the actual behaviour of inflation. The 
main difference between our framework and the aforementioned studies is that we model 
explicitly the wealth effect of asset prices on aggregate demand. The optimal rule for 
nominal interest rates is obtained by dynamic minimisation of the central bank's loss 
function. The results depend on the assumption underlying the dynamic evolution of asset 
prices. If asset prices are always equal to their fundamental value (no bubbles), the derived 
policy rule conditions the policy instrument upon concurrent inflation and the output gap, 
as standard in the literature. In the most realistic case where, in addition to the reversion 
towards fundamentals, asset prices are allowed to be positively affected by their past 
change the results change critically. We show that monetary policy should respond to asset 
price misalignments with the aggressiveness of the response being a positive function of the 
impact of asset prices on aggregate demand. This result constitutes the main contribution of 
chapter 4 to the existing literature and has important implications for the conduct of 
monetary policy given the recent, as well as historical, experience of sustained asset price 
deviations from their fundamental value. 
Finally, in chapter 5 we take another look at the interaction between asset price 
misalignments and monetary policy using stochastic simulation techniques. The model 
employed in this chapter is forward-looking in order to be consistent with agent 
micro foundations. In particular, we augment the standard New Keynesian framework to 
allow for the impact of asset prices on aggregate demand and, using simulations, we 
examine how inflation, output, interest rates, and asset prices behave under alternative 
monetary policy rules. Previous evidence by Bernanke and Gertler (1999,2001) and 
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Cecchetti et al. (2000) is inconclusive since the former argue that a central bank should pay 
no attention asset prices per se, except insofar as they signal changes to expected inflation, 
while the latter show that are gains from responding to asset price misalignments even 
when inflation appears to remain on track. Our results contribute to the existing literature 
in a dual manner. First, in addition to the forward-looking Taylor rule that is employed in 
the aforementioned studies, we also examine the case of the inflation-forecast targeting 
rule. Second, we incorporate a partial adjustment mechanism of asset prices towards their 
fundamental value that allows for both bubble build-up and reversion towards 
fundamentals, without making explicit assumptions about the probabilistic structure of the 
bubble. Our simulation evidence confirms pervious findings by Cecchetti et al. (2000) in 
that the central bank can reduce macroeconomic volatility with a mild adjustment of its 
interest rate instýument to asset price misalignments. This result does not depend on 
whether the Taylor rule or the inflation-forecast targeting rule is utilised. Hence, monetary 
authorities should take into account asset price misalignments when formulating policy 
despite the measurement errors that they might face. 
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Chapter I 
Monetary Policy and the Stock Market 
1.1 Introduction 
Monetary policy attempts to achieve a set of objectives that are expressed in terms 
of macroeconomic variables such as inflation, real output and employment. However, 
monetary policy actions such as changes in the central bank discount rate have at best an 
indirect effect on these variables and considerable lags are involved in the policy 
transmission mechanism. Broader financial markets though, for example the stock market, 
government and corporate bond markets, mortgage markets, foreign exchange markets, are 
quick to incorporate new information therefore a more direct and immediate effect of 
changes in the monetary policy instruments may be identified using financial data. 
Identifying the link between monetary policy and financial asset prices is highly important 
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to gain a better insight in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, since changes in 
asset prices play a key role in several channels. 
This chapter will provide empirical evidence on the relationship between monetary 
policy and one of the most important financial markets, the stock market. Stock prices are 
among the most closely monitored asset prices in the economy and are regarded as being 
highly sensitive to economic conditions. In the context of the transmission mechanism 
through the stock market, monetary policy actions affect stock prices which themselves are 
linked to the real economy through their influence on consumption spending (wealth effect 
channel) and investment spending (balance sheet channel). As Bernanke and Kuttner 
(2003) point out, some observers view the stock market as an independent source of 
macroeconomic volatility to which policyniakers may wish to respond. Stock prices often 
exhibit pronounced volatility and boom-bust cycles leading to concerns about sustained 
deviations from fundamental values that, once corrected, may have significant adverse 
consequences for the broader economy. Hence, establishing quantitatively the existence of 
a stock market response to monetary policy changes will not only be germane to the study 
of stock market determinants but will also contribute to a deeper understanding of the 
conduct of monetary policy and of the potential economic impact of policy actions or 
inactions. 
According to the discounted cash flow model stock prices are equal to the present 
value of expected future net cash flows. Monetary policy should then play an important role 
in deten-nining equity returns either by altering the discount rate used by market 
participants or by influencing market participants' expectations of future economic activity. 
As Crowder (2004) argues, these channels are generally reinforcing since a tighter 
monetary policy usually implies both higher discount rates and lower future cash flows. 
Thus, monetary policy tightening should be associated with lower stock prices given the 
higher discount rate for the expected stream of cash flows and/or lower future economic 
activity. In contrast, an expansive monetary environment is commonly viewed as good 
news as these periods are usually associated with low interest rates, increases in economic 
activity and higher earnings for the firms in the economy. Consequently, stock market 
participants pay close attention to strategies based on the stance of the monetary authority 
as inferred by changes in indicators of central bank policy. Also, the financial press often 
interprets asset price movements as reaction to monetary policy shifts, attributing for 
instance increases in stock markets to low interest rates (Economist, 24/04/2004). 
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Previous empirical evidence broadly supports the notion that restrictive (expansive) 
monetary policy decreases (increases) contemporaneous stock returns, as well as expected 
stock returns'. These studies typically relate stock returns to measures of monetary policy 
stringency in the context of single equation specifications and/or multivariate Vector 
Autoregressions (VARs). In this chapter we take a closer look at the impact of monetary 
policy on stock returns by utilising international data on thirteen OECD countries that 
covers the crucial period of the late 1990s stock market bubble and its subsequent collapse. 
Given the considerable debate on the relative merits of money aggregates during the late 
1970s and early 1980s, we adopt the nowadays standard approach of measuring monetary 
policy using interest rate variables. We expand on previous work by examining the 
sensitivity of our findings in inclusion of dividend payments in the stock returns 
calculation, while considering both nominal and real returns. Our results indicate that for 
the majority of the countries under investigation the monetary environment is an important 
determinant of investors' required returns. This holds across a variety of returns 
specifications (nominal, real, dividend adjusted, non-adjusted). We also examine the 
contemporaneous effect of monetary policy on stock returns taking into account the non- 
normality typically inherent in such data as well as the significant comovement of 
international stock markets. The main result, that expansionary monetary policy boosts the 
stock market, remains largely robust in most sample countries. 
The implications of such findings for monetary policy making and investor portfolio 
formation are quite important. Central bankers and stock market participants should be 
aware of the relationship between monetary policy and stock market performance in order 
to better understand the effects of policy shifts. Given the ability of monetary policy to 
affect stock prices, central bank policy makers face the choice of whether to respond to 
stock price movements, above and beyond the standard response to inflation and output 
developments. This important issue will be examined from various perspectives in the 
context of chapters 3 to 5. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section surveys the vast 
theoretical and empirical literature that relates monetary conditions with real economic and 
stock market performance. Section 1.3 contains the econometric part of the chapter. Section 
1.3.1 discusses the properties of the international data to be employed in testing the 
1 See among others, Conover, Jensen and Johnson (1999), Thorbecke (1997), Patelis (1997). 
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relationship between stock returns and monetary policy. Section 1.3.2 and 1.3.3 provide 
empirical estimates of the impact of monetary policy changes on contemporaneous and 
expected stock returns, respectively. Section 1.4 concludes. 
1.2 Monetary policy, real economy and the stock market 
1.2.1 Present value model and monetary policy effects 
The present value or discounted cash flow model offers useful insights on the stock 
market effects of monetary policy changes. According to this widely used model the stock 
price (S, ) is the present value of the future expected dividends (D, +j). Under the assumption 
of constant discount rate (R), it can be shown that 2: 
K )jDt+j 
+ Et 
)K 
St St = E, 1] 
j=l , 1+R 1+R 
+K (1.1.1) 
where, Et is the conditional expectations operator based on information available to market 
participants at time t, R is the rate of return used by market participants to discount future 
dividends, and K is the investor's time horizon (stock holding period). The standard 
transversality condition implies that as the horizon K increases the second term in the right- 
hand side of Eq. (1.1.1) vanishes to zero (no rational stock price bubbles): 
lim E, 
K-+oo I+R 
Thus, we obtain the familiar version of the present value model3: 
K 
E, 1: -1 
)'D, 
-, j j=l I+R 
2 To derive Eq. (1.1.1) we may assume for simplicity that there is an investor with two alternative investment 
opportunities over a one-period horizon: either a stock with expected gross return E, [S,,, + D,,, ] / S, or a risk- 
free bond with constant nominal gross return I+R. Arbitrage opportunities imply that, for the investor to be 
indifferent between the two alternatives, they must yield the same expected return: Et[S,,, + Dt+, ] / S, =I +R. 
We then solve forward the resulting expectational difference equation and obtain Eq. (1.1.1). 
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Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1996) relax the assumption of constant discount 
rate. They show that when discount rates are time-varying (R, ), the log-linear 
approximation of Campbell and Shiller (1988a, b) yields the following expression for the 
log-stock price (st): 
k co 
+E, 2]pj[(l-p)d t t+j+l r 1-p i=O 
t+j+l (1.1.4) 
where, logs of variables are denoted by lowercase letters, and p and k are parameters of 
linearization defined by p=1 /[1 +e (d-p) ], where (d - p) is the average log dividend-price 
ratio, and k=- ln(p) - (I - p) ln(l /p- 1) . In order to derive Eq. (1.1.4), the transversality 
condition has been imposed (limp' s, +j 
0). As Campbell et al. (1996) point out, when the 
J--*co 
dividend-price ratio is constant, then p1 /(1 +D/ P) . The average dividend yield in the 
US over the period 1871-2003 has been around 4.7%, implying that p should be about 
0.954 in annual data 4. This implies that the weight on log dividend (I - p) is close to zero 
reflecting the fact that on average the dividend is smaller than the stock price, hence a given 
proportional change in the dividend exerts a smaller effect on the stock return than the same 
proportional change in the stock price. 
Eqs. (1.1.2) and (1.1.4) indicate that a change in monetary policy can affect stock 
returns in a dual manner. First, there is a direct effect on stock returns by altering the 
discount rate used by market participants (one-off shift in R in the case of constant discount 
rate). In particular, tighter monetary policy leads to an increase in the rate at which firms' 
future cash flows are capitalised causing stock prices to decline. The underlying 
assumptions are that, first, the discount factors used by market participants are generally 
linked to market rates of interest and second, the central bank is able to influence market 
interest rates 5. Second, monetary policy changes exert an indirect effect on the firms' stock 
value by altering expected future cash flows. Monetary policy easing is expected to 
increase the overall level of economic activity and the stock price responds in a positive 
3 Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1996, p. 258) discuss models of rational bubbles that relax the transversality 
condition. 
4 The calculations were made using the annual US data available online at Robert J. Shiller's website 
(http: //aida. econ. yale. edu/-shiller/data. htm). 
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manner (expecting higher cash flows in the future). Hence, this channel generally assumes 
the existence of a link between monetary policy and the aggregate real economy. As Patelis 
(1997) argues, stocks are claims on future economic output, so if monetary policy has real 
economic effects then stock markets should be influenced by monetary conditions. In the 
next section we review the empirical evidence and theoretical arguments put forth by 
various schools of thought considering the impact of monetary policy on the real economy. 
1.2.2 Money, interest rates and real economic conditions 
Standard Keynesian theory predicts that variations in the money stock may affect 
the real economy by changing the level of interest rates (liquidity effect) and consequently 
the cost of capital for firms. If changes in the money supply have no effect on the real 
system then money is said to be neutral or money does not matter. Walsh (1998) provides a 
summary of the empirical evidence regarding the effect of money on real output. He points 
out (p. 39) that, "the consensus ... on the long-run relationship between money, prices, and 
output is clear. Money growth and inflation essentially display a correlation of 1; the 
correlation between money growth or inflation and real output growth is probably close to 
zero". The consensus on the short-run effects of monetary policy is quite different though. 
Empirical evidence from VARs and large scale structural econometric models suggest that 
monetary policy tightening shocks decrease real economic activity with the peak effects 
occurring after several quarters, as much as one to three years (see e. g. Sims, 1992; Brayton 
and Tinsley, 1996; Angeloni et al. 2002). The empirical estimates, however, depend 
significantly on how monetary policy is measured. 
VAR studies typically use a short-term interest rate as a proxy for monetary policy 
(e. g. Sims, 1992). Eichenbaum (1992) shows that when MI is used to measure policy, 
positive money supply innovations (expansionary monetary policy shocks) lead to higher 
interest rates and lower output (output puzzle). The failure of the liquidity effect prediction 
(faster money growth should be associated with lower nominal interest rates) has led to its 
subsequent examination in many studies with mixed results, see e. g. Christiano and 
Eichenbaurn (1992), Strongin (1995) for evidence in favour of the liquidity effect, and 
Thornton (1996) for evidence against it. Eichenbaum (1992) finds that when monetary 
' Fuhrer (1995) shows that the US monetary policy instrument (federal funds rate) constitutes a source of 
change for many longer term interest rates. 
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policy is measured by the federal funds rate, as opposed to Ml, contractionary shocks lead 
to lower output and to a positive price level response. Hence, while the output puzzle 
disappears, a price puzzle emerges instead. Sims (1992) shows that the price puzzle is 
present not only in the US but also in France, Germany, Japan and the UK. The price 
puzzle becomes smaller but not in all cases disappears, when inflation-sensitive variables 
such as a commodity price index and nominal exchange rate are included in the system. 
VAR studies have been generally criticised in that they focus on the effect of monetary 
policy shocks that are by construction unrelated to the endogenous policy responses to the 
state of the economy. They also fail to incorporate forward-looking behaviour in the policy 
feedback rule (Walsh, 1998). 
From a theoretical perspective the issue of whether monetary conditions matter for 
real economic prospects is one of the oldest in economics. Its origins lay in the quantity 
theory of money, an identity developed to illustrate the classical dichotomy - the idea that 
real variables in the economy, such as real interest rates, real wages, employment, and real 
output, are determined by real forces and that monetary forces only affect nominal 
quantities. Thus, in the classical model money is said to be neutral (money is a 'veil over 
barter' )6. Money neutrality is dependent on a number of conditions, such as price and wage 
flexibility, an absence of money illusion and an absence of distribution effects. These 
assumptions are most likely to be violated in the short-run, thus money does not exhibit 
short-run neutrality. This was acknowledged by the quantity theorists. As Patinkin (1987) 
argues, Hume recognised that prices do not rise proportionately to the increased quantity of 
money and that in the intervening period this stimulates production. 
While classical analysis had shown that money supply fluctuations may have real 
effects in the short run, in the 1960s and early 1970s the Keynesian/Monetarist debate was 
in full swing. On the one hand, according to the Keynesian view in some circumstances an 
increase in the nominal money stock will lead to increased money-hoarding reducing the 
velocity of money and the real impact of monetary policy shifts 7. In particular, when 
6 David Hume (1752), one of the best known exponents of the quantity theory and the Oong-run) neutrality of 
money, argued that wealth should be measured by the stock of commodities of a nation, not its stock of 
money: "... We may conclude that it is of no manner of consequence, with regard to the domestic happiness of 
a state, whether money be in greater or less quantity". 
7 In the Keynesian speculative version of liquidity preference the portfolio holdings of agents include either 
money or bonds (and not a combination of both assets) based upon their individual assessment of the 'normal' 
long-run interest rate. If they think that the present rate of interest is smaller than the normal rate, they will 
expect an interest rate increase which will decrease bond prices, and hence move out of bonds and into 
money. 
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nominal interest rates are close to zero, absolute liquidity preference may exist. In this case, 
there is a loss of monetary policy control because an increase in money supply will have 
only a very small negative effect or no effect at all on interest rates, due to consensus 
among bondholders that interest rates will rise in the future (liquidity trap). Hence, at very 
low interest rates monetary policy may be not effective in altering the cost of capital for 
firms and thereby the level of investment. However, this is the extreme position and in 
general most moderate Keynesians, while subordinating the role of monetary policy to 
maintaining low interest rates, would acknowledge some effect of a change in money on 
real output (although changes in the velocity will reduce the impact of such effects). 
On the other hand, Monetarists adopt a similar line to the classical economists and 
see increases in the money supply impinging mainly on output in the short-run and on 
prices in the long-run. In this sense, money stability via a rule for the growth rate of money 
supply 8 is important for long-run price stability but not for long-run real growth. Long-run 
output is determined by real factors such as the state of the technology, the stock of capital 
goods, and the size and quality of the labour force. The monetarist position is based on 
Friedman's (1956) restatement of the quantity theory of money as a theory of money 
demand. Friedman introduced the expected income stream or Permanent Income as a 
determinant of money demand. This generates a crucial difference with the Keynesian 
approach (where current income was the relevant variable) in that money demand will be 
less volatile because it will respond less to changes in transitory income. 
Friedman's version of money demand is quite similar to the quantity theory of 
money, the difference being that the velocity of money in the monetarist model is a stable 
function whereas in the classical model it is simply a numerical constant. Variations in 
money supply will have important short-run real effects since, following a monetary 
expansion, agents have money balances in surplus to their requirements. These excess 
money balances will be spent and hence aggregate demand will rise. According to the 
Pigou effect there is a direct wealth effect linking changes in real money balances to 
consumption spending (Patinkin, 1965). As Walsh (1998) argues, wealth effects can be 
8 As Friedman (1968, p. 16) argues, "My own prescription is still that the monetary authority go all way in 
avoiding such swings by adopting publicly the policy of achieving a specified rate of growth in a specified 
monetary total. The precise rate of growth, like the precise monetary total, is less important than the adoption 
of some stated and known rate". 
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incorporated by including real money balances or a broader measure of wealth (e. g. asset 
prices) in the aggregate demand9. 
The issue of whether money exhibits cyclicality with respect to output is crucial for 
the Monetarists and has been extensively investigated in numerous empirical studies. The 
evidence of Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Romer and Romer (1989), and Stock and 
Watson (1999) suggests that money supply is procyclical and leads the business cycle in 
the US. However, Fiorito and Kolintzas (1994) use G7 data and find that money does not 
have a clear-cut cyclical pattern. Also, as Benati (2001) demonstrates, band-passed filtered 
money may appear procyclical even when the money stock follows a random walk by 
construction. As Walsh (1998) argues, short-run dynamic correlations between money, 
inflation and output reflect both the private agents and the monetary authority's reaction to 
the same economic disturbances. Hence, these relationships are likely to vary both across 
time in a single country and across countries, due to variation in the sources of economic 
disturbances, and due to differences in policy implementation, respectively. The money- 
output correlation also depends on the measure that is employed for money supply. Walsh 
(1998) shows that the while for narrow money (MO) the correlation is positive at both leads 
and lags, a broader measure (M2) is positively correlated with real output at lags but 
negatively correlated at leads. 
In the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, the UK and US experimented with the 
monetarist idea of targeting monetary aggregates in order to control accelerating inflation. 
However, the instability of money demand and the unpredictability of the velocity of 
money in the 1980s, due e. g. to increased deregulation and advances in financial innovation 
that blurred the lines between what is money and what is not, led to the abandonment of the 
monetarist experiment in the UK and US10. Following the rational expectations revolution 
of the 1970s, the New Classical school of thought focused in the distinction between 
expected and unexpected variations in money. In the flexible price model of Lucas (1972) 
if there is imperfect information about the current money supply (agents face a signalling 
extraction problem) unexpected changes in the stock of money can generate short-run 
transitory movements in real output. In the context of the New Classical specification 
money neutrality holds only if there is no imperfectness on information. Luca's model 
heavily influenced the analysis of Sargent and Wallace (1975) which led to the 'policy 
9 We adopt this approach in the models of chapters 3-5 
10 See chapter 2, section 2.5 for a description of the evolution of UK monetary policy operating procedures. 
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irrelevance hypothesis'. According to it, any policy that creates predictable variations in the 
money supply will have no impact on the real economy. 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the development of real business cycle (RBC) 
analysis, as an outgrowth of the New Classical theory, focused explicitly on non-monetary 
factors as the driving forces behind business cycles (Kydland and Prescott, 1982). In the 
RBC framework, it is argued that shocks that affect technology, capital formation and 
labour productivity, as well as shocks that influence the availability and prices of natural 
resources can explain both short-run fluctuations in output and its long-run growth path. As 
King and Plosser (1984, p. 363) argue, fluctuations in real output and employment arise 
"from variations in the real opportunities of the private economy". Hence, contrary to the 
New Classical prediction, RBC theorists expect no impact from monetary surprises on the 
real economy. - 
Another important strand of the literature, the New Keynesian school of thought, 
started to emerge over the last several years incorporating the techniques of dynamic 
general equilibrium theory and the focus in microeconomic foundations which were key 
aspects of the RBC analysis. Thus, in these models agents optimize (acting in their own 
self-interest) and markets clear. A key difference between RBC and New Keynesian 
models involves the explicit incorporation of nominal price rigidities in the latter, providing 
the key friction that gives rise to the non-neutral short-run effects of monetary policy. The 
assumption of staggered nominal price setting in the spirit of Taylor (1980) and Calvo 
(1983) allows nominal product prices to ad ust incompletely to changes in the nominal 
quantity of money, increasing the impact of monetary disturbances on real output. As 
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999, p. 8) point out, "within the model, monetary policy affects 
the real economy in the short-run, much as in the traditional Keynesian IS-LM framework. 
A key difference however, is that the aggregate behavioural relationships evolve explicitly 
from optimization by households and firms". Other differences with earlier Keynesian 
models include the New Keynesian assumption of imperfect competition (as opposed to 
perfect competition) and the f6cus on nominal product price rigidity (as opposed to money 
wage rigidity) 11- 
11 Apart from the standard New Keynesian nominal price rigidities, other types of rigidities that received 
attention in recent literature include restrictions to financial transactions in the context of 'limited 
participation' models (see e. g. Lucas, 1990; Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992). These models, in order to 
generate effects from monetary injections on employment and real output, assume that there are limits in the 
ability of households to participate in financial markets. 
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The New Keynesian model, in its most basic form, consists of three equations. The 
demand side of the economy is represented by a forward looking IS curve, which is the 
linear approximation to the representative household's Euler condition for optimal 
consumption. The supply side of the economy is represented by a forward looking Phillips 
curve derived under the assumption of monopolistically competitive firms setting prices in 
a staggered, overlapping fashion. Monetary policy operates through a rule for setting the 
nominal interest rate according to deviations of inflation (or expected inflation) from the 
central bank's target, and deviations of output from its natural-rate (Taylor rule form). The 
rule is either exogenously specified or derived under certain assumptions for the central 
bank's preferences. Monetary policy actions attempt to ensure that the nominal anchor, 
usually specified in terms of inflation, is achieved with interest rate changes that affect 
inflation through ý their impact on aggregate demand. The focus on interest rate rules is 
prevalent nowadays given the demise of monetarism and difficulties faced by central banks 
that attempted to target money growth during the 1980s. Some of the issues have been 
raised about the use of interest rate rules in the New Keynesian model include the following 
(Arestis and Sawyer, 2003, p. 9): "the consensus neglects the possibility that interest rates 
are a cost to business that may be passed along to their customers. This simple model refers 
to a single interest rate, and the interdependence of the central bank interest rate and long 
term interest rates is an issue". In their view, the theory is relevant only for demand-driven 
inflationary pressures and does not offer guidance in the case of supply-side disturbances, 
such as oil shocks. 
One of its most important characteristics of the New Keynesian model is the 
absence of money from the system, reflecting the endogenous nature of money. In contrast 
to the standard textbook IS-LM analysis the New Keynesian money supply is not 
exogenously determined by the central bank but endogenously generated within the model. 
McCallum (2001a) demonstrates that it is possible to add to the new Keynesian model a 
(base) money demand relationship relating the stock of money to variables such as income 
and the rate of interest. However, such an equation would be redundant, since money would 
not affect the behaviour of inflation, real output and nominal interest rates. The only 
function of a money demand equation in such a framework would be to specify the amount 
of base money necessary for the implementation of the interest rate rule. Hence, as 
McCallum (2001 a, p. 145) argues, "it has recently become common practise ... for monetary 
policy analysis to be conducted in models that include no reference to any monetary 
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aggregate ... this general tendency is true of research conducted by both central bank and 
academic economists. " Money endogeneity is also central feature in the analysis of the Post 
Keynesian school of thought. The Post Keynesian endogenous (bank) money approach has 
a special interest in the process by which loans and deposits are created and destroyed, 
generating causal links between loan creation and investment spending' 2. 
The review of the literature suggests that both empirical evidence and state-of-the- 
art models for policy analysis are largely consistent with the existence of a transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy actions to the real economy. Hence, referring back to 
Patelis's (1997) statement, since monetary policy has real economic effects, the value of 
claims to future real output (stock price) should be influenced by monetary conditions. In 
the next section we present theoretical models that investigate the relationship between 
stock returns and monetary conditions. 
1.2.3 Theoretical models of money and stock prices 
In addition to the simple present value model reviewed in section 1.2.1, a variety of 
more elaborate models have been employed in the financial and monetary economics 
literature. These models fall into two general categories: utility maximising representative 
agent models, and structural macroeconomic models where the underlying relationships 
among variables are postulated rather than derived from micro foundations. We will focus 
on the first category, given the prevalence of the microfoundations-consistent models in the 
modem literature 13. 
A number of different approaches have been suggested in order to introduce money 
into a dynamic general equilibrium asset pricing framework. It is necessary to specify a role 
for money so that agents have positive money demand, and money is, in equilibrium, 
12 As Tchemeva (200 1, p. 113) points out, in Post Keynesian analysis "money emerges not spontaneously in 
order to lubricate markets, but rather because of the government's conscious efforts to generate a demand for 
its currency". The money supply depends on private sector activity; therefore is endogenously determined and 
cannot be controlled by the central bank. The central bank can only control short-tenn interest rates (e. g. 
federal funds rate). Post Keynesian accept that interest rates are determined not in the loanable funds market 
but by the demand for liquidity, adopting Keyne's (1936) liquidity preference theory. 
13 Sellin (2001) reviews various structural macroeconomic models that analyse the interaction between 
inflation and the stock market. For example, Lachler (1983) employs a neoclassical framework and shows that 
if the inflation tax is offset by a lower income tax, higher inflation increases real stock prices. 
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positively valued 14 . As Sellin (2001) argues, 
if money is not to be dominated by assets that 
pay interest, such as bonds, it must offer a non-pecuniary return greater than zero. The 
money-in-the-utility function (MrU) model assumes that real money balances enter (along 
with consumption) in the utility function of the representative agent (see e. g. Sidrauski, 
1967; Brock, 1974). Suitable restrictions on the utility function can then guarantee that, in 
15 
equilibrium, there a positive demand for money so that money has a positive value . 
Feenstra (1986) shows that this way of incorporating money balances in general 
equilibrium is equivalent to assuming that money facilitates consumption transactions. 
Bakshi and Chen (1996) adopt the MIU approach model in their theoretical asset 
pricing model (see also, LeRoy 1984; Danthine and Donaldson, 1986; Boyle, 1990 Stultz 
1986). They show that in an economy driven by random processes for output and money, 
where monetary policy has no impact of output and neither is policy accommodating to 
economic growth, the growth rate of real stock prices is equal to the growth rate of output. 
Another important result considers the correlation between real stock returns and money 
growth; it is positive (negative) if the correlation between money growth and output growth 
is positive (negative). Thus, the money growth-stock returns relationship depends on 
whether monetary policy is procyclical or countercyclical. If money supply is procyclical 
(countercyclical), it will be positively (negatively) correlated with stock returns. 
The MIU approach has been criticized on the grounds that it solves the problem of 
creating a positive value for money in general equilibrium, simply by assuming away the 
problem. An alternative approach in monetary economics employs transaction costs to 
produce positive demand for money. This happens due to asset exchanges being costly 
(Baumol, 1952; Tobin, 1956), or commodities barter being costly (Kiyotaki and Wright, 
1989), or due to the role of money in facilitating transactions (Clower, 1967). In Marshall's 
(1992) model agents hold money to reduce the cost of consumption transactions. In 
particular, Marshall assumes that the agent maximises the utility derived from 
consumption, subject to a budget constraint that is affected by the real cost of transactions. 
These transactions costs are negatively related to real money balances, and positively to 
14 As Walsh (1998, p. 41) argues, "this is just another way of saying that we would like the money price of 
goods to be bounded". Given a money price of goods equal to P, one unit of money will buy UP units of 
goods. If money has positive value, UP > 0, and P is bounded (0 <P <00). 
15 In the MIU approach the utility function of the representative agent takes the form: Q, = u(c, z), where, c, 
zt denote per-capita consumption and real money balances. Utility is increasing in both c, z, strictly concave 
and continuously differentiable. There is positive demand for money If JIM au / az = oo , 
for all c. 
z--). o 
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consumption. Marshall shows that in the presence of transaction costs, the Fisher 
hypothesis as applied to stocks does not hold since real returns and inflation are not 
independently determined 16 . His simulation results indicate that the transaction costs model 
can generate negative correlations between real stock returns and inflation, of the type 
observed using actual data (see e. g. Fama and Schwert, 1977; Fama, 198 1). 
Lucas (1982) suggests an alternative way to introduce money in a general 
equilibrium framework. In his model agents have to meet a cash in advance (CIA) 
constraint in order to purchase goods. In essence, the CIA approach reflects the role of 
money as a medium of exchange by requiring that agents use money (that has been 
obtained before the goods market opens) to buy consumption or investment goods (see also 
Clower, 1967). Boyle and Peterson (1995) extend the framework of Lucas to answer the 
question whethermonetary policy, as opposed to money itself, matters for real output and 
asset pricing. They focus on this distinction by arguing that money growth variation may be 
due to the monetary authority following or changing a particular monetary policy, or it may 
be due to changes in the precision with which a given policy is implemented. In their model 
the monetary authority follows a policy of altering the growth rate of money in response to 
the realisation of the real state of the economy. The monetary policy reaction function 
targets money growth rates, as opposed to levels, to allow for serial correlation in the 
money supply. Also, following Walsh (1984) they allow for imperfect monetary policy 
implementation via adding exogenous disturbances to the money stock. A central result in 
Boyle and Peterson (1995) is that the stock returns-inflation correlation depends on 
monetary policy. If policy is strongly procyclical, equity returns and inflation are positively 
correlated. But if policy is weakly procyclical or countercyclical the stock returns-inflation 
correlation will be negative, thereby providing a formalisation of the explanation for the 
empirical findings in Geske and Roll (1983) and Kaul (1987). 
As Boyle and Young (1999) point out, there is a link between monetary policy and 
stock prices since by altering the supply of money in response to real conditions the 
monetary authority affects both the average level and the volatility of future real equity 
dividends. Hence, changes in macroeconomic uncertainty affect the stock market not only 
by changing the required rate of return on stock, but also through their effect on expected 
16 Marshall finds that the expected excess stock return is more likely to covary negatively with expected 
inflation, if inflation innovations are due to output shocks rather than money shocks. This mechan'sm works 
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future dividends. Boyle and Young (1999) compare the effects of two alternative monetary 
policy rules, inflation target as opposed to money growth target, on aggregate wealth. They 
employ a general equilibrium framework augmented by CU constraint and show that the 
real stock price is higher under the inflation rule if and only if the agents' intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution is sufficiently low. This is due to the fact that the lower the 
elasticity of substitution, the investors are more averse to volatility in expected dividends. 
The inflation target rule by neutralising the effect of real disturbances in expected dividends 
generates lower fluctuations in the future real dividend stream than does the money rule; 
hence, it is preferred by risk-averse investors. 
Summarising the theoretical studies, it appears that the empirical finding of a 
negative relationship between money growth/inflation and real stock returns can be 
explained in the context of microfoundations-consistent models. This result is robust to the 
manner via which money is introduced in general equilibrium. Several of the theoretical 
models also indicate that the sign of the correlation between monetary conditions, inflation 
and stock returns depends on whether monetary policy is procyclical or countercyclical. We 
continue by discussing existing econometric evidence on the effect of monetary policy on 
stock market returns. 
1.2.4 Stock return predictability and monetary policy 
Early empirical evidence from the 1960's and 1970s suggests that past money 
supply data has important information for the predictability of stock returns (see e. g. 
Sprinkel, 1964; Homa and Jaffee, 197 1; Hamburger and Kochin, 1972). Such findings were 
against the efficient markets hypothesis, which states that current stock prices should reflect 
all available information, including past money supply data. Research that followed, 
however, seemed to contradict the previous evidence since it showed that past changes in 
money supply have no predictive ability for stock returns, but there could be a reverse 
causality -in Granger sense- from stock returns to changes in money (see e. g. Cooper, 1974; 
Pesando 1974). Rozeff (1974) stressed the importance of allowing for a publication lag of 
money supply data and ascertaining precisely when the information becomes publicly 
through the effect of output shocks on the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, inflation, and the real 
return to money. 
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available, in order to provide an explanation for the contradictions with previous findings 17 . 
Rogalski and Vinso (1977) extended Rozeff s approach by organising the data so that the 
money supply data were generated at intervals that were the same as those for the stock 
return data and also by taking into account the data autocorrelation. In agreement with 
Rozeff, Rogalski and Vinso (1977, p. 1029) find that "causality does not appear to go 
from money supply to stock prices but rather from stock prices to money supply". 
As Sellin (2001) argues, in the aforementioned studies, it is not clear whether the 
money stocks data reflect exogenous money supply, as suggested by the authors, or demand 
for money. The results of the early empirical studies may be difficult to interpret, if velocity 
varies over time and is related to changes in stock prices. Indeed, Friedman (1988) shows 
that while real demand for money relative to income is negatively related to concurrent 
stock prices (both nominal and real), it is positively related to the 3-quarters lagged stock 
prices. According to Friedman, the negative contemporaneous relationship between stock 
prices and monetary velocity may be explained by three factors: a wealth effect, a risk- 
spreading effect, and a transactions effect. According to the first explanation, an increase in 
stock prices leads to higher nominal wealth increasing the wealth to income ratio, which 
should be reflected in higher money to income ratio and hence lower velocity (wealth 
effect). The second explanation notes that higher stock prices and excess returns on stocks 
may be associated with higher risk, inducing investors to shift to lower risk assets, like 
money, and thereby increasing the money to income ratio (risk-spreading effect). The third 
explanation states that higher stock prices should imply a higher money volume of 
transactions, which would require increased money balances (transactions effect). Friedman 
also argues that these three effects may be partially offsetted by a contemporaneous 
substitution effect: if real stock prices increase, stocks will be more attractive in a portfolio 
and should be substituted for money, decreasing the money to income ratio. 
Due to problems with money endogeneity, a number of empirical studies has 
focused on the 'announcement effect' using an event-study approach, which looks at the 
stock market effects immediately after a monetary policy announcement using high 
17 Rozeff (1974) tested the efficient markets hypothesis against the monetary portfolio model, which was 
developed by Brunner (1961) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963) among others. According to the monetary 
portfolio model, asset holders view money as another asset in their portfolios. If the monetary authority 
follows expansionary policy and increases the money supply, investors will be wiling to exchange money for 
a variety of other assets, e. g. stocks, in order to restore their desired money holdings. This increases the 
demand for stocks and thus stock prices. If investors respond with a lag, this implies that money can predict 
future stock returns. 
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frequency (daily and/or weekly) survey data. In these studies, changes in monetary 
conditions are decomposed into expected and unexpected components using survey data as 
a measure of the market's expectations. According to the efficient markets hypothesis, 
stock prices should react only to the unexpected component of any announcement, since the 
expected part should already be embedded in the stock price. The studies of Comell (1983), 
Pearce and Rolley (1983,1985), Hardouvelis (1987), and McQueen and Rolley (1993) use 
US data and all report that unanticipated increases in money supply announcements exert a 
significant negative impact on stock prices. They also find that the estimated effect does not 
differ across monetary policy regimes. 
Cornell (1983) discusses several different hypotheses that attempt to explain how 
unexpected money supply expansion may negatively affect stock prices. The expected 
inflation hypothesis suggests that an unexpected rise in money supply increases market 
participants' expectations of future inflation leading to higher short-term interest rate' 8. As 
a result, expected cash flows decrease and the rate at which these cash flows are discounted 
increases, leading to lower stock prices. The policy anticipation hypothesis argues that 
since the price level doesn't respond to a monetary shock in the short-run, higher than 
expected money stock leads agents to anticipate higher interest rates to equilibrate the 
money market. Hence, stock prices will decline. Another hypothesis related to monetary 
policy changes is the risk premium hypothesis. An unanticipated increase in the money 
stock adds pressure on the central bank to 'do something'. This generates higher 
uncertainty about future policy, increasing risk premiums and decreasing stock prices. 
Cornell (1983) also pointed out that there may be a positive stock market effect from 
unexpected increases in money supply. According to real activity hypothesis, higher than 
expected money supply signals information about higher future money demand 
(accommodated by the central bank) caused by higher expected output. Higher expected 
output implies higher expected cash flows, which cause stock prices to increase. 
The aforementioned event studies that use the money supply (MI) as a measure of 
monetary policy find a negative effect from unexpected monetary easing on stock returns. 
Completely opposite conclusions, though, are reached when monetary policy is measured 
by the change in an instrument interest rate. In particular, unexpected increases in the 
discount rate (monetary policy tightening) lead to lower stock prices (see e. g. Hardouvelis, 
18 A positive response of the short term interest rate to higher expected inflation is consistent with the Fisher 
hypothesis, as well as a forward-looking Taylor rule reaction function. 
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1987; Sellin, 1997). Guo (2002), and Bernanke and Kuttner (2003) use data from the 
federal funds futures market to infer investor's expectations about the target to be set for 
the federal funds rate. Bemanke and Kuttner (2003) find that unexpected funds rate 
increases lead to a decline in stock prices. They argue that the impact of monetary surprises 
on stock prices seems to derive mainly from their effect on expected future dividends and 
excess returns. Tight money may increase the equity risk premium, either directly (by 
increasing interest costs and weakening balance sheets of publicly owned firms), or 
indirectly by increasing investors' risk aversion (e. g. by reducing expected income or 
increasing the probability of unemployment). Their evidence indicates a stronger stock 
market response to policy changes that are perceived as relatively more permanent, and to 
reversals in the direction of federal funds rate movements. They find that the reactions 
differ considerably across industries, with high-tech and telecommunication sectors being 
strongly affected by monetary policy, while energy and utilities seem not to be affected. 
Guo's (2002) evidence suggests that unanticipated target rate increases have 
significant effect on the price of size-sorted portfolios. He finds that while small stocks in 
the 1970s were more sensitive to monetary innovations (as compared to large stocks) this 
pattern does not persist in the 1990s. Given that the 1970s were a period of global 
economic downturn and the 1990s were marked by a large economic expansion, Guo 
(2002, p. 16) notes that "our results provide support to a credit channel of monetary 
transmission - small firms are more likely to be credit constrained than large firms in 
economic downturns, but not in economic expansions". Thorbecke (1997) extends the daily 
dataset of Cook and Hahn (1989) and finds that including utilities and transportation stocks 
in the calculation of the broad stock market index reduces the magnitude of the coefficient 
relating monetary policy to stock returns. This reflects the fact that the impact of discount 
rate changes on such stocks in the US market is rather small. 
In addition to the event-study, Thorbecke (1997) employed a number of alternative 
methodologies to examine the relationship between monetary policy and stock prices. 
Using a VAR system, he finds that monetary policy shocks, measured by orthogonalized 
innovations in the federal funds rate, have a greater impact on smaller stocks, which is in 
line with the hypothesis that monetary policy affects firms' access to credit19 (Gertler and 
" The variables in the VAR are the growth rate of industrial production, the inflation rate, the log of a 
commodity price index, the federal funds rate, the log of non-borrowed reserves, the 
log of total reserves, and 
stock returns. 
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Gilchrist, 1993). VARs have been frequently applied in empirical literature to test for 
Granger causality between monetary policy and stock prices and to examine the dynamic 
response of the stock market to a monetary policy shock using impulse response functions 
and variance decompositions. In order to identify the structural parameters from the VAR 
estimates, Thorecke (1997) uses the Choleski identification scheme placing equity returns 
at the last position of the chain order. This is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis 
since it assumes that the stock market reacts sensitively to shocks in macroeconomic 
variables (see e. g. Chen, Roll and Ross, 1986). Alternative identification schemes include 
Rigobon and Sacks' (2003) approach. They argue that their identification method, which 
relies on the heteroskedasticity of stock returns and interest rates over time, avoids the 
simultaneity problem of stock market returns and interest rates responding 
contemporaneously to each other 20 (see also Bohl, Siklos and Werner, 2004). 
Thorbecke (1997) adopts the Boschen and Mills' (1995) index as an alternative 
measure of monetary policy conditions. This index uses a five category classification of the 
monetary policy stance (from strongly anti-inflationary to strongly pro-growth) and is 
based on the Federal Open Market Committee records and other relevant information. In 
line with his VAR estimates, Thorbecke finds that expansionary monetary policy exerts a 
large and statistically significant positive effect on monthly stock. He concludes that (p. 
61): 64 ... evidence that positive monetary shocks increase stock returns indicates that 
expansionary monetary policy exerts real effects by increasing future cash flows or by 
decreasing the discount factors at which those cash flows are capitalised ... these findings 
are consistent with the hypothesis that monetary policy, at least in the short-run, has real 
and quantitatively important effects on real variables". 
Patelis (1997) examined whether some portion of the observed predictability in 
excess stock returns can be attributed to shifts in the monetary policy stance. Following 
Fama and French 21 (1989), he employed the long-horizon regression methodology, using 
two sets of explanatory variables: monetary policy variables and financial variables. The 
monetary policy variables are the federal funds rate, the spread between the federal funds 
rate and the 10-year Treasury bond, the (default) spread between the return on 6-month 
commercial paper and 6-month Treasury Bills, the quantity of non-borrowed reserves, and 
2' A crucial assumption in this approach is that the central bank raises interest rates in response to higher stock 
market returns. As we will see in chapters 4 and 5, the theoretical literature has mixed views on this subject. 
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the portion of non-borrowed reserve growth orthogonal to total reserve growth. The 
financial variables are the dividend yield, the (term) spread between the 10-year Treasury 
bond and the I-month Treasury bill, and the I-month real interest rate. He finds that 
monetary policy variables are significant predictors of future returns, although they cannot 
account fully for the observed stock return predictability. As he points out (p. 11), "there is 
predictive power in the financial variables that is independent of the predictive power of the 
monetary variables, and vice versa". His results are also consistent with Fama and French 
(1989), in that there is increased predictability at longer horizons. 
Patelis' explanation for the finding that monetary policy indicators are significant 
predictors of excess stock returns relates to the financial propagation mechanism (Bemanke 
and Gertler, 1989) and to the credit channel of monetary policy transmission (Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1995). Both theories assume that monetary policy shocks are propagated depending 
on the financial health of the firms in the economy. Shocks to firms' balance sheets are 
amplified by the financial propagation mechanism through endogenous changes in the 
agency costs of lending, and the spread between external and internal finance. The credit 
channel incorporates both the balance sheet channel mentioned above (broad credit 
channel), and the bank lending channel (narrow credit channel), whereby a monetary policy 
shock leads to a reduced and costlier bank-loan supply. Hence, firms' responses to 
macroeconomic shocks will be state-dependent. A monetary policy shock during a easy 
money period has smaller effects than one during tight money periods, since the financial 
health of firms has already improved due to higher balance-sheet income (and thus smaller 
dependence on costlier external finance), and increased bank loan supply. 
Jensen and Johnson (1995) also find that monetary policy developments are 
associated with stock returns patterns. In particular, they show that long-term stock returns 
following discount rate decreases are higher and less volatile than returns following rate 
increases. Their motivation for the employment of the discount rate as a proxy for the 
stance of monetary policy follows from the view that the discount is typically regarded as a 
signal of monetary and possibly economic developments. This argument is based on 
Waud's (1970) suggestion that discount rate changes affect market participants' 
expectations about monetary policy because rate changes are made only at substantial 
intervals, they represent a somewhat discontinuous instrument of monetary policy, and they 
21 Fama and French (1989) regress stock returns at increasing time horizons on the dividend yield, the default 
spread and the term spread. They find that predictability increases with the time horizon. 
26 
are established by a public body perceived as being competent in judging the economy's 
cash and credit needs. Financial economists discuss various reasons why changes in the 
discount rate may affect stock returns. For example, discrete policy rate changes influence 
forecasts of market determined interest rates and the equity cost of capital. Also, changes in 
the discount rate possibly affect expectations of corporate profitability (Waud, 1970). 
In a subsequent study, Jensen, Mercer and Johnson (1996) extend Fama and 
French's (1989) analysis by suggesting that the monetary environment affects investors' 
required returns. Monetary policy stance is proxied by a binary dummy variable indicating 
discount rate changes. Jensen et al. (1996) find that predictable variation in stock returns 
depends on monetary as well as business conditions, with expected stock returns being 
higher in tight money periods than in easy money periods. The results also indicate an 
asymmetry in the relation between business conditions and stock returns: business 
conditions could predict future stock returns only in periods of expansive monetary policy. 
During restrictive periods, the three business proxies (term spread, dividend yield, default 
spread) possess little explanatory power for expected stock returns. 
Booth and Booth (1997) adopt the Jensen et al. (1996) methodology including an 
additional proxy for the stance of the monetary authority, the federal funds rate, and 
examining portfolios of small and large US stocks to determine whether the results are size- 
dependent. Their findings indicate that monetary policy indicators contain significant 
information that can be used to forecast expected stock (both small and large) portfolio 
returns. However, the result of Jensen et al. that only during restrictive monetary 
environments do the business conditions proxies have explanatory power for stocks is not 
confirmed by Booth and Booth. This is attributed to differences in the definitions of 
business conditions proxies and to differences in the stock and bond portfolios employed. 
Conover, Jensen and Johnson (1999) argue that not only US stock returns, but also 
returns on foreign markets are related with US monetary environments (as well as their 
local monetary environment). They find that stock returns in twelve OECD countries over 
the period 1956-1995 are generally higher in expansive US and local monetary 
environments than they are in restrictive environments. As in Jensen and Johnson (1995) 
and Jensen et al. (1996), the monetary policy proxy used by Conover et al. (1999) is a 
dummy variable based on discount rate changes. Jensen et al. (1996) show that this 
categorisation of monetary regimes differentiates effectively US monetary conditions. They 
employ parametric and non-parametric tests and demonstrate that there are significant 
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differences, in magnitude and frequency, between the levels as well as changes of several 
macroeconomic variables (monetary aggregates, credit, excess reserves, federal funds 
22 
premium across the defined environments - 
Thus to summarize, while early evidence is ambiguous as to the role of monetary 
policy for stock return predictability, more recent studies provide strong evidence 
suggesting that monetary easing (tightening) increases (decreases) stock returns. As Sellin 
points out, the problem inherent in early analyses is that no distinction is made between 
shocks to the supply and demand for money. Following the recent literature, in the next 
section we examine empirically the effect of changes in monetary stringency on 
international stock returns using interest rate policy indicators. 
1.3 Empirical evidence on monetary policy and stock returns 
1.3.1 Data description, monetary policy proxies & unit root tests 
We employ monthly stock prices and interest rates data from thirteen countries over 
the period January 1972 to July 2002. The data are obtained from OECD's Main Economic 
Indicators: Historical Statistics. Our sample of advanced economies, includes the G7 
(United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, France, Italy and Canada), and other 
European economies: Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands, Spain. Out of 
the nine European Union sample countries: Germany, France, Italy, Finland, Belgium, 
Netherlands, Spain, UK, Sweden, the first seven have adopted the single European currency 
(Euro) in the context of the European Monetary Union (EMU). 
Table 1. La presents summary statistics for monthly nominal stock returns over the 
thirty year sample period. The mean monthly stock return for Sweden, Finland, and France 
is the highest while it is the lowest for Japan, Belgium, Germany, and Canada. The standard 
deviation of returns is the highest for Italy, Finland, and UK while it is the lowest for the 
US, Belgium, and Canada. The Jarque-Bera test for normality indicates that stock returns 
are non-normally distributed. Non-normality is a typical feature of stock returns data, 
especially in higher frequencies, potentially leading to problems with hypothesis testing 
22 Note that as Conover et al. (1999) argue, while this method for monetary regime classification effectively 
differentiates monetary conditions, the procedure is not advocated as the best technique of identifying minor 
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based on reported probability statistics from regression analysis. The non-normality of 
stock returns will be accounted for, through bootstrap analysis. 
Table 1.1a: Descriptive statistics for nominal stock returns, 1972.02 - 2002.07. 
us UK Japan France Germany Canada Italv 
Mean 0.62 0.63 0.41 0.69 0.48 0.48 0.67 
Maximum 13.46 42.31 16.68 24.44 16.70 13.33 26.25 
Minimum -26.41 -30.92 -22.83 -28.07 -25.21 -25.65 -22.39 
Std. Dev. 4.57 6.04 5.16 6.03 5.33 4.92 7.17 
Normality (JB) 
239.01 1061.84 42.79 171.09 110.16 257.68 8.87 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.0001 [0.000] [0.000] [0.0001 [0.01] 
Correlation 1 0.61 0.36 0.44 0.50 0.74 0.31 
with US return 
Belgium Netherlands Finland Sweden Spain Switzerland 
Mean 0.42 0.62 0.92 0.98 0.53 0.50 
Maximum 14.84 18.09 26.16 24.24 22.82 16.88 
Minimum -28.05 -26.58 -31.84 -24.28 -26.74 -26.30 
Std. Dev. 4.64 4.99 6.76 5.94 5.68 4.94 
375.11 192.02 80.87 49.16 41.71 407.91 Normality (JB) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Correlation 0.35 0.64 0.09 0.48 0.31 0.61 
with US return 
Note: 
(a) Monthly nominal stock returns measured in local currency terms as the first difference of the logarithm of the 
local stock price index. 
(b) JB denotes the value of the Jarque-Bera normality test (probability shown in bracket below). 
We also calculate the correlation coefficient of local stock returns with US stock 
returns. The correlation is positive for all countries and exceeds 40% for Canada, 
Netherlands, UK, Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, and France. The correlation is less than 
40% for Japan, Belgium, Italy, Spain, and Finland. The emerging high degree of 
correlation between international equity markets is a relatively recent phenomenon. As 
Brooks and Del Negro (2002) argue, the monthly correlation coefficient of US stock returns 
with stock returns in other developed economies has risen from a relatively stable level of 
around 0.4 from the mid-1980s through the mid-1990s to close to 0.9 more recently. 
Several explanations have been suggested, including the increasing level of diversification 
of firms' sales and financing across countries that exposes firms, more than before, to the 
changes in the stringency of monetary policy. 
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global business cycle, causing national stock markets to move together more. Another 
explanation for the rise in comovement since the mid-1990s is that it simply a temporary 
phenomenon associated with the recent stock market bubble. Finally, additional reasons 
include the convergence in industrial composition and greater policy coordination across 
countries, or simply that country specific shocks have declined in importance (Brooks and 
Del Negro, 2002). The high degree of international correlation is another feature of stock 
returns data that will be taken into account in the empirical estimations. 
Table 1.1b: Descriptive statistics for short-term interest rates, 1972.01 - 2002.07. 
us UK Japan France Germany Canada Italy 
Mean 6.65 9.23 2.64 8.46 5.95 8.31 11.62 
Maximum 15.92 16.27 6.00 18.92 13.60 20.82 22.08 
Minimum 1.67 3.78 0.01 2.46 2.58 1.97 2.45 
Std. Dev. 2.76 3.20 1.69 3.52 2.52 3.58 4.65 
90.61 17.59 16.74 6.74 59.44 37.58 6.65 Normality (JB) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.033] [0.000] [0.000] [0.035] 
Correlation 1 0.72 0.50 0.69 0.51 0.86 0.6 
with US rate 
Belgium Netherlands Finland Sweden Spain Switzerland 
Mean 8.38 6.01 7.73 7.50 11.06 9.01 
Maximum 17.60 14.00 9.50 12.00 32.17 20.13 
Minimum 3.03 0.70 3.50 2.00 3.00 2.00 
Std. Dev. 3.42 2.49 1.74 2.43 5.15 3.51 
Normality (JB) 
18.43 
[0.000] 
19.31 
[0.000] 
42.25 
[0.000] 
8.18 
[0.016] 
98.33 
[0.000] 
13.21 
[0.001] 
Correlation 
with US rate 
0.71 0.57 0.51 0.56 0.44 0.46 
Note: 
(a) Descriptive statistics for local 3 month Treasury Bill Rates. 
(b) JB denotes the value of the Jarque-Bera normality test (probability shown in the bracket below). 
Table 1. Lb presents summary statistics for short-term interest rates. From the early 
1990's researchers and policy makers focused mainly on interest rate variables and spreads 
as indicators of monetary policy. The change in the short-term interest rate is one of our 
measures for the stance of the monetary authority. Short-term interest rates are proxied by 
the three month Treasury Bill JB) rate (see also, Nelson, 2000; Martin and Milas, 2002). 
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TB rates are highly correlated with the central bank interest rate instrumentS23. In Euro- 
members, national monetary policies were abolished on December 1998. Thereafter, 
common monetary policy is implemented by the European Central Bank (ECB) through 
changes in the ECB refinancing rate. Local TB rates reflect the single ECB interest rate 
plus local market risk. Over the period 1999.01-2002.07, the correlation between the local 
three month TB rate and the ECB refinancing rate is equal to 0.84,0.89,0.97,0.97,0.98, 
0.97ý 0.99 in Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Spain, 
respectively. 
The average short tem interest rate is the highest for Italy, Spain, and UK while it is 
the lowest for Japan, Germany, and Netherlands. The volatility of short-term rates is 
substantially lower than the equity return volatility. Interest rate standard deviations obtain 
values in the neighbourhood of 2% to 5%, while the equity return standard deviations range 
from 4% to 7%. The standard deviation of short-term rates is the highest for Spain, Italy, 
and Canada while it is the lowest for Japan, Finland, and Sweden. The average standard 
deviation of sample short-term interest rates is almost two times smaller than the average 
standard deviation of stock returns (2.85% as opposed to 5.55%), reflecting the higher risk 
associated with stock market investment. The Jarque-Bera test shows that, similarly to 
stock returns, interest rates are non-normal variables. The correlation between local short- 
term rates and US rates is the highest for Canada, UK and Belgium (see also Conover et al., 
1999). In contrast, the correlation coefficient with the US rate is the lowest for Spain and 
Switzerland. The results in Tables Lla and Llb suggest that our sample exhibits a high 
degree of diversity with respect to average stock market performance and monetary policy, 
and their unconditional volatilities. Foreign stock market returns and short term interest 
rates are positively correlated with their US counterparts, but their correlations range 
substantially across the sample. 
We also employ an alternative proxy for the stance of the monetary authority, that 
is, a binary dummy variable based upon changes in the discount rate constructed according 
to Jensen et al. (1996) approach. Unlike the TB rate, the discount rate is not market 
determined but administered by the central bank 24 . The discount rate dummy variable is 
23 Table Al. 1 in Appendix I shows that the correlation coefficient between three month TB rates and central 
bank discount rates over the period 1972-2002 is close to one (except from Switzerland where it is 0.58). 
2' As Arestis and Sawyer (2003) argue, the discount rate is the rate of interest at which the central bank is 
willing to supply reserves to the financial system and Is used to cover rates such as the federal funds rate in 
the US, the repo rate (ECB) etc. 
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equal to one if the previous discount rate change was an increase (restrictive monetary 
policy) and zero (expansive monetary policy) if the previous change was a decrease. The 
dummy variable relies on discount rate changes, which, as Conover et al. (1999, p. 1360) 
argue "are likely to correspond with changes in the monetary environment as well as 
changes in business and economic conditions". The monetary environment classification 
remains the same until the discount rate is changed in the opposite direction, since the 
central bank is assumed to be operating under the same fundamental monetary policy until 
the discount rate is changed in the opposite direction from the prevailing trend. For 
example, the period following a discount rate decrease is classified as expansive. Further 
discount rate decreases do not alter the classification of the monetary environment. 
Likewise, restrictive monetary environments begin when the discount rate first increases 
and end when the discount rate is decreased. The initial categorisation of monetary 
25 environments cannot begin until there is a change in the discount rate 
Following the Jensen et al. (1996) approach, we exclude months when the discount 
rate was pegged to a market rate than being set by the central bank itself This results in 
elimination of data for Canada from March 1980 to December 1993 26 . Local discount rate 
data for Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Italy (Euro, members) is available up till 
December 1998; over the rest of the sample period (1999.01-2002.07), we use the ECB 
refinancing rate as a proxy for the Euro-members discount rate. Figure 1.1 shows graphs of 
the local discount rate, and the local discount rate dummy variable. The graphs indicate that 
interest rates have been declining over the 1990s, reflecting the lower average inflation 
rates experienced over that period. 
Table 1.2 presents descriptive statistics for monetary environments, defined using 
the discount rate dummy variable. The number of expansive and restrictive periods varies 
substantially from country to country implying a disparity in how actively discount rates 
were used by the sample central banks. In the United Kingdom there were 19 expansive and 
14 restrictive periods, while in Japan we document only 4 periods of expansive and 3 
periods of restrictive monetary PoliCY17 . 
The average duration of the monetary 
environments varies significantly, with Japan reporting the highest average duration of 
25 For example, the first change in the discount rate for Sweden, and hence the first characterisation of the 
monetary environment, occurs in April 1974. 
26 Spain and Netherlands are also excluded from the empirical analysis using the discount rate dummy 
variable, due to the lack of adequate number of discount rate observations in the Datastream series. 
27 See Table Al .2 in Appendix 
I for more details on the chronology of discount rate changes. 
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Figure 1.1: Graphs of discount rates and discount rate dummy variables. 
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Note: The UK series has been constructed using the Bank Rate (1972.01-1972.09), the Minimum 
Lending Rate (1972.10-1981.07), the Minimum Band I Dealing Rate (1981.08-1997.04), and the 
Repo Rate (1997.05-2002.07). 
expansive periods (74 months) and Germany the highest average duration of restrictive 
periods (32 months). Switzerland also has long expansive monetary periods, while Finland 
and UK have about the same mean duration for restrictive and expansive periods. The 
United States experienced 7 expansive and 7 restrictive monetary policy periods, giving a 
total of 195 expansive and 146 restrictive months, respectively. 
Table 1.2 also shows summary statistics for the average monthly real stock returns 
across monetary environments. It appears that in all sample countries, stock returns are 
lower during periods of restrictive monetary policy. The average real equity return during 
expansive periods is positive, ranging from 0.39% per month in Japan to 1.77% in Finland. 
On the other hand, during periods of tighter monetary policy the average return on stocks is 
negative. Tables 1.3a and 1.3b present the results from Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root 
tests with an intercept (ADF), and intercept plus deterministic linear trend (ADF trend). 
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European Central Bank 
Following Fountas et al. (2000), a sensitivity test is performed for the order of 
augmentation, by estimating the ADF regressions with both a small (LB = 4) and a large 
(UB = 24) number of lagged difference terms. In addition, we calculate the ADF t-statistic 
for the order of augmentation chosen by the Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC). Overall, 
the results suggest that, over the period 1972-2002, nominal stock returns and the first 
difference of short-term interest rates can be treated as stationary variables in all sample 
28 countries 
In the next section, we expand on the literature that examines the contemporaneous 
relationship between monetary policy and stock returns by utilising a more up-to-date 
dataset, by checking the robustness of the empirical findings to inclusion of dividend 
payments in stock returns, and by taking into account the non-normality inherent in our 
data as well as the significant co movement of international stock markets. 
28 Tables Al. 3a, Al. 3b and Al. 3c in Appendix I show ADF unit root test results for real stock returns and 
dividend adjusted (nominal and real) stock returns. The results broadly support the notion that stock returns 
are stationary in real and dividend ad usted terms. Ii 
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1.3.2 Monetary conditions and stock returns 
(a) Nominal stock returns 
The contemporaneous relationship between monetary conditions and stock returns 
is examined using the following regression model: 
AS, =a+, 8Ai, + u, (1.2) 
where, AS, is the local monthly nominal stock return, S, is the local share price index 
measured in local currency terms, and Ait is the change of the local short-term interest rate. 
It is assumed that positive (negative) values of the change of the short-term rate are 
associated with a restrictive (expansive) monetary environment. If the 8 coefficient is 
negative and statistically significant, then it is implied that monetary tightening depresses 
the stock market within the same month that the interest rates increase(s) occurred. 
Eq. (1.2) has been frequently used in the financial economics literature with 
previous international evidence broadly supporting a negative relationship between stock 
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returns between (the level and/or the first difference of) interest rates . Eq. (1.2) is 
estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) using the Newey-West heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix estimator. In Table 1.4, the estimated 
intercepts are all positive and the majority of them statistically significant at the 
conventional significance levels, reflecting the generally positive average returns associated 
with stock market investment. The F statistic indicates acceptance of the null of joint 
(explanatory variable) insignificance only in the cases of Finland, Japan, Spain and 
Switzerland. Ten of the thirteen coefficient estimates for local monetary conditions are 
negative and statistically different from zero at conventional significance levels, indicating 
that higher interest rates are associated with lower stock returns than the returns 
experienced during periods of lower interest rates. 
29 In the literature that examines the effect of inflation on stock prices, using a generalised Fisher effect 
framework (which relates nominal stock returns with expected inflation), expected inflation is often proxied 
by the nominal Treasury Bill rate at the beginning of the period, see e. g. Fama and Schwert (1977), Gultekin 
(1983). Fama and Schwert justify this approach by observing that almost all of the variability in the nominal 
TB rate is due to revisions of inflation expectations. This approach is extensively justified in Fama (1975). 
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Table 1.4: Regressions of nominal stock returns against the change in the short-term interest rate, 
1972.02 - 2002.07. 
Country a P F JB R2, 
Belgium 
0.423 -1.212 8.93 483.02 0.031 
(1.764) (3.642) [0.038] [0.000] 
Canada 
0.483 * -1.654 *** 15.55 440.62 0 04 (1.919) (2.923) [0.0001 [0.000] . 
Finland 
0.915 *** -0.768 0.27 81.74 0 001 (2.59) (0.509) [0.6011 [0.0001 . 
France 
0.689 ** -2.338 *** 15.42 157.06 0 04 (2.226) (3.032) [0.000] [0.000] . 
Germany 0.474 * - 1.471 * 4.71 109.86 0.01 (1.709) (1.928) [0.03] [0.0001 
Italy 
0.574 -1.363 ** 6.52 14.12 0.01 (1.502) (2.283) [0.011] [0.000] 
Japan 
0.396 -1.781 2.16 38.36 0.006 (1.328) (1.327) [0.14] [0.000] 
Netherlands 
0.626 ** -0.855 ** 4.07 207.68 0 011 (2.411) (2.251) [0.04] [0.000] . 
Spain 
0.534 * 0.114 1.00 43.02 
0.002 (1.799) (0.99) [0.316] [0.000] 
Sweden 
0.967 *** -1.63 ** 4.34 81.46 0 011 
(3.125) (2.286) [0.037] [0.000] . 
Switzerland 
0.501 * -0.432 2.38 409.61 0 006 (1.94) (1.95) [0.123] [0.000] . 
United Kingdom 
0.631 ** -2.581 *** 34.88 1347.43 0.08 
(2.087) (5.406) [0.000] [0.000] 
United States 
0.616 *** -0.859 ** 4.51 352.96 0 01 (2.599) (2.302) [0.0341 [0.000] . 
Note: 
(a) OLS estimates, with Newey-West heteroskedasti city and serial correlation consistent covariance 
matrix estimator, of the regression equation AS, =a+ flAit + u, where AS, is the monthly nominal stock 
return and Ai, is the change of the short-term interest rate. 
(b) Absolute t-statistics are presented in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates. 
(c) JB denotes the value of the Jarque-Bera non-nality test. The associated probability is shown in the 
bracket below. 
(d) ***, **, * denote the 1,5, and 10 percent level of significance respectively. 
Some of the largest return differences are observed in the UK, France, Canada, and 
Italy. On an annualized basis, the returns in expansive monetary environments exceeded the 
returns in restrictive environments for these countries by approximately 31%, 28%, 20%, 
and 16%, respectively. These differences exceed the difference of approximately 10% 
exhibited by the US market. Especially strong statistical relationships are observed for four 
of the thirteen sample countries. Specifically, the monetary conditions coefficient is 
More recent literature on monetary policy rules also suggests a positive correlation between the level of short- 
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significant at the 1% level in Belgium, Canada, France and UK. The regression R-squares 
suggest that, for these four countries, the monetary policy variable explains approximately 
3% to 8% of the variation in stock returns. Given the monthly horizon of our data, the 
proportion of stock variation that is explained is relatively high. The results indicate that 
only in Finland, Japan and Spain stock returns are unrelated to the change in short-term 
interest rate. 
The fifth column of Table 1.4 shows the Jarque-Bera test for normality of the 
residuals from regression Eq. (1-2). The Jarque-Bera test rejects residual normality in all 
sample countries. In order to calculate the non-normality-adjusted critical values, we 
undertook bootstrap analysis. In particular, we created 1000 bootstrapped versions of the 
original dependent variable (nominal stock returns) using the reshuffled (random draw with 
replacement) scaled residuals from Eq. (1.2). The generated dependent variable is then 
regressed on the original explanatory variable (lagged change in short-term rate). This 
process is repeated 1000 times for each country in the sample, generating 1000 t-ratios. 
These 1000 t-ratios are then sorted, so that the 5% critical values can be selected as the 25 th 
(lower bound) and 975th (upper bound) values of the series. Finally, average critical values 
are computed from 100 repetitions of 1000 iterations producing a distribution of critical 
values. Comparing the bootstrap results (Table AlA in Appendix I) with the OLS results, 
we see that when residual non-normality is taken into account, Germany and Switzerland 
are added to the list of countries where the effect of interest rate changes on equity returns 
is significant at the 5% level. 
Another sensitivity test for the validity of the results involves taking into account 
the contemporaneous correlation in the error terms across equations of the local country 
model 1.2. As we showed in Tables 1.1a, 1.1b, US stock returns are strongly correlated 
with stock returns in the other sample countries. We suspect that this correlation may be 
present in the residuals of Eq. (1.2) across different countries, and therefore, we form the 
following system of equations, to be estimated with the seemingly unrelated regression 
method (SUR): 
ASJ., 
t = aj + 
8jAij, 
t + uj, t 
(1.2)' 
tenn interest rates and inflation, (Taylor, 1993). 
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where, j= Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US. The SUR method, also known as the multivariate regression 
(or Zellner's method) estimates the parameters of the system, accounting for 
heteroskedasticity, and contemporaneous correlation in the errors across equations. The 
estimation results are presented in Table 1.4.1 below: 
Table 1.4.1 : Seemingly Unrelated Regressions of nominal stock returns against the change in 
the short-term interest rate, 1972.02 - 2002.07 
Country a Cor R2 
Belgium 0.402 -0.742 0.350 0.02 (1.699) (2.306) 
Canada 0.456 * -1.292 *** 0.741 0.04 (1.844) (4.853) 
Finland 0.889 *** -0.046 0 102 0.0001 (2.542) (0.037) . 
France 0.667 ** -1.069 *** 0.440 0.03 (2.185) (2.378) 
Germany 0.443 -0.407 0.503 0.006 (1.636) (0-951) 
Italy 0.554 -0.925 ** 0.326 0.02 (1.485) (2.119) 
Japan 0.376 -1.039 0.366 0.004 (1.417) (0.986) 
Netherlands 0.589 *** -0.547 ** 0.650 0.01 (2.335) (2.317) 
Spain 0.501 * 0.095 0.325 0.002 (1.718) (1.027) 
Sweden 1.038 *** -0.904 0.410 0.01 (3.371) (1.41) 
Switzerland 0.46 * -0.06 0.620 0.001 (1.836) (0.35) 
United Kingdom 0.593 
** -2.009 *** 0.624 0.08 (2.003) (6.524) 
United States 0.583 
*** -0.69 *** 1 0.01 (2.507) (2.923) 
Note: 
(a) SUR estimates of the system AS,,, = aj + PjAij,, + uj,, where AS, is the monthly nominal stock return 
and Ai, is the change in the short-term interest rate. The estimates of the cross-equation covanance 
matrix are based upon parameter estimates of the unweighted system. 
(b)Absolute t-statistics are presented in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates. 
(c) Cor denotes the correlation coefficient of local country residuals with US residuals. 
(d) ***, **, * denote the 1,5, and 10 percent level of significance respectively. 
The fourth column in Table 1.4.1 shows the contemporaneous correlation 
coefficient of the local country residuals with US residuals. As expected, the correlation 
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coefficient is positive and statistically significant in all cases. The SUR estimates indicate a 
negative effect from monetary policy tightening on stock returns in 7 out of the 13 sample 
countries. Comparing the SUR results with the OLS results, we see that Sweden drops from 
the list of countries with a significant stock retums-monetary policy relationship at the 5% 
level. 
Real stock returns 
The previous section results indicate that nominal stock returns are related to 
changes in the level of interest rates, however, it is unclear whether this is the case for real 
stock returns. Stock returns usually respond negatively to increased inflation (see e. g. 
Fama, 198 1) and at the same time central banks typically respond with interest rate 
increases to increases in inflation. In this scenario, stock returns will decrease when 
monetary policy is contractionary, but this decrease will be related with changes in 
inflationary expectations. To determine whether the patterns identified in nominal returns 
are also present in real returns, Table 1.5 presents the estimation results (OLS, robust 
errors) of Equation 1.3, which relates local stock returns net of inflation to the change in the 
local monetary short-term interest rate. 
A. 
As, =a+, 8Ai, + u, (1.3) 
where, As, = AS, - 7r, is the monthly real stock return, 7it is the monthly inflation rate. We 
use monthly consumer price indices from the OECD's Main Economic Indicators: 
Historical Statistics in order to calculate 7Et as the first difference of the natural log of 
consumer pnces. 
The results in Table 1.5 are qualitatively the same with those in Table 1.4, where 
nominal equity returns were used in the estimation. For all countries but Finland and Spain, 
the coefficient of the change of the short-term interest rate is negative and statistically 
different from zero at the usual levels of significance. For seven countries (Belgium, 
Canada, France, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, UK) the relationship is significant at the 1% 
level. Large real return differences, associated with higher interest rates, are observed in 
UK and France. One striking difference between the results of Tables 1.4 and 1.5 is the 
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statistical insignificance of the intercept for all the sample countries (except Sweden) when 
real returns are employed. 
Table 1.5: Regressions of real stock returns against the change in the short-term interest rate, 
1972.02 - 2002.07 
Country a F JB R2 
Belgium 0.06 - 1.254 9.49 446.58 0.025 (0.24) (3.77) [0.002] [0.000] 
Canada 0.063 -1.698 *** 16.14 419.65 042 0 (0.25) (2.972) [0.000] [0.000] . 
Finland 0.41 -1.033 0.48 76.27 001 0 (1.159) (0.689) [0.485] [0.0001 . 
France 
0.237 -2.42 *** 16.41 154.99 043 0 (0.763) (3.161) [0.000] [0.000] . 
Germany 0.213 -1.524 * 5 105.13 0.013 (0.764) (1.941) [0.0251 [0.0001 
Italy -0.12 -1.485 *** 7.69 14.04 0.022 (0.315) (2.476) [0.005] [0.000] 
Japan 
0.094 -2.118 * 3.01 33.90 0.008 (0.392) (1.806) [0.083] [0.000] 
Netherlands 
0.311 -0.843 *** 3.90 186.22 0.01 (1.19) (2.563) [0.048] [0.000] 
Spain -0.182 
0.107 0.856 32.31 0.002 (0.604) (0.896) [0.355] [0.000] 
Sweden 
0.62 * -1.824 *** 5.48 79.74 0.016 (1.929) (2.627) [0.019] [0.000] 
Switzerland 
0.247 -0.419 * 2.18 385.82 0.005 (0.946) (1.915) [0.14] [0.000] 
United Kingdom 
0.052 -2.592 *** 35.15 1027.84 0.088 (0.173) (5.416) [0.000] [0.000] 
United States 
0.213 -0.901 ** 4.817 312.38 0.013 (0.883) (2.194) [0.028] [0.000] 
Note: 
(a) OLS estimates, with Newey-West heteroskedasti city and serial correlation consistent covariance 
matrix estimator, of the regression equation As, =a+, BAi, + u, where As, is the monthly ex post real 
stock return and Ai, is the change in the short-terin interest rate. 
(b) Absolute t-statistics are presented in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates. 
(c) JB denotes the value of the Jarque-Bera normality test. The associated probability is shown in the 
bracket below. 
(d) ***, **, * denote the 1,5, and 10 percent level of significance respectively. 
Overall, we find that contractionary monetary environments depress not only 
nominal but also inflation adjusted stock returns. Bootstrap analysis (see Table Al. 5 in 
Appendix I) reveals that after non-normality in the residuals (as suggested by the Jarque- 
Bera. test in Table 1.5) is taken into account, the relationship between changes in interest 
rates and stock returns is statistically different from zero at the 5% level in 10 out of the 13 
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countries. Simultaneous estimation of Eq. (1.3) for the 13 sample countries using the SUR 
method, indicates that the findings are identical to those obtained using nominal stock 
returns. Table 1.5.1, shows the SUR estimation results of the system (1.3)'. The estimated 
slope is negative and significant at the 5% level in Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, 
Netherlands, UK, US. 
Asj,, = aj + j6jAij, t + uj, t (1.3)' 
Table 1.5.1 : Seemingly Unrelated Regressions of real stock returns against the change in the 
short-term interest rate, 1972.02 - 2002.07 
Country a 0 Cor R2 
Belgium 0.04 -0.753 0.362 0.02 (0.17) (2.338) 
Canada 
0.038 -1.266 *** 0.740 0.04 (0.153) (4.705) 
Finland 
0.39 -0.312 0.113 0.0006 (1.108) (0.248) 
France 
0.214 -1.145 *** 0.442 0.03 (0.700) (2.541) 
Germany 
0.185 -0.431 0.505 0.006 (0.681) (0.997) 
Italy -0.156 -1.01 
** 0.336 0.02 (0.417) (2.310) 
Japan 
0.09 -1.359 0.367 0.007 (0.336) (1.276) 
Netherlands 
0.277 -0.541 ** 0.652 0.01 
(1.092) (2.274) 
Spain -0.212 
0.085 0.337 0.002 
(0.717) (0.906) 
Sweden 
0.537 * -0.989 0.413 0.013 
(1.73) (1.533) 
Switzerland 
0.212 -0.02 0.625 0.005 
(0.834) (0.115) 
United Kingdom 
0.018 -2.00 *** 0.634 0.08 
(0.062) (6.565) 
United States 
0.186 -0.724 *** 1 0.01 
(0.787) (3.022) 
Note: 
(a) SUR estimates of system Asj,, = aj +#jAij,, + uj,, where As, is the monthly ex post real stock return and 
Ai, is the change in the short-term interest rate. The estimates of the cross-equation covariance matrix are 
based upon parameter estimates of the unweighted system. 
(b) Absolute t-statistics are presented in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates. 
(c) Cor denotes the correlation coefficient of local country residuals with US residuals. 
(d) ***, **, * denote the 1,5, and 10 percent level of significance respectively. 
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(c) Dividend adjusted stock returns 
The national stock price indices employed for the construction of the nominal and 
real return series are not adjusted for dividend payments. In order to perform an additional 
examination of the results' robustness, return series which include dividends were obtained 
from the Datastream Total Markets series 30 . Tables 1.6 and 1.7 present the results 
from the 
estimation of Eqs. (1.2) and (1.3) using dividend adjusted nominal stock returns (AS t 
ý), and 
D dividend adjusted real stock returns (Ast ). It is evident that inclusion (or exclusion) of 
dividends in the calculation of the returns doesn't affect the strongly negative relationship 
between changes in the short-term interest rate and stock returns in Belgium, Canada, 
France, Italy, Netherlands, UK, US. Using nominal dividend adjusted returns, the 
coefficient of the proxy for monetary tightening is negative and statistically significant at 
the 10% level of significance in II of the 13 sample countries. Especially strong patterns 
are observed in France and the UK, where return differences of more than 2% (on a 
monthly basis) are observed. The majority of the estimated intercepts are positive and 
significant and higher in value, as compared to the case when we exclude dividends from 
the returns calculation. Using real dividend adjusted returns, changes in interest rates 
appear statistically insignificant in explaining local returns in Spain and Switzerland. 
The Jarque-Bera tests in Tables 1.6,1.7 indicate the presence of non-normality in 
the residuals of our estimated models. Bootstrapped confidence intervals (see Tables Al. 6, 
Al. 7 in Appendix I) show that the impact of interest rate changes on equity returns remains 
statistically significant in the majority of our sample countries, even when error non- 
normality is accounted for. SUR results in Tables 1.6.1,1.7.1 indicate that, in line with the 
findings for non-dividend adjusted returns, when we employ dividend adjusted returns to 
estimate system (1.3)', the relationship between interest rate changes and stock returns isn't 
statistically significant at the 5% level in Spain, Finland, Germany, Japan, Sweden and 
Switzerland. 
30 The series commence on February 1973 for Belgium, Canada, France, German, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Switzerland, UK, and US while for Sweden, Spain, and Finland on 1982.02,1987.04 and 1988-05, 
respectively. 
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Table 1.6: Regressions of dividend adjusted nominal stock returns against the change in the 
short-term interest rate. 
Country a 0 F JB R2 
Belgium 0.835 -1.574 13.83 235.86 0.037 (3.279) (4.505) [0.000] [0.000] 
Canada 0.824 *** -1.62 *** 16.07 421.91 043 0 (3.345) (3.956) [0.000] [0.0001 . 
Finland 0.925 -4.0 7* 2.23 8.01 007 0 (1.305) (1.836) [0.136] [0.018] . 
France 1.034 *** -2.458 *** 15.59 15.41 042 0 (3.204) (2.98) [0.000] [0.000] . 
Germany 0.637 *** -1.474 4.75 121.19 0.013 (2.365) (1.898) [0.02] [0.000] 
Italy 0.941 *** -1.5 *** 7.77 36.08 0.022 (2.434) (2.478) [0.005] [0.000] 
Japan 0.388 -1.889 2.40 33.86 0.006 (1.409) (1.573) [0.121] [0.000] 
Netherlands 0.976 *** -0.705 ** 2.94 198.99 0.008 (3.866) (2.249) [0.087] [0.000] 
Spain 0.87 ** -0.078 0.006 219.67 0.000 (2.019) (-0.035) [0.936] [0.000] 
Sweden 1.501 *** -1.87 ** 2.89 44.87 0.014 (3.171) (2.221) [0.09] [0.000] 
Switzerland 0.69 *** -0.343 * 1.65 
392.83 0.004 (2.768) (1.658) [0.198] [0.000] 
United Kingdom 1.075 *** -2.29 *** 27.49 
1364.29 0.072 (3.54) (4.702) [0.000] [0.000] 
United States 0.869 *** -0.844 
** 4.261 171.41 0.011 (3.572) (2.064) [0.003] [0.0001 
Note: 
(a) OLS estimates, with Newey-West heteroskedasti city and serial correlation consistent covariance 
matrix estimator, of the regression equation ASD =a +pAi, + u, where ASD is the monthly dividend 
adjusted nominal stock return and Ai, is the change in the short-term interest rate. The Datastrearn return 
series are available from 1973.02 for Belgium, Canada, France, German, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Switzerland, U`K, and US, and 1982.02,1987.04 and 1988.05 for Sweden, Spain, and Finland, 
respectively. 
(b)Absolute t-statistics are presented in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates. 
(c) JB denotes the value of the Jarque-Bera non-nality test. The associated probability is shown in the 
bracket below. 
(d) ***, **, * denote the 1,5, and 10 percent level of significance respectively. 
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Table 1.6.1: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions of dividend adjusted nominal stock returns 
against the change in the short-term interest rate. 
Country a 0 Cor R2 
Belgium 0.818 -0.758 0.514 0.027 (3.407) (2.595) 
Canada 0.815 *** -1.177 *** 0 768 04 0 (3.469) (4.703) . . 
Finland 1.032 -3.262 0 223 01 0 (1.558) (1.377) . . 
France 1.029 *** -0.873 ** 0 550 02 0 (3.345) (2.052) . . 
Gen-nany 0.634 *** -0.573 0.517 0.008 (2.523) (1.351) 
Italy 0.902 *** -1.007 ** 0.339 0.02 (2.44) (2.301) 
Japan 0.378 -1.316 0.379 0.006 (1.427) (1.252) 
Netherlands 0.958 *** -0.397 ** 0 671 007 0 (4.069) (1-998) . . 
Spain 0.881 ** -0.96 0.358 0.004 (2.162) (1.295) 
Sweden 1.29 *** -1.12 0 269 01 0 (3.044) (1.247) . . 
Switzerland 
0.67 *** -0.004 0 632 00003 0 (2.89) (0-003) . . 
United Kingdom 1.063 
*** -1.706 *** 0.636 0.07 (3.643) (5.798) 
0.862 *** -0.781 *** United States (3.726) (3.259) 1 0.015 
Note: 
(a) SUR estimates of system ASj,, D= aj + PjAij., + uj,, where AS tD is the monthly dividend adjusted 
nominal stock return and Ai, is the change in the short-terrn interest rate. The estimates of the cross- 
equation covariance matrix are based upon parameter estimates of the unweighted system. The 
Datastrearn dividend adjusted return series are available from 1973.02 for Belgium, Canada, France, 
German, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, and US, and 1982.02,1987.04 and 1988.05 for 
Sweden, Spain, and Finland, respectively. 
(b)Absolute t-statistics are presented in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates. 
(c) Cor denotes the correlation coefficient of local country residuals with US residuals. 
(d) ***, * *, * denote the 1,5, and 10 percent level of significance respectively. 
48 
Table 1.7: Regressions of dividend adjusted real stock returns against the change in the short- 
term interest rate. 
Country cc 0 F JB R" 
Belgium 0.473 -1.614 14.38 203.33 0.039 (1.865) (4.536) [0.000] [0.000] 
Canada 0.404 -1.663 *** 16.64 391.32 0 045 (1.625) (2.99) [0.000] [0.000] . 
Finland 0.713 -4.404 2.18 7.65 0 012 (1.00) (1.874) [0.14] [0.02] . 
France 0.584 * -2.531 *** 16.44 15.52 0 044 (1.805) (3.107) [0.000] [0.0001 . 
Germany 0.384 -1.514 ** 4.95 112.77 0.013 (1.418) (2.22) [0.026] [0.000] 
Italy 0.245 -1.622 *** 9.09 33.98 0.026 (0.634) (2.67) [0.002] [0.000] 
Japan 0.106 -2.227 3.28 29.16 0.009 (0.384) (1.896) [0.07] [0.000] 
Netherlands 0.671 *** -0.687 ** 2.75 178.25 0 007 (2.642) (2.155) [0.0971 [0.000] . 
Spain 0.527 -0.092 0.008 232.07 0.000 (1.219) (0.041) [0.926] [0.000] 
Sweden 1.117 
** -1.976 ** 3.19 44.47 0.015 (2.327) (2.267) [0.0751 [0.000] 
Switzerland 
0.449 * -0.333 1.51 379.62 0.004 (1.777) (1.609) [0.218] [0.000] 
United Kingdom 0.498 * -2.303 *** 27.71 1037.99 0.072 (1.653) (4.709) [0.000] [0.000] 
United States 
0.463 * -0.889 ** 4.60 152.89 0 012 (1.877) (2.146) [0.032] [0.000] . 
Note: 
(a) OLS estimates, with Newey-West heteroskedasti city and serial correlation consistent covariance 
matrix estimator, of the regression equation As, D=a+, 8Ai, + u, where As, D is the monthly dividend 
adjusted ex post real stock return and Ai, is the change in the short-term interest rate. The Datastrearn 
dividend adjusted return series are available from 1973.02 for Belgium, Canada, France, German, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, and US, and 1982.02,1987.04 and 1988.05 for Sweden, 
Spain, and Finland, respectively. 
(b)Absolute t-statistics are presented in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates. 
(c) JB denotes the value of the Jarque-Bera normality test. The associated probability is shown in the 
bracket below. 
(d) ***, **, * denote the 1,5, and 10 percent level of significance respectively. 
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Table 1.7.1: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions of dividend adjusted real stock returns against 
against the change in the short-term interest rate. 
Country a 0 Cor R2 
Belgium 0.439 -0.768 0.522 0.03 (1.817) (2.618) 
Canada 0.374 -1.164 *** 0 766 0 04 (1.576) (4.595) . . 
Finland 0.707 -3.267 224 0 0 01 (1.062) (1.378) . . 
France 0.55 * -0.945 ** 0 551 0 03 (1.78) (2.215) . . 
Gen-nany 0.354 -0.604 0.518 0.01 (1.398) (1.409) 
Italy 0.162 -1.108 *** 0.348 0.02 (0.438) (2.543) 
0.075 -1.571 Japan (0.283) (1.481) 0.381 0.008 
Netherlands 0.627 *** -0.379 ** 0 675 0.006 (2.645) (2.001) . 
Spain 0.415 -0.933 0.356 0.00003 (1.013) (1.254) 
Sweden 0.823 
* -1.236 0.271 0.01 (1.932) (1.373) 
Switzerland 
0.402* 0.039 0.639 0.001 (1.712) (0.248) 
United Kingdom 
0.461 -1.697 *** 0.645 0.067 (1.586) (5.819) 
0.434* -0.824 *** United States (1.851) (3.398) 1.000 0.011 
Note: 
(a) SUR estimates of system Asj,, D= aj + PjAip + uj,, where As, D is the dividend adjusted monthly 
ex post real stock return and Ai, is the change in the short-term interest rate. The estimates of the 
cross-equation covariance matrix are based upon parameter estimates of the unweighted 
system. The Datastream dividend adjusted return series are available from 1973.02 for Belgium, 
Canada, France, German, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, and US, and 1982.02, 
1987.04 and 1988.05 for Sweden, Spain, and Finland, respectively. 
(b)Absolute t-statistics are presented in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates. 
(c) Cor denotes the correlation coefficient of local country residuals with US residuals. 
(d) ***, **, * denote the 1,5, and 10 percent level of significance respectively. 
Surnmarising the findings of this section, we obtain a consistent strong negative 
contemporaneous impact of monetary policy on stock returns in seven sample countries: 
Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, France, UK, US and Canada. In contrast, the results do not 
suggest any contemporaneous relationship at the 5% level in Finland, Spain and Japan 
31 
. 
31 See Table A 1.8 in Appendix I for a summary of the Tables 1.4-1.7.1 (and Appendix I Tables A 1.4-A1.7) 
related to the statistical significance of the change in the short term interest rate in Eqs. (1.2) -(1.3)'. 
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Japan is a particularly interesting case given the size of its economy and the huge boom and 
bust cycle that it experienced in land and stock prices over the end of the 1980s and the 
beginning of the 1990s. As Okina, Shirakawa and Shiratsuka (2001) point out, from the 
start of 1989 the Bank of Japan began seriously addressing the question of raising the 
discount rate, but faced difficulties in persuading the government or the general public on 
the need to tighten monetary policy. Eventually, Japanese monetary policy start tightening 
on May 1989, while the bubble was in full swing, but "the economy expanded rigorously 
even after the official discount rate was raised" and "it took a considerable time for these 
hikes to have visible effects on money supply and asset prices... Stock prices continued to 
rise until end-1989, and in 1990 plummeted with a few rebounds on the way" (Okina, 
Shirakawa and Shiratsuka, 2001, p. 425). Hence, historical experience alone suggests that 
the effect of policy changes may not be contemporaneous, and lags may be involved in the 
transmission of monetary policy to asset prices. Taking this into consideration, in the next 
section we will look at the lagged effect of monetary policy on stock returns, or in other 
words, the effect of discount rate changes on expected stock returns. 
Finally, sensitivity analysis indicates that accounting for non-normality in equity 
returns generally increases the number of countries with a significant contemporaneous 
relationship between monetary policy and stock returns. Bootstrap results show that 
Germany should be included in the list of countries with significant monetary policy betas 
(and Switzerland in the case of non-dividend adjusted stock returns). Also, comparing 
single equation OLS estimates, with system SUR estimates, we see that controlling for 
international stock market correlation affects the monetary policy-stock returns relationship 
only in Sweden, rendering it insignificant. 
1.3.3 Monetary conditions and expected stock returns 
The previous section verified a strong negative contemporaneous response of stock 
markets to increases in the level of interest rates. In the majority of our sample countries, 
the empirical results suggest that stock returns are generally higher in expansive monetary 
environments than they are in restrictive environments. In this section we use the Jensen et 
al. (1996) dummy variable measure of monetary policy and examine whether the monetary 
environment is an important consideration for investor required returns. We expand on 
previous work by Jensen et al. (1996), Conover et al. (1999) and Durham (2001) by 
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utilising a more up-to-date dataset and by looking at the robustness of the findings to 
inclusion of dividend payments in the calculation of stock returns. We estimate Eq. (1.4) 
using nominal (ASt), real (Ast), nominal dividend-adjusted (ASt D) and real dividend- 
adjusted stock returns (Ast D): 
AQ, =a+, 8D, + u, (1.4) 
where, AQt is the monthly equity return (ASt, Ast, ASt 
Dý Ast D) 
, and Dt is the directional 
discount-rate change dummy variable, which takes a value of I if the most recent change in 
the central bank discount rate was an increase and zero if it was a decrease. 
Following Jensen et al. (1996), months that include the first rate change in a series 
are eliminated from the sample. This is done to filter out announcement effects and focus 
on the relationship between longer-term stock returns and the monetary environment. In 
essence, we examine whether expected stock returns are time-varying and to some extent 
predictable, using as an information variable a dummy that represents monetary 
conditions 32 . The monetary policy variable 
is an ex-ante measure of monetary conditions, 
since it is known in advance of the stock returns measurement interval, hence investors 
could conceivably replicate the results. As Conover et al. (1999) argue, if the observed 
stock return patterns do not correspond with similar patterns in investor required returns, 
investors could predict periods of abnormal return performance. 
(a) Nominal stock returns 
Table 1.8 presents the results from the estimation of Eq. (1.4) using nominal stock 
returns. The estimated intercepts are all positive and statistically significant, indicating the 
generally positive return that is expected from stock market investment. The estimated fi 
coefficients associated with the local monetary environment variable are negative and 
statistically significant in six countries (Finland, France, Italy, Switzerland, UK, US). 
Hence, for those countries our measure of the stance of monetary policy contains 
significant information, which can be used to forecast expected stock returns. 
32 As Patelis (1997) argues, in order to disprove the constant expected returns hypothesis, one has to show that 
a variable contained in time t information set can help predict asset returns at time t+k. By deleting the months 
that include the first discount rate change we filter out the contemporaneous effect of monetary policy on 
stock returns and focus on whether expected stock returns are time varying and whether the monetary policy 
variable is a significant predictor of future returns. 
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Table 1.8: Regressions of nominal stock returns against monetary policy dummy variable. 
Country cc 0 F R2 
Belgium 0.915 -0.841 2.29 0.007 
(2.671) (1.37) [0.131] 
Canada 0.989 ** -0.808 1.05 0.006 (2.03) (1.065) [0.306] 
Finland 2.014 *** -2.266 *** 11.55 0 037 (4.16) (3.414) [0.000] . 
France 1.31 *** -1.644 ** 5.21 0.016 (3.014) (2.157) [0.023] 
Germany 0.956 *** -0.896 2.27 0.007 (2.456) (1.521) [0.132] 
Italy 
1.292 *** -1.449 * 3.72 0.01 (2.982) (1.871) [0.044] 
Japan 
0.567 * -1.141 2.58 0.007 (1.749) (1.478) [0.108] 
Sweden 
1.232 *** -0.553 0.64 0.002 (2.604) (0.811) [0.424] 
Switzerland 1.066 
*** -1.704 *** 9.00 0.025 
(3.241) (3.013) [0.002] 
United Kingdom 
1.732 *** -1.431 ** 5.14 0.016 
(3.966) (2.297) [0.024] 
United States 
1.195 *** -1.401 *** 7.61 0.021 
(3.853) (2.702) [0.006] 
Note: 
(a) OLS estimates, with Newey-West heteroskedasti city and serial correlation consistent covariance 
matrix estimator, of the regression equation AS, =a +PD, + u, where AS, is the monthly nominal stock 
return and D, is a dummy variable equal to I if the most recent change in the central bank discount 
rate was an increase and 0 if it was a decrease. The data excludes months when changes occurred in 
local monetary policy. Also excluded are months when the central bank discount rate was pegged to a 
market rate than being set by the central bank itself. This results in elimination of data for Canada from 
March 1980 to December 1993. The discount rate data for Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Italy 
(Euro members) ends on December 1998. Thereafter, the dummy variable for these countries was 
calculated using the ECB refinancing rate. 
(b) Absolute t-statistics are presented in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates. 
(c) ***, **, * denote the 1,5, and 10 percent level of significance respectively. 
Particularly, we find that restrictive (expansive) monetary policy stance decreases 
(increases) expected stock returns. The largest expected return differences are observed in 
Finland and Switzerland. On an annualized basis, the expected returns in expansive 
monetary environments exceeded the expected returns in restrictive environments for these 
countries by approximately 27% and 20%, respectively. These differences exceed the 
difference of approximately 17% exhibited by the UK, US stock markets. Especially strong 
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statistical relationships are observed for three of the eleven countries under investigation 33 . 
Specifically, the discount rate dummy coefficient is significant at the 1% level in Finland, 
Switzerland and the US. In Belgium, Canada, Germany, Japan and Sweden expected stock 
returns appear to be unrelated to local monetary conditions 34 . 
(b) Real stock returns 
In order to examine whether expected returns net of inflation differ significantly 
across monetary environments, we estimate Eq. (1.4) using real stock returns. The results in 
Table 1.9 indicate that the negative relationship between monetary tightening and expected 
stock returns is significant at the 10% level in Belgium and Germany; 5% level in France, 
Italy and Japan; and 1% level in Finland, Switzerland, UK and US. In the UK and US stock 
markets the annualised difference in real stock returns across expansive and restrictive 
environments is approximately 20%. Comparing the results in Tables 1.8-1.9 we see that 
the number of countries with a statistically significant P increases from six to nine. A 
notable addition to the list of countries with significant fl's is Japan, where real expected 
returns differ by about 21% across periods of expansive and restrictive monetary policy. 
Our results agree with previous evidence by Conover et al. (1999) in that, in those countries 
where there is a significant relationship between local monetary conditions and expected 
nominal stock returns, there is also a significant relationship between local monetary policy 
and expected real stock returns. 
(c) Dividend adjusted stock returns 
Tables 1.10 and 1.11 present the results from the estimation of Eq. (1.4) using 
dividend adjusted nominal and real stock returns, respectively. In the case of nominal 
returns all intercepts are significantly positive and higher in value (compared to when 
dividend payments are excluded). The slope coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant in seven of the eleven sample countries. 
33 Recall that Spain and Netherlands are excluded from the empirical analysis in this section, due to the lack 
of adequate number of discount rate observations in the Datastrearn series. 
34 We should mention, though, that as Conover et a]. (1999) point out, tests of significance of the monetary 
environment variable are actually joint tests of the hypotheses that the monetary policy variable effectively 
differentiates monetary conditions, and that the monetary environment is related to stock returns. Thus, an 
54 
Table 1.9: Regressions of real stock returns against monetary policy dummy variable. 
Country Cc P F R2 
Belgium 0.57 -0.923 2.73 0.009 
(1.519) (1.442) [0.099] 
Canada 0.646 -0.948 1.43 0 008 
(1.317) (1.244) [0.232] . 
Finland 1.722 *** -2.752 *** 16.88 054 0 (3.528) (4.13) [0.000] . 
France 0.852 * -1.751 ** 5.837 0.018 (1.982) (2.199) [0.016] 
Gen-nany 0.751 * -1.074 * 3.22 0.01 (1.926) (1.828) [0.073] 
Italy 
0.783 * -1.889 ** 6.34 0.017 (1.736) (2.074) [0.012] 
Japan 
0.394 -1.731 ** 5.88 0.016 (1.381) (2.049) [0.015] 
Sweden 
0.893 * -0.858 1.51 0.004 (1.88) (1.244) [0.21] 
Switzerland 
0.911 *** -1.976 *** 11.83 0.037 (2.758) (3.437) [0.000] 
United Kingdom 
1.206 *** -1.631 *** 6.76 0.022 
(3.075) (2.618) [0.009] 
United States 
0.918 *** -1.695 *** 10.89 0.031 
(2.939) (3.227) [0.001] 
Note: 
(a) OLS estimates, with Newey-West heteroskedasti city and serial correlation consistent covariance 
matrix estimator, of the regression equation As, =a +PD, + u, where As, is the monthly ex post real 
stock return and D, is a dummy variable equal to I if the most recent change in the central bank 
discount rate was an increase and 0 if it was a decrease. The data excludes months when changes 
occurred in local monetary policy. Also excluded are months when the central bank discount rate was 
pegged to a market rate than being set by the central bank itself. This results in elimination of data for 
Canada from March 1980 to December 1993. The discount rate data for Belgium, France, Finland, 
Germany, Italy (Euro members) ends on December 1998. Thereafter, the dummy variable for these 
countries was calculated using the ECB refinancing rate. 
(b) Absolute t-statistics are presented in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates. 
(c) ***, **, * denote the 1,5, and 10 percent level of significance respectively. 
Comparing Tables 1.8 and 1.10, it is evident that inclusion (or exclusion) of 
dividend payments in the returns calculation doesn't affect the negative relationship 
between monetary policy tightening and expected stock returns in Finland, France, Italy, 
Switzerland, UK and US. The strongest statistical relationship is observed in Finland, 
where P is equal to -3.784 and significant at the 1% level. The regression R2 for Finland 
insignificant dummy coefficient may reflect either a flow in the monetary variable, or that stock returns are 
genuinely unrelated to monetary conditions. 
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indicates that the local monetary policy variable explains approximately 5% of the variation 
in expected stock returns. 
Table 1.10: Regressions of dividend adjusted nominal stock returns against monetary policy 
dummy variable. 
Country a 0 F R2 
Belgium 1.177 -0.492 0.72 0 002 (3.007) (0.848) [0.396] . 
Canada 1.352 *** -0.802 1.16 0 006 (2.856) (1.116) [0.281] . 
Finland 2.634 *** -3.784 *** 6.73 0 051 (3.281) (2.456) [0.0 1 . 
France 1.671 *** -1.389 * 3.47 0 011 (3.781) (1.863) [0.063] . 
Germany 1.212 *** -0.994 * 3.013 0.009 (3.191) (1.777) [0.083] 
Italy 1.613 *** -1.331 * 2.97 0.008 (3.64) (1.658) [0.085] 
Japan 0.618 * -1.086 2.29 0.006 (1.872) (1.423) [0.131 
Sweden 1.346 *** -0.285 0.08 0.0003 (2.33) (0.294) [0.771] 
Switzerland 1.131 *** -1.257 ** 5.542 0.015 (3.733) (2.319) [0.019] 
United Kingdom 2.066 *** -1.275 ** 4.13 0.013 (4.73) (2.064) [0.042] 
United States 1.353 *** -1.133 ** 4.981 0.014 (4.354) (2.186) [0.034] 
Note: 
(a) OLS estimates, with Newey-West heteroskedasticity and serial correlation consistent covariance 
matrix estimator, of the regression equation AStD =a +flD, + u, where ASD is the monthly dividend 
adjusted nominal stock return and Dt is a dummy variable equal to I if the most recent change in 
the central bank discount rate was an increase and 0 if it was a decrease. The data excludes months 
when changes occurred in local monetary policy. Also excluded are months when the central bank 
discount rate was pegged to a market rate than being set by the central bank itself. This results in 
elimination of data for Canada from March 1980 to December 1993. The discount rate data for 
Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Italy (Euro members) ends on December 1998. Thereafter, the 
dummy variable for these countries was calculated using the ECB refinancing rate. The Datastrearn 
return series are available from 1973.02 for Belgium, Canada, France, German, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, and US, and 1982.02,1987.04 and 1988.05 for Sweden, Spain, and 
Finland, respectively. 
(b) Absolute t-statistics are presented in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates. 
(c) ***, **, * denote the 1,5, and 10 percent level of significance respectively. 
Finally, Table 1.11 shows that tighter monetary policy is associated with lower 
expected real returns, even after we adjust them for dividend payments. The slope 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level in eight of the eleven 
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sample countries. The results are broadly consistent with the argument that monetary 
conditions are related to investor required returns. If monetary authorities tend to follow 
expansive policies when the economy is weak, then investors may require higher rates of 
return to invest in the stock market. 
Table 1.11: Regressions of dividend adjusted real stock returns against monetary policy 
dummy variable. 
Country a F R2 
Belgium 0.841 -0.579 0.98 0.003 (2.155) (0.988) [0.322] 
Canada 1.01 
** -0.942 1.59 0 009 (2.109) (1.302) [0.20] . 
Finland 2.492 *** -3.998 *** 7.39 0 056 (3.067) (2.581) [0.007] . 
France 1.213 *** -1.496 ** 3.993 0.012 (2.789) (1.998) [0.046] 
Gen-nany 1.019 
*** -1.18 ** 4.19 0.013 (2.678) (2.091) [0.041] 
Italy 
1.112 *** -1.779 ** 5.34 0.015 (2.525) (2.223) [0.021] 
Japan 
0.453 -1.685 ** 5.46 0.016 (1.558) (1.99) [0.019] 
Sweden 1.055 -0.411 0.17 0.0007 (1.542) (0.42) [0.677] 
Switzerland 
0.978 *** -1.529 *** 8.02 0.002 (3.215) (2.774) [0.004] 
United Kingdom 
1.64 *** -1.475 *** 5.61 0.018 (3.857) (2.39) [0.017] 
United States 
1.076 *** -1.427 *** 7.748 0.022 (3.439) (2.724) [0.005] 
Note: 
(a) OLS estimates, with Newey-West heteroske dasti city and serial correlation consistent covariance 
matrix estimator, of the regression equation As, D=a+, 8D, + u, where Ast D is the monthly dividend 
adjusted ex post real stock return and D, is a dummy variable equal to I if the most recent change 
in the central bank discount rate was an increase and 0 if it was a decrease. The data excludes months 
when changes occurred in local monetary policy. Also excluded are months when the central bank 
discount rate was pegged to a market rate than being set by the central bank itself. This results in 
elimination of data for Canada from March 1980 to December 1993. The discount rate data for 
Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Italy (Euro members) ends on December 1998. Thereafter, the 
dummy variable for these countries was calculated using the EC13 refinancing rate. The Datastream 
return series are available from 1973.02 for Belgium, Canada, France, German, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, and US, and 1982.02,1987.04 and 1988.05 for Sweden, Spain, and 
Finland, respectively. 
(b) Absolute t-statistics are presented in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates. 
(c) ***, **, * denote the 1,5, and 10 percent level of significance respectively. 
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1.4 Conclusions 
This chapter examined the relationship between stock returns and monetary 
conditions providing a link between the macroeconomics literature, that views interest rates 
as indicators of the monetary policy stance, and the finance literature that uses interest rates 
to interpret stock market movements. The existence of such a relationship has important 
implications for both stock market participants and central bankers since, with respect to 
the former this issue relates to the broader topic of stock price determination and portfolio 
formation, while the latter are interested in whether monetary policy actions are transmitted 
through financial markets. Our proxies for shifts in monetary policy are based on interest 
rate variables including the change in the short-term Treasury Bill rate and a dummy 
variable reflecting discount rate changes. Our main contribution to the existing literature is 
that when we examine the impact of interest rate changes on stock price changes, we take 
into account the non-normal distribution of stock returns as well as the co-movement in 
international stock markets. The results suggest that in the majority of the countries under 
investigation, periods of tight money are associated with contemporaneous declines in stock 
market value. These findings can be understood in the context of the present value model, 
whereas interest rate increases are associated with lower stock prices via higher discount 
rates and lower future cash flows. 
Another important result is that following monetary policy changes, not only 
contemporaneous but also future stock returns, across a variety of returns specifications, are 
affected. Hence, our interest rate measure of monetary policy contains significant 
information that can be used to forecast expected stock returns. Specifically, we find that 
in most sample countries a restrictive (expansive) monetary policy stance decreases 
(increases) expected stock returns. Such shifts in required returns do not necessarily 
contradict market efficiency since central banks often adopt expansive monetary policy 
when there is increased concern of an economic downturn. Hence, the finding that during 
these periods investors require higher returns to invest in the stock market may be a 
reasonable expectation after all. The practical implication of our results is that investors 
should be aware of the international diversification opportunities across countries with 
different monetary environments, while central bankers should keep in mind that interest 
rate decisions have important effects on stock market wealth. 
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Chapter 2 
Modelling Inflation, Uncertainty 
Impact of Inflation Targeting 
2.1 Introduction 
and the 
In the 1990's a number of countries adopted explicit inflation targeting (IT) 
monetary policy frameworks. Over the same period, their inflation rates became lower and 
less variable. The reduction in inflation and inflation variance seems to be more generalised 
since it is observed both in countries where formal targets are in use and in non-targeting 
countries. Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2000) argue that over the last decade, aversion to 
inflation variability increased in all major economies irrespective of whether they were 
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operating under explicit IT or not. Higher non-forecastable inflation variability increases 
inflationary uncertainty and induces significant economic costs by distorting the 
intertemporal and intratemporal allocation decisions of individuals and firms, by re- 
distributing wealth between debtors and creditors, and by reducing the effectiveness of 
relative prices in co-ordinating economic actions. 
Friedman (1977) suggests a positive correlation between the level of inflation and 
inflation uncertainty, with higher inflation leading to greater uncertainty and lower output 
growth. Ball (1992) formalises Friedman's argument in the context of an asymmetric 
information game between the public and the policy maker. The empirical relationship 
between average inflation and inflation uncertainty has been studied extensively throughout 
the last three decades, with the results largely accepting the Friedman-Ball prediction. 
Thus, policies that lower average inflation lead to lower inflation uncertainty with apparent 
economic benefits. A key question that arises is whether explicit IT leads to a greater 
decrease in inflation uncertainty, as compared to the case where formal targets are not 
announced. Targets have an independent role if they help to anchor inflation expectations 
and to produce an additional decline in inflation uncertainty. Johnson (2002) finds that 
formal targets reduce expected inflation but bring no additional benefits in the form of 
lower uncertainty. 
In this chapter we take a closer look at the effect of IT on average inflation and 
inflation uncertainty using British data over the period 1972-2002. The United Kingdom 
(UK) was among the first major economies to adopt explicit targeting in October 1992. We 
employ a variety of GARCH related models to account for time-varying inflation volatility. 
GARCH techniques are popular in empirical investigations of the inflation-uncertainty 
relationship, since the estimated conditional volatility can serve as a proxy for uncertainty. 
Furthermore, GARCH-in-mean (GARCH-M) specifications augmented by lagged inflation 
allow for the possibility of a simultaneous feedback relationship between inflation and 
uncertainty. In addition, given the importance of long-run price stability, we use 
Component GARCH models to decompose inflation uncertainty into a temporary a 
permanent component and examine whether past inflation and IT affect long-run 
uncertainty. The results have important implications for the design of monetary policy 
given the decade-long targeting experience. This chapter's major contribution to the 
existing literature is the finding that, even if we take into account the indirect effect of 
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lower average inflation, the adoption of formal targeting exerts a direct negative impact on 
long-run uncertainty, thereby promoting macroeconomic stability. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section discusses the 
serious economic consequences of inflation uncertainty. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 provide an 
overview of the various sources of inflation uncertainty, and its empirical measures, 
respectively. Section 2.5 describes the UK inflation data to be employed, and section 2.6 
contains the empirical models and results. Section 2.7 provides conclusions and policy 
implications. 
2.2 Consequences of Inflation Uncertainty 
Economists often argue that uncertainty about the future rates of inflation is a major 
source of the welfare costs associated with inflation. Even perfectly foresighted inflation 
induces a welfare loss via the cost of economising on real money balances ('shoe leather' 
costs), the cost of operating in a less-than-perfectly indexed tax system and the cost of 
constantly revising price lists (menu costs) along with the increased variability in relative 
prices, among others'. Feldstein (1996) quantifies the first two costs of fully anticipated 
inflation for the U. S. economy, and concludes that the annual welfare cost of an inflation 
rate of 2 percent, rather than zero, is a surprisingly large I percent of GDP 2. Bakshi et al. 
(1997) replicate Feldstein's analysis for the U. K. and conclude that the above effects are 
indeed significant, but smaller in magnitude due to differences in the tax system between 
the two countries. 
Up till recently however, these costs of fully anticipated inflation were thought to be 
less important than the costs of unanticipated inflation. It is generally accepted that when 
contracts are written in nominal terms unexpected inflation enhances the relative position of 
debtors, while worsening the relative position of creditors. Another line of reasoning 
stresses the effects of unexpected inflation on the intra-generational distribution of wealth, 
with the re-distribution effect running from older people (which are more likely to be net- 
creditors) to younger people (net-debtors). When inflation is unexpected, risk-averse 
economic agents will incur a loss, even if prices and quantities are fully flexible in all 
1 For a further discussion of the costs of inflation see Driffill, Mizon, and Ulph (1990). 
2 Most of this cost derives from the distortion of the intertemporal allocation of consumption caused by the 
inflation-induced reduction in the real rate of saving. 
61 
markets, because the efficiency of the resources allocation system will deteriorate. In 
addition, unexpected inflation reduces the real value of government liabilities held by the 
public (wealth effect). Stultz (1986) argues that investors whose real wealth depreciates 
unexpectedly rebalance their portfolios and reduce the real value of their equity investment. 
Modigliani and Cohn (1979) suggest that "money illusion" effects, working via unexpected 
inflation, affect negatively the stock market. In particular, unexpected inflation is likely to 
increase nominal interest rates and if investors discount expected future earnings at these 
higher rates, ignoring the positive effect of inflation on nominal earnings, stocks will be 
under-valued. Increased inflation uncertainty implies higher unexpected inflation 
realisations, thus the costs associated with unexpected inflation will be more pronounced. 
Hu and Willett (2000) find that real stock returns in the US are negatively affected by 
inflation uncertainty. 
Following Golob (1993), the effects of inflation uncertainty can be categorised into 
ex post and ex ante effects. Ex ante, inflation uncertainty is thought to affect financial 
markets by raising required rates of return on debt. Higher expected returns imply higher 
long-ten'n interest rates, which in turn decrease consumption and investment spending. 
Another related argument stresses the spillover of uncertainty in inflation to interest rates 
and other economic variables. Inflation uncertainty might (and probably will) be 
incorporated into interest rates uncertainty, thus affecting the intertemporal allocate 
decisions made in the economy. Berument (1999) shows that in the UK both expected 
inflation and inflation risk positively affect the 3 month Treasury Bill rate. 
Increased short-term interest rate uncertainty might encourage firms and consumers 
to finance their investment and saving decisions with long-term fixed rate debt, in order to 
avoid the risk of increases in short-term rates. Since long-term rates are typically higher 
than short-term rates, employment of long-term debt causes financing costs to increase, and 
therefore lowers investment. Also, in the absence of tax indexation, inflation uncertainty 
implies tax rates uncertainty. Generally, the saving and investment decisions of individuals 
and firms will be distorted by inflation uncertainty, since it causes the real value of future 
nominal payments to be unknown. 
As Huizinga (1993) argues, in a world of nominal rigidities, inflation may affect 
intratemporal allocation decisions via its effects on: uncertainty about the real cost of 
various production factors, and uncertainty about the relative price of various final goods. 
In Huizinga's model, the transmission mechanism for the link between inflation uncertainty 
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and investment is uncertainty about the real net present value of capital expenditures 3. 
Lucas (1973) assumed imperfect information and no nominal rigidities to argue that the 
sensitivity of economic agent's actions to price signals can be dependent on the amount of 
inflation uncertainty. 
In an uncertain inflation environment, firms will be devoting part of their resources 
to forecast and/or hedge against inflation which results to substantial distortions in the 
efficiency of resource allocation. Additionally, ex. post, unexpected inflation causes a 
redistribution of wealth from net creditors to net debtors if contracts are written in nominal 
terms (Kessel and Alchian, 1959). When inflation uncertainty is higher, risk averse 
individuals will attempt to shorten the duration of contracts, in order to reduce the risk of 
welfare loss cause by deviations of actual from expected inflation. Contracts will be more 
frequently negotiated, thus diverting economic resources from other more efficient uses, to 
the contracting process. In the context of the stock market, according to the nominal 
contracting hypothesis, unexpected inflation should be negatively related to the equity 
value of a firm with a positive level of nominal contracts. Empirical evidence, however, on 
4 this topic is rather mixed . 
Milton Friedman (1977) in his Nobel lecture stressed that increased inflation 
uncertainty reduces the effectiveness of relative prices in co-ordinating economic actions, 
by making it more difficult to distinguish between nominal and relative price changes, and 
may adversely affect real economic activity. The more uncertain inflation is, "the harder it 
becomes to extract the signal about relative prices from the absolute prices... at the 
extreme, the system of absolute prices becomes nearly useless ... agents resort either to an 
alternative currency or to barter, with disastrous effects to productivity" 5 (Friedman , 1977, 
p. 467). The distortions in the economic system, that inflation uncertainty produces, affect 
negatively the efficiency of resource allocation and the level of real activity. Friedman 
argued that stagflation scenario of the 1970's reflected "temporary" deviations from a 
vertical Phillips curve due to higher inflation uncertainty. 
3 See also Abel (1983), Hartman (1972), Bernanke (1983) and Pindyck (199 1) among others, for theoretical 
and empirical work on the investment - inflation uncertainty link. 
4 Pearce and Rolley (1988) and Bernard (1986) argued that the nominal contracting hypothesis is empirically 
significant in explaining stock price behaviour. French, Ruback and Schwert (1983), on the other hand, find 
little evidence corroborating a positive effect of unexpected inflation on the stock returns of firms with 
relatively large net monetary liabilities (net debtors). 
5 Similar arguments are presented in Lucas (1973). It should be also emphasised that, In his analysis, 
Friedman refers to the terms "inflation variability" and "inflation uncertainty" interchangeably, while as we 
see in the next part of the paper these two terms are not necessarily identical. 
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Friedman's insight of how unexpected changes in wages-prices affect the 
economy's real equilibrium was given an explicit theoretical foundation by Lucas (1972). 
In Lucas's model economic agents face a signal extraction problem due to imperfect 
information about the current money supply. Unpredictable short-run fluctuations in money 
may cause output and employment movements (see also Barro, 1978). However, empirical 
evidence by Mishkin (1982) and others showed that, contrary to Lucas's prediction of 
"policy irrelevance", both anticipated and unanticipated money appear to influence real 
economic activity in the short-run. Nowadays, the general consensus on the effect of 
inflation on the real economy, can be well summarised by Taylor's (1996) first proposition, 
"about which there is now little disagreement ... 
is that there is no long-run trade off 
between the rate of inflation and the rate of unemployment" (Taylor, 1996, p. 186). 
Taylor's second proposition is that there is a short-r-un trade off between the variability of 
inflation and the variability of unemployment. There is vast empirical evidence concerning 
the effects of inflation uncertainty on real activity, measured either by employment or by 
output. U. S. studies with no assumption of fixed parameters for the inflation process tend to 
6 find a negative relationship between inflation uncertainty and real activity . Closing the 
discussion of the consequences of inflation uncertainty, we should also point out the 
important social costs of inflation. As Fischer (1996) argues, the social costs have been less 
comprehensively catalogued and established, but these too contribute importantly to the 
public's dislike of high inflation. Evidence ftom opinion polls suggests that high inflation is 
politically unpopular, and history confirms that high inflation rates are disruptive to the 
society, since they are associated with political and social disorder. 
2.3 Sources of Inflation Uncertainty 
2.3.1 Friedman-Ball link 
Inflation uncertainty is related to various monetary and non-monetary factors, such 
as uncertainty about price shocks and real shocks, uncertainty about money supply growth 
and its inflationary effects, the credibility of inflation targeting and other anti-inflationary 
policies, and relative-general price variability. Friedman (1977) claimed that there is a 
See among others, Zamowitz and Lambros (1987), Holland (1986), (1988), Evans and Wachtel (1993). 
64 
positive correlation between inflation rates and inflation uncertainty with the causation 
running from inflation to uncertainty about future inflation: "A burst of inflation produces 
strong pressure to counter it. Policy goes from one direction to the other, encouraging wide 
variation in the actual and anticipated rate of inflation ... Everyone recognizes that here is 
greater uncertainty about what actual inflation will turn out to be over any specific future 
interval 
... " (p. 466). Friedman's hypothesis implies a positive relation between inflation 
and inflation uncertainty, which eventually depresses real activity, leading to a positively 
sloped Phillips curve. The idea that a rise in the level of inflation raises uncertainty about 
future inflation is also central in Okun's (1971) work. Employing a rather simple statistical 
analysis, Okun found that countries with high inflation generally had more variable 
inflation. Okun interpreted the higher variability as an indication of higher uncertainty. 
Ball (1992) formalised Friedman's arguments in the context of an asymmetric 
information game between the public and the policy maker. Ball, following Alesina (1987), 
captures policy uncertainty by assuming that there are two types of policy-makers who 
alternate in power stochastically. The public knows that one type of policy-maker is willing 
to bear the cost of disinflation policies (Conservative-C), while the other is not (Liberal - 
L). Hence, L's loss function includes both unemployment and inflation, while C's includes 
only inflation: 
= (Ut - 
UO) 2+ a7rt 
2 
zC= 7ri 
2 
(2.1) 
(2.2) 
where, U is actual unemployment, V is socially optimal unemployment, 7r is the inflation 
rate and a is a taste parameter. 
A short-run Phillips curve determines the time series evolution of unemployment: 
e Ut ý-- L/V - 
(7rt 
- 7rt 
), L/V = bp +I (2.3) 
where, L1v denotes the natural rate of unemployment, and 7rt' is expected inflation at t 
conditioned on the information at t-I 7. 
Since LIN > LIO there is a time-consistency problem that leads to inflation. 
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Ball (1992) assumes the following time-sequence of events: at the start of each 
period the public forms rational expectations of inflation, then the policy maker is 
determined and sets the target for inflation by minimising the expected present value of the 
loss function, putting equal weights on all periods when is in power and not. Thus, the 
central bank doesn't have perfect control over inflation (see also Canzoneri, 1985) and 
actual inflation (; r) is determined only after the inflation shock (e) materialises: 
7rt = 7rt + et (2.4) 
where, 7r* is target inflation, and e is a white noise monetary control error, unobservable by 
the public. 
The policy makers switch to power by a Markov process: if L is at power at t- 1 then 
the probability that L remains in power at t is (1-c), while the probability of replacement by 
C is c. If at time t-1 the inflation rate remains bellow a positive bound 7r b, then at t 7r* is 
zero irrespective of which policy maker prevails. Hence, there is no uncertainty about 7r* 
because both C and L target zero inflation. In this case, the conditional variance of 
e inflation, Et-l[(7r, - 7rt )2], is equal to the constant variance of the monetary control error 
term: Et- I [et 2] = orý . If, however, at time t- I the policy maker 
is L with inflation above 7ý, 
then at t the inflation target is equal to: 7r+ > 7r bI if L remains in power, and zero, if C 
comes to power. Compared to the previous case, expected inflation at t increases (from 
zero) to: 7r+ (1-c), while the variance of inflation increases (from u2 
) to : c(I-c) 7r )2 + 0.2. 
Consequently, higher inflation rates imply higher inflation uncertainty via the uncertainty 
concerning the future monetary stance. 
Ball essentially shows that there is a positive relationship between the conditional 
mean and the conditional variance of inflation, with the causality running from the mean to 
the variance of inflation. A shortcoming of the Ball's model is that high inflation creates 
uncertainty only about disinflation, while in actual economies it appears that high inflation 
creates uncertainty about whether it will keep rising. The models of Evans and Wachtel 
(1993), and Holland (1993) also suggest that higher inflation uncertainty is part of the 
inflation welfare costs, since inflation precedes (Granger causes) inflation uncertainty. 
While Ball examined the effect of regime uncertainty, Holland's alternative explanation for 
the positive effect of inflation on inflation uncertainty considered the case in which agents 
are unsure about the price-level effects of a given change in the quantity of money. This 
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type of uncertainty arises because the length of nominal contracts and the degree of 
indexation change over time. In Holland's model unexpected inflation is positively related 
to the squared root of expected inflation. During the post war period, inflation rates have 
been almost always positive, thus the correlation between inflation rates and the level of 
8 uncertainty has been positive . 
Empirical evidence by Holland (1995) for the U. S., and Grier and Perry (1998) for 
the all the G7 countries during the post war period, suggests that, in agreement with the 
Friedman-Ball hypothesis, inflation Granger causes inflation uncertainty. Additional 
evidence supporting the Friedman-Ball hypothesis in the context of the U. S. economy has 
been provided by Bruner and Hess (1993) and Golob (1993) among others. Contrary to 
these studies, Fischer (1981), Cosimano and Jansen (1988), Baillie et al. (1996), find that 
the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty in the U. S. is insignificant. 
Finally, evidence by Joyce (1995), and Crawford and Kasumovich (1996) for the U. K. and 
Canada, respectively, yielded mixed results. 
2.3.2 Cukierman -Meltzer link 
Theoretical work by Cukierman and Meltzer (198 6) and Cukierman (1992) suggests 
that the causality runs from inflation uncertainty to inflation. Reversing the causality link of 
the Friedman-Ball argument, they show that higher inflation uncertainty will raise the 
optimal inflation rate. Both studies build upon the traditional Barro-Gordon framework: the 
policyrnaker maximises his own (politically motivated) objective function that is positively 
related to economic stimulation through monetary surprises and negatively related to 
monetary growth. The relative weights assigned to each target evolve stochastically over 
time. The money supply process is also random, due to imprecise monetary control 
procedures. Thus, the public faces an inference problem when trying to distinguish between 
persistent changes in the objectives, and transitory monetary control errors. An increase in 
uncertainty about money growth and inflation provides the policymaker with an incentive 
to create an inflation surprise to stimulate real activity leading to a positive correlation 
between uncertainty and optimal average inflation. 
8 Holland's model allows for a "stabilisation motive", i. e. an increased incentive to lower the inflation rate in 
order to lower also the resulting uncertainty and the real economic costs that accompany it. 
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Empirical evidence in favour of the Cukierman and Meltzer causality link is rather 
scarce. Fountas et al. (2000) employing monthly U. S. data provide strong evidence 
supporting a positive effect of changes in inflation uncertainty on inflation. Grier and Perry 
(1998) obtain similar results only for a sub-sample of their G7 countries sample (namely 
Japan and France). 
2.3.3. Dereveux link 
Dereveux (1989) also starts with the Barro-Gordon model to argue that a link 
between the inflation rate and the inflation uncertainty arises because of real disturbances. 
In order to show it, a stochastic element is added to money growth, and workers are 
assumed to endogenously choose the degree of wage indexation. Larger real shocks reduce 
the optimal degree of wage indexation. Thus, since less indexing renders surprise inflation 
more effective, the incentives of monetary policy to create surprise inflation increase. 
Unlike the Friedman-Ball and the Cukierman and Meltzer explanations, in Dereveux's 
model the link between inflation rates and inflation uncertainty is not causal but depends 
mainly on real shocks (output uncertainty). 
2.4 Measuring Inflation Uncertainty 
Unlike the inflation rate, inflation uncertainty is a non-directly observable variable, 
therefore in empirical investigations of the inflation-uncertainty relationship, a measure for 
uncertainty needs to be constructed. 
2.4.1. Unconditional volatility measures of uncertainty 
A usual practise in the early studies of the 1970's and 1980's was to proxy inflation 
uncertainty by the unconditional variance of (observed) inflation. In the first empirical 
study on this topic, Okun (1971), using a sample of seventeen industrial countries for the 
period 1951-1968, found a high positive correlation between the average rate of inflation 
and its variability. Additional cross-country evidence supporting Okun's findings was 
provided by Logue and Willett (1976), Logue and Sweeney (1981), and Taylor (1981) 
among others. This evidence however, concerns the relationship between the cross- 
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sectional mean and variance of inflation and how it varies over time, thus it is of little 
relevance in supporting the theories that relate the time-series variance of inflation and its 
mean. 
Furthermore, cross-sectional analysis implicitly assumes homogeneity over time 
both across countries and within countries. According to Gale (1981), this assumption is 
rather questionable. Fischer (1981) and Katsimbris (1985) used a moving average inflation 
rate (either overlapping or non-overlapping) and the corresponding moving standard 
deviation, in to provide time series evidence for the inflation-uncertainty relation on a 
country-by-country basis. Fischer's results indicate a positive link between inflation and his 
proxy for uncertainty, while Katsimbris found no significant relation for the majority of the 
countries into consideration. 
The employment of inflation variability as a proxy for inflation uncertainty has been 
widely criticised. As Driffill et al. (1990) point out, " ... the fact that inflation is variable 
does not mean that it is unpredictable: variability and uncertainty are distinct properties". 
Higher inflation variability implies higher uncertainty if and only if agents do not possess 
the relevant information to predict part of the increased variability. For instance, if agents 
possess enough information to predict a change in monetary policy, then, even though the 
unconditional variance of inflation increases, the uncertainty accompanying it is indeed 
very small. It is the unpredictable part of inflation volatility that seriously affects the 
efficiency of the economic system. Studies of the type cited above don't distinguish 
between predictable and unpredictable volatility, thus their results should be interpreted 
with extra cautiousness. 
2.4.2 Survey-based measures of uncertainty 
Apart from volatility measures, survey based measures have often been used to 
proxy inflation uncertainty. When using survey data, there are two major techniques to 
proxy inflation uncertainty. One approach proxies uncertainty by the variance of inflation 
forecasts across individual respondents to surveys on expected inflation. Uncertainty will 
be low when the survey participants' expectations on future inflation are similar, and vice 
versa. In the context of this approach, the surveys that have typically been used in the U. S., 
are the Livingston survey of professional economic forecasters and the Michigan 
University's SRC (Survey Research Center) survey of households. Studies based on these 
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surveys tend to find a positive relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty (see 
for instance, Cukierman and Wachtel, 1979, Fischer, 1981, Holland, 1995). More recently, 
Johnson (2002) measured uncertainty as the standard deviation of individual forecasts 
within a calendar year, and as the average next-year forecast error and finds a strong 
positive link between past inflation and current uncertainty in line with the Friedman-Ball 
view. Johnson (2002) analysed five inflation-targeting, and six non-targeting countries 
using data from the Consensus Forecasts, and its predecessor, Economic Forecasts: a 
monthly worldwide survey. 
An alternative approach in measuring uncertainty from survey data is advocated by 
Zamowitz and Lambros (1987). They pointed out that a proxy for inflation uncertainty 
should not be based on the standard deviation of forecasts, since it provides only a measure 
of the heterogeneity of expectations across individual forecasters. Their preferred measure 
of uncertainty the average size of the confidence interval for individual inflation forecasts. 
The respondent with a wider confidence interval is presumed to be more uncertain, and vice 
versa. Zamowitz and Lambros employed data from the ASA-NBER Survey of Professional 
Forecasters (SPF), which, in addition to point forecasts, asks each participant to assign a 
probability to his/her forecast. Their evidence suggests a positive relation between inflation 
and inflation uncertainty. More recently, Giordani and Soderlind (2000) re-examined the 
statistical properties of the SPF data over the period 1969-99, and certified Zarnowitz and 
Lambros' empirical finding. 
2.4.3 Conditional volatility measures of uncertainty 
(a) Fixed Parameters in the Inflation Process 
Ever since Engle's (1982) seminal paper on ARCH modelling of U. K. inflation, and 
the subsequent GARCH extension by Bollerslev (1986), ARCH and GARCH, techniques 
have been very popular in proxying inflation uncertainty. In the context of these models, 
the estimated one-step-ahead conditional variance of inflation serves as a proxy for the 
unobservable inflation uncertainty. More specifically, the ARCH(q) model specifies the 
conditional mean of inflation, 7r, 
lit-I 
, as a function of a vector of explanatory variables, 
Xt-1, while the conditional error variance, h,, is a function of lagged values of the squared 
forecast errors: 
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ni I I, -, - N(yX, -I, hd (2.5) 
E(it I It-, ) = h, = ao + Ei=lq ai 6ýt-j (2.6) 
et =; rt - yxt -1 (2.7) 
where, It-I is the information set at time t-1, et is the the one-period forecast error, and the 
elements of vector v and the c? s are parameters to be estimated by maximum likelihood. 
The parameters in the conditional variance Eq. (2.6) should satisfy the following 
restrictions in orders for the conditional variance to be positive and covariance-stationary: 
ao >0ý0:! ý Fi=l 
q 
ai <1 (2.8) 
If ai =0, for i= Lq , then Eq. (2.6) collapses to the standard homoskedastic 
specification for the conditional error variance: ht = ao (constant). Eq. (2.6) implies that 
inflation uncertainty, proxied by the conditional variance of inflation, ht, will increase if 
periods with large forecast errors are grouped together. Thus, if there a positive relationship 
between the absolute size of forecast errors and the level of inflation, there will also be a 
positive relationship between inflation uncertainty and the level of inflation. 
It is often the case that long lag processes for the squared residual in (2.6) are 
needed to capture the inflation dynamics. The GARCH(p, q) model by Bollerslev (1986) 
extended Engle's original work by allowing the conditional variance to follow an 
ARMA(p, q) process: 
h, = ao + Zi=l q aiii + lj=, P, 8jht-j (2.9) 
In order to model the conditional variance of U. S. inflation, Bollerslev employed a 
GARCH(l, 1) model, which corresponds to an ARCH(oo) with geometrically declining 
weight: 
ao + ai it-i + 81 ht-, (2.10) 
where, the conditional variance positivity and stationarity restrictions imply that: 
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ao >0,0 s- a, +, 81 <1 
The presence of the autoregressive term (ht-1) in the conditional variance Eq. (2.10) 
implies that the impact of inflation shocks declines geometrically over time. The 
GARCH(1,1) model offers a reasonable approximation of a higher order ARCH, and, due 
to its implicit parsimony, it has been preferred to ARCH specifications in modelling the 
persistence in inflation uncertainty. 
As Grier and Perry (1998) argue, the ARCH-GARCH time varying conditional 
variance estimates of inflation uncertainty correspond better (than survey or moving 
standard deviation measures) to the notion of inflation uncertainty as defined in theoretical 
models, such as the Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) model. In addition, contrary to other 
measures of inflation uncertainty, ARCH-GARCH specifications allow the researcher to 
formally test the null hypothesis of a constant uncertainty over the sample period. If the 
tests for ARCH-GARCH effects accept the null of homoskedasticity, then this is equivalent 
to accepting the null of constant inflation uncertainty. Finally, as Pagan (1984) showed, the 
simultaneous conditional mean and variance estimation, implicit in ARCH-GARCH, is 
more efficient than a two-step process, when working with generated regressors. Studies of 
the inflation-inflation uncertainty relationship, based on survey or unconditional volatility 
measures, are typically forced to a two-step estimation process. 
As far as the inflation - inflation uncertainty causality puzzle is concerned though, 
the seminal studies by Engle (1982), (1983) and Bollerslev (1986) simply compared the 
estimated conditional variance series with the average inflation rate over various periods, 
rather than performing an formal statistical test of the Friedman hypothesis. The results are 
mixed. ARCH and/or GARCH effects are usually statistically significant, implying that 
inflation uncertainty is time varying but there appears to be no systematic relationship 
between the level of inflation and the measure of inflation uncertainty. For instance Engle 
(1982) found significant ARCH effects in U. K. inflation over the period 1958-77, and the 
estimated conditional variance increased substantially, along with the average inflation rate, 
during the 1970's. 
Engle (1983) examined the U. S. inflation rate, and, surprisingly, the estimated 
conditional variance for the highly inflationary 1970's was not significantly greater than 
conditional variance of the low-inflation late 1950's and 1960's, and both were well bellow 
the variances in the late 1940's and early 1950's. Engle's explanation was that, "although the 
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level of inflation in the seventies was high, it was predictable". Thus, contrary to the 
Friedman-Ball causality link, an increase in the level of inflation does not necessarily lead 
to an increase in uncertainty. Engle and Kraft (1983) and Bollerslev (1986) reached similar 
conclusions. 
The symmetry restriction on the conditional variance of standard ARCH, GARCH 
models - implying that "good" and "bad" news have identical effects on volatility- has been 
criticised by Bruner and Hess (1993). In their view, the assumption that agents become 
more uncertain about future inflation, whether inflation unexpectedly rises or falls may lead 
to misleading estimates of inflation uncertainty. Bruner and Hess (1993) and Joyce (1995) 
pioneered the employment of asymmetric GARCH models in estimating inflation 
uncertainty. Engle (1990) developed an asymmetric GARCH (AGARCH) model which 
under certain conditions, allows a negative shock to increase uncertainty by less than 
positive shock of the same size. For instance, in the context of the AGARCH(1,1) 
conditional variance Eq. (2.12), the necessary condition for the negative shocks to have a 
less pronounced effect on uncertainty is that c>0. For c=0, the AGARCH model nests 
the symmetric GARCH. 
ht = ao + al ( Et- I+ C) 
2+ 81 ht-I (2.12) 
Another asymmetric model tha has been used to model inflation uncertainty is the 
threshold GARCH (TGARCH) model by Zakoian (1994) and Glosten et al. (1993). The 
TGARCH model adds a dummy variable to the GARCH process. Consider the 
TGARCH(l, 1) conditional variance equation given by (2.13): 
ht = ao + ai 41 + 61 ht-I + dit-, Dt-I 
where, A=0 if 6, -, ý: 
0 (positive shock), and Dt =1 
(2.13) 
if 6t-l <0 (negative shock) 
The necessary condition for negative inflation shocks to have a smaller effect on 
uncertainty is: d<0. Finding d#0 implies asymmetry in the conditional variance. 
The AGARCH model captures the asymmetry in the inflation shocks by allowing 
its news impact curve to be centered at . 6t-I =-c, which is to the left of the origin when 
c >0, while the TGARCH model is centered at . 6,1 = 0, but it has a steeper slope for positive 
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forecast errors if d<0. For a comparison of the symmetric GARCH specification and 
various asymmetric alternatives see Engle and Ng (1993). 
Bruner and Hess (1993) and Joyce (1995) both reject the symmetry restriction in 
their GARCH models for U. S. and U. K. inflation. Joyce found that inflation uncertainty is 
more responsive to positive inflation shocks than to negative shocks. Crawford and 
Kasumovich (1996) using Canadian data fail to reject the symmetry restriction. These three 
studies examined the inflation level- inflation uncertainty link more explicitly, by including 
lagged inflation rates in the conditional variance equation. Their finding of a significantly 
positive coefficient for lagged inflation implies that, consistently with the Friedman Ball 
hypothesis, higher inflation causes higher inflation uncertainty. Grier and Perry (1998) 
estimated the conditional variance of inflation from GARCH and asymmetric GARCH 
models and then -employed Granger-causality tests to test for the direction of causality 
between average inflation and inflation uncertainty. They found that in all G7 countries 
over the period 1948-93, inflation significantly Granger-caused inflation uncertainty. 
Baillie et al. (1996) advocated the employment of GARCH-in-mean (GARCH-M) 
models in testing for interactions between inflation and inflation uncertainty. They 
estimated a fractionally integrated GARCH-M model of the inflation rate and then tested 
the hypotheses that lagged inflation is a significant regressor in the conditional variance 
equation (Friedman-Ball link), and that the conditional variance is a significant regressor in 
the conditional mean inflation equation (Cukierman and Meltzer link). Baillie et al. (1996) 
discovered strong feedback effects between post war inflation and uncertainty, only in 
U. K., and the three high-inflation countries of their sample, namely Argentina, Brazil, and 
Israel. Fountas et al. (2000) employed the following GARCH-M (1,1) specification in order 
to model monthly U. S. inflation over the period 1960-99: 
Xt ý'-- VO + Yl Irt-I + r2 Mt-12 + Y3 7-rt-24 + (51 ht 
ht = ao + a, e2,1 + 81 ht-I + 52 7rt- I 
(2.14) 
(2.15) 
The estimated parameters 81 and S2were significantly positive indicating a strong 
positive bi-directional relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty. However, 
including lagged inflation in the conditional variance equation may cause problems 
regarding the non-negativity of the variance. The possibility of a negative variance can be 
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avoided by using the square or the absolute value of inflation. Crawford and Kassumovich 
(1996) employed three alternative inflation variables: the level of inflation, the absolute 
change in inflation and squared inflation 9. All three variables were found to be positive and 
statistically significant in explaining next period's conditional variance. 
(b) Time-Varying Parameters in the Inflation Process 
Evans and Wachtel (1993) stress that the assumption of fixed parameters in the 
inflation process overestimates the degree to which agents can forecast inflation, and 
consequently underestimates inflation uncertainty. Evans and Wachtel (1993) decompose 
the sources of inflation uncertainty into two components: "regime uncertainty component" 
and "certainty equivalence component". The second component ignores uncertainty about 
future inflation regimes and reflects only the variance of future shocks to the inflation 
process. The first component reflects the agents' uncertainty about the characteristics of the 
current policy regime or even future regimes, if there is a possibility that the regime will 
change. Thus, cross-counties differences in the conduct of monetary policy may account 
for the differences in the average levels of uncertainty. The decomposition employed by 
Evans and Wachtel allows inflation uncertainty to change over time as agents keep 
updating their information on the current regime and their expectations about the future 
regime. 
Evans (1991) assumes that the inflation process varies over time due to changes in 
the frequency of occurrence of structural disturbances affecting inflation, such as money 
supply, productivity, and price shocks. The GARCH specification that he employed allows 
the parameter vector y in the conditional mean equation to be time varying in order to take 
into consideration new information as soon as it becomes available: 
m, I I, -, - N(ytX, -,, 
ht + Xt-lfltXt-'d 
ht = ao + Ei=lq ai i, j + Fi=, P A h, -i 
. 6t = ; rt - rt Xt- I 
rt = yt-I ut ut - N(O, 
(2.16) 
(2.17) 
(2.18) 
(2.19) 
9 The absolute change in inflation was used by the authors to test whether inflation uncertainty is more closely 
related to changes in inflation, as opposed to the level of inflation, while squared inflation was used to test for 
a non-linear relationship. As Bruner and Hess (1993) argue though, such symmetric measures of inflation, 
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where, Ot is the conditional covariance matrix of yt given the information set at t- 1. 
If vt is known with certainty then Qt is equal to the null matrix and the conditional 
variance inflation collapses to ht that is the standard GARCH conditional variance. Evans' 
results for the U. S. over the period 1960-1988, indicate that short-run uncertainty, measured 
by the conditional variance ht + Xt_1QtXt_ 1 is not related to the level of inflation, while long- 
run uncertainty, measured by the conditional variance of steady-state inflation, is positively 
related to the level of inflation. Steady-state inflation is defined for ut =0 (no unexpected 
changes in the structure of inflation) and &=0 (no inflation shocks). 
The underlying intuition for decomposing uncertainty into short-run and long-run 
components is that the effect of inflation uncertainty on economic decision-making differs 
over the time-hon'zon employed. Short-run uncertainty is most likely to affect temporal 
economic decisions. Lucas (1973) showed that changes in the next period's inflation 
variance affect the inferences that agents draw from aggregate price movements about 
shifts in current individual relative prices. If short-run uncertainty is higher, agents will 
attribute more of a particular change in the price of a product to the general price changes; 
thus, the output response will be lower. On the other hand, uncertainty about the long-term 
prospects of inflation affects more seriously intertemporal decisions, which require long- 
term commitments. 
Ball and Cecchetti (1990) decomposed US inflation changes into shifts in trend 
inflation and temporary deviations from the trend. Short-run uncertainty depends mainly 
on the variance of temporary deviations, while long-run uncertainty depends mainly on the 
variance of the trend. Their findings indicate that a higher level of inflation makes the trend 
considerably less stable, while the effect on the variance of deviations from the trend is 
smaller. Thus, there is a positive effect of inflation rates to long-run uncertainty, implying 
substantial inflation costs of the type analysed by Friedman (1977), that is, higher level of 
risk for individuals engaging in nominal contracting, and therefore lower economic 
0 efficiency' 
In Table A2.1 in Appendix II we summarise a number of papers presented in 
section 2.4.3. In the majority of these studies, the empirical investigations end by the mid- 
with the same value for inflation and deflation shocks, are not consistent with a test of the Friedman 
hypothesis. 
10 See also Kim (1993) for additional US evidence. 
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1990's therefore not covering the crucial decade when inflation targeting (explicit or 
implicit) became the prevalent monetary policy framework. 
2.5 An overview of UK inflation data 
Inflation is measured as the first difference of the seasonally adjusted log consumer 
price index (CPI), ir, = 100 * (In CPI, - In CPI, -, 
) , using monthly and quarterly data in order 
to examine the relationship between inflation- uncertainty and IT over alternative time 
horizonsi I. This study utilises 370 monthly and 122 quarterly UK observations over the 
period 1972-2002. A decade of targeting experience is covered allowing us to study the 
effects of IT on inflation dynamics and uncertainty over a long horizon. The data are 
obtained from OtCD's Main Economic Indicators: Historical Statistics series. 
UK monetary policy has undergone important changes throughout the period under 
investigation. While from the late-1970's till the mid-1980's formal broad monetary targets 
were in use, these targets were abandoned in the 1987 Medium Term Financial Strategy 12 . 
A target for narrow money continue to exist but more emphasis was placed on a range of 
other indicators, including the exchange rate and the growth rate of nominal GDP. The 
pound was anchored to the Deutsche Mark in order to bring down inflation through 
imported credibility, first informally, and then formally by entering the ERM. in October 
1990. On the 16 th of September 1992, U. K. abandoned the ERM after strong downward 
pressures on the exchange rate and large official intervention to support it. In October 1992 
the UK government adopted IT. By May 1997, the UK central bank was awarded 
operational independence in setting short-term interest rates to meet the government's stated 
target-currently 2.5%. 
Figure 2.1 plots the year-to-year mean and standard deviation of annual inflation. It 
appears that periods of higher average inflation correspond to periods of more volatile 
inflation. During the 10 years of targeting regime, both the level of inflation and its 
unconditional volatility have been strikingly lower. 
11 Quarterly and even lower frequency data are more appropriate from the point of view of the monetary 
authority, due to the long lags in the implementation of monetary policy. Monthly sampling provides a 
robustness check for the quarterly results. 
" More specifically, throughout the period July 1972 (1" full month of floating exchange rate) to June 1976, 
policy attempts to control inflation were largely non-monetary, i. e. they worked through prices and 
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Figure 2.1: Annual inflation rate, United Kingdom, 1973-2002. 
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2.5.1 Unit Root tests 
Previous evidence considering the stationarity of UK inflation rate provides mixed 
results. For instance, Grier and Perry (1998) show that CPI inflation over the post WWII 
period (1948: 10-1993: 12) is non-stationary. Joyce (1995) uses quarterly data and contends 
that over the same period, inflation is stationary, but over a shorter sub-period (1976-1994), 
the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test cannot reject the unit root-null hypothesis. Table 
2.1 reports the results from ADF and Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests with an intercept 
and a deten-ninistic linear trend. Following Fountas et al. (2000), a sensitivity test is 
performed for the order of augmentation (d) by estimating the ADF regressions with a 
small and a large number of lagged difference terms. In addition, Table 2.1 presents the 
ADF t-statistic for orders of augmentation chosen by the reduction and the Schwartz 
information criteria (see Table 2.1 notes for more details). PP tests are also estimated for 
alternative Bartlett kernel truncation lags. Overall, the results suggest that UK CPI inflation 
over the period 1972-2002 can be treated as integrated of order zero, 1(0), variable. Thus, 
the methods suggested by Ball and Cecchetti (1990) and Evans (1991) to decompose 
inflation uncertainty into long-run and short-run components, based upon the assumption of 
unit root in the level of inflation, are not applicable to our sample. Since the stationarity 
wages controls. The period: July 1976 - October 1985 was charactensed by f M3 targeting. 
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criterion is satisfied, we proceed by estimating models from the autoregressive family to 
accommodate for the significant inertia inherent in inflation. 
Table 2.1: Unit root Tests, UK CPI inflation rate, 1972-2002. 
Monthly Quarterly 
d ADF pp d ADF _ pp 
UB: 4 -5.82*** -11.59*** UB: 1 -4.39 *** -6.21 
LB: 24 -3.21 -13.94 LB: 8 -3.33 -6.52 
R: 11 -3.58 -14.21 R: 7 -3.52 -6.49 
SIC: 5 -4.31 -12.99 SIC: 0 -6.31 -6.31 
Note: 
(a) An intercept and'a deterministic trend are included in the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Philips 
Perron (PP) models. Inclusion of the trend is needed to capture the reduction in average inflation that took 
place throughout the sample period. The reported t-statisfics test the null hypothesis that inflation contains a 
unit root. 
(b) In order to correct for serial correlation, ADF uses d lagged differences of inflation. PP tests employ a 
non-parametric estimator of the variance-covariance matrix with d truncation lags. 
(c) UB: upper bound of lagged difference terms; LB: lower bound of lagged difference terrns; R: number of 
lagged difference terms chosen by the reduction criterion. In the ADF regressions we set an upper bound of 
lagged differences, equal to UB, and test down by sequentially removing the last lag until a significant (at 5% 
level) lag is reached; SIC: order of augmentation for ADF that minimises the Schwartz information criterion 
starting from upper bound UB. 
(d) *, **, *** indicate rejection of the null-unit root hypothesis at 10,5,1 % level of significance 
respectively. 
2.6 Empirical models and results 
2.6.1 Benchmark autoregressive conditional mean model 
The first step in time varying volatility modelling is to specify a sufficient equation 
for the conditional mean of the series under investigation. Autoregressive specifications 
are popular in the empirical literature and are employed by Grier and Perry (1998), and 
Joyce (1995) among others to analyse the UK experience. Based on the Akaike - Schwartz 
information criteria and the whiteness of the residuals, general-to-specific approach led to 
the following models: 
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Monthly (M) )TI = YO + V, 7, r, 
-, 
+ Y21rt-3 + Y3)71-6 + Y47t-12 + Ult (2.20) 
Quarterly (Q) ll*t --.,: i'o + /Vli7t-I + r27rt-4 + U2t (2.21) 
Allowing for maximum lag-length of one year, or more, is usual practise in time 
series studies of inflation in an effort to model the persistence of the data (see e. g. 
Bollerslev, 1986). Table 2.2 summarizes the ordinary least squares parameter estimates 
(robust estimates) and diagnostic statistics of Eqs. (2.20) and (2.21). At first glance, the 
benchmark autoregressive model performs adequately. All lagged inflation coefficients are 
significant at the 5% level and add up to around 0.8-0.9 in both monthly and quarterly 
regressions indicating high level of persistence. Batini and Haldane (1999) also specify a 
central value of 0.8 for the UK inflation persistence parameter. A battery of diagnostic tests 
indicates that the residuals are serially uncorrelated. Ljung-Box and Breusch-Godfrey serial 
correlation tests are insignificant at all lags. 
2.6.2 Sensitivity analysis 
The results are examined for robustness with respect to a temporal sample division 
of particular interest for the British economy. We would expect inflation to exhibit a 
structural break around October 1992 when IT commenced. Therefore, Eqs. (2.20) and 
(2.2 1) are re-estimated for both sub-periods, before and after IT. The results indicate crucial 
changes in the time-series behaviour of inflation. In monthly regressions, columns 4-5 of 
Table 2.2. the estimated coefficient of 1-month lagged inflation (rj) becomes insignificant 
during IT. On the other hand, the 12-month lag coefficient (r4) increases substantially in 
magnitude and significance: from 0.098 and significant at the 10% level, it becomes 0.413 
and significant at the 1% level. Similar patterns are revealed using quarterly data (Table 
2.2, columns 8-9). Inflation persistence, as proxied by the coefficient of l-quarter lagged 
inflation (ri), turns out to be insignificant over the IT sub-period. 
Parameter stability in Eqs. (2.20), (2.2 1) is fon-nally tested with Chow breakpoint 
tests. With monthly data, the Chow F-statistic for breakpoint in October 1992 is significant 
at the 1% level, firmly rejecting the null of no-structural change in inflation dynamics. 
With quarterly data however, the Chow test fails to identify statistically significant 
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structural change. Taking into account that the residual volatility of the estimated models is 
not equal over the two sub-samples but much higher during the pre-targeting period, we 
also calculate the Wald statistic for structural change that allows for unequal sub-sample 
variances. The null hypothesis of no structural change and independent samples is strongly 
rejected. 
In general, temporal sample divisions and breakpoint tests suggest that the 
commonly employed benchmark autoregressive model is rather misspecified. In the 
following section we attempt a modification of the benchmark to avoid the instability 
arising from not modelling the effect of IT on inflation dynamics. 
2.6.3 Dummy Variable model and the dynamics of inflation 
A multiplicative dummy variable is introduced in Eq. (2.20) via lags 1 and 12 and in 
Eq. (2.2 1) via the first lag, in order to allow for change in the slope of average inflation 
after targeting: 
(M) 'rt ý- oVO 
+ Cyl + r5Dt )7rt-l + Y21rt-3 + 
OV37&rt-6 
+ (r4 + 76DI)lrl-12 + e,, (2.22) 
(Q) /Tt rO + CVI + r3DI 
)'Tt-I + r2lrt-4 + e2t (2.23) 
where, Dt is a dummy variable equal to zero during the pre-targeting period and one during 
IT 13 . Variants of the above equations, with 
lagged inflation augmented by indicators of 
policy regimes or economic events, are often employed in the inflation persistence 
literature (see e. g. Alogoskoufis, 1992). The results in Table 2.2 reveal an improvement in 
statistical performance associated with the dummy augmented models. The adjusted R2 
increases while residual volatility declines. 
In monthly regressions, all inflation lags as well as the dummy coefficients v5and y6 
are significant at the 1% level -their negative sum (y5 + r6= -0.192) indicates that inflation 
" We experimented by allowing the IT dummy to interact with all lagged inflation variables but the results 
were similar to those from Eqs. (2.22) and (2.23) in terms of parameter significance and worse in diagnostics. 
We also allowed for intercept change but the dummy coefficient was insignificant and the results are not 
presented to save space. In monthly regressions D, is zero before October 1992 and one onwards. In quarterly 
regressions D, is zero before 1992 Q4 and one onwards. 
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persistence declined under IT. The Wald test-statistic, X2 version, for the joint significance 
of y5and y6is equal to 15.59, rejecting the null (, v5 = y6= 0) at the 1% level. In accordance 
with monthly results, estimates of the quarterly model in Table 2.2 suggest that IT has 
eliminated inflation inertia. Using a Wald test, the hypothesis yJ +Y3= 0 cannot be rejected 
at the usual levels of significance. Siklos (1999) agrees that inflation persistence has been 
significantly reduced in a number of explicit IT countries such as UK, New Zealand, and 
Canada among others. The dummy- augmented equations offer two main advantages: first, 
improved fit and second, they allow verifying the negative effect from a decade of targeting 
on UK inflation persistence. 
2.6.4 Time-varying inflation volatility and pre-tests of the inflation-un certainty link 
Before estimating the conditional variance of inflation, it is necessary to examine 
the residuals of the mean equation for time-varying volatility. The standard test is a 
Lagrange multiplier test developed by Engle (1982) and involves regressing the squared 
OLS residuals from the conditional mean against a constant and their lagged values: 
e, (2.24) 
where, the null hypothesis of constant variance (homoskedasticity) implies that: 
'51 = '52 '= - -= 
Sq =0 (2.25) 
Bollerslev (1986) shows that the LM test for aq th order ARCH is equivalent to a 
test for GARCH (ij) where i+j =q. The results from the tests are reported in Table 2.3. 
There is overwhelming evidence that the residuals of the AR-dummy variable models 
(2.22) and (2.23) exhibit time-varying variance. The F and TR 
2 test statistics indicate that 
the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected. In addition, Ljung-Box statistics of the 
squared residuals (Q) are all significant at the I% level signifying the typical volatility 
clustering of an ARCH process. A key pattern emerging from Table 2.3 is that the IT period 
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coincides with a significant reduction in the variability of inflation. While at the pre- 
targeting period there is strong evidence of time varying residual variance, the period after 
October 1992 is clearly more stable as none of the diagnostic statistics suggests ARCH 
effects. 
A pre-test of the inflation-inflation uncertainty link can be performed by regressing 
the squared OLS residuals from the conditional mean (proxy for inflation uncertainty) on a 
constant and a variable representing the effect of past inflation. Following Crawford and 
Kasumovich (1996), three alternative lagged inflation variables were considered: the level 
of inflation (asymmetric measure), the absolute change in inflation, and squared inflation 
(symmetric measures). The results are presented in Table 2.4. In full sample and pre- 
targeting regressions uncertainty is significantly and positively related to symmetric and 
asymmetric measures of past inflation. The relationship appears to break down during IT 
since none of the lagged inflation variables is different from zero at the usual levels of 
significance. 
Table 2.4: Inflation uncertainty and lagged inflation variables. 
Monthly Regressions 
Equation 2.22 Equation 2.20 
Lagged Inflation 02/73 - 11/02 02/73 - 09/92 10/92 - 11/02 
Variable Full Sample Pre-Target After-Target 
Rt-I 0.392 0.457 -0.033 
A7r, 
-, 
1 0.293 0.349 -0.06 
7rt- 120.121 0.115 -0.062 
Quarterly Regressions 
Equation 2.21 Equation 2.21 
Lagged Inflation 02/73 - 03/02 02/73 - 03/02 02/73 - 03/02 
Variable Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample 
71t-1 0.518 0.518 0.518 
AIT, 0.692 0.692 0.692 
7Et- 12 0.072 0.072 0.072 
Note 
(a) The table presents the estimated coefficient of the lagged inflation variable obtained by regressing the 
squared OLS residuals from Equations 2.20 to 2.23 on a constant and the lagged inflation variable. 
(b) *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10,5,1 % level respectively. 
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As we have already point out, GARCH estimation has several advantages as 
compared to the current two-step process. Hence, the next section examines the 
interaction between inflation, uncertainty and IT in the context of GARCH-related 
frameworks. 
2.6.5 GARCH models of inflation uncertainty 
A model that tests simultaneously the Friedman-Ball and Cukierman-Meltzer links 
is the GARCH-in-mean (GARCH-M) with the conditional variance augmented by lagged 
inflation (see for instance Fountas et al., 2000, Kontonikas, 2004). We too allow for 
feedback effects between the conditional mean and the conditional variance by modifying 
mean Eqs. (2.22)and (2.23) as follows: 
7rt -: ": 70 + (*Yl + r5D, )lrt-I + r,. 7r, -3 
+ r37rt-6 + (r4 + V6D, )7rt-12+45j +vlt 
+v2, lrt "'-70 + Cyl + 73Dt)lrt-I + 
72'rt-4 
(2.26) 
(2.27) 
where, h, denotes the conditional variance of inflation 14 . Coefficient 
6 represents the effect 
of inflation uncertainty on average inflation. An estimated positive and significant 6 is 
interpreted as evidence in favour of the Cukierman-Meltzer argument. The augmented 
GARCH(p, q) conditional variance models that we employ, utilise the following generic 
form: 
qp 
.,, 
8jht ht = (p + a, e, z , +j] -j 
where, zt = [z, t ... z, t and 
(2.28) 
A ... Aj denote the vector of n-exogenous 
variance regressors and their coefficient vector respectively. The standard approach is to 
restrict zt to contain only past levels of inflation. In this case, estimated positive and 
significant A-coefficients are consistent with the Friedman-Ball link. Brunner and Hess 
" The volatility measure used in the conditional mean Eqs. (2.26), (2.27) is standard deviation rather than 
variance. This approach to the in-mean modelling of inflation was introduced by Baillie et al. (1996). 
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(1993) point out that, tests of the Friedman hypothesis (higher inflation leads to more 
variable inflation) are consistent only with z, including asymmetric measures of past 
inflation". Nevertheless, in order to examine whether inflation variability is affected by the 
direction and/or the magnitude of price level changes we employ both asymmetric, zt = XI-1, 
and symmetric, zt = Ixt-11, measures of lagged inflation. 
As indicated in Table 2.5 by quasi-maximum likelihood 16 estimates of the 
symmetric GARCH-M model formed by Eqs. (2.26), (2.27) and (2.28), there is a strong 
positive relationship between past inflation and the current conditional volatility of 
inflation. In most cases a GARCH(l, l) version of Eq. (2.28) is utilised. Ljung-Box 
statistics of the standarised and the squared standarised residuals are all insignificant 
implying proper model specification. In agreement with the Friedman-Ball link, the 
estimate of the -1-period lagged inflation coefficient, A, is positive and statistically 
significant. Contrary to the Cukierman-Meltzer prediction, inflation uncertainty has no 
impact on average inflation as 6 is insignificant in all cases. The finding of a positive link 
between past inflation and current variability does not depend on the data frequency and on 
whether symmetric or assymetric inflation measures are in use. 
Figure 2.2 scatter-plots estimates of the conditional variance from GARCH-M 
models versus the corresponding lagged inflation variable. The upward slopping fitted 
linear regression lines (top 2 diagrams) depict a positive relationship using both lagged and 
absolute lagged inflation. Kernel regression fitted lines (bottom 2 diagrams) reveal similar 
patterns. 
On the other hand, asymmetric measures of lagged inflation imply that the monetary authority can reduce 
uncertainty by pursuing deflation Furthermore, improper negative estimates of the conditional variance may 
be obtained since sample monthly and quarterly inflation rates take both positive and negative values. 
16 Due to the departure of residuals from normality, as indicated by the Jarque-Berra test, we employ the 
quasi-maximum likelihood estimation which returns consistent estimates and compute standard errors using 
the method of Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992). 
87 
*Z: 
CL) 
liz 
10 
E- 
C 
S 
C 
(1) 
04 
C11 
*** rf) -il - C-4 elf) 
C14 
C, 4 
C14 
r- (c) I IT 'T 
00 
C', 
Eu-: 8 
cq 
Cý 
W) 06 (5 C'4 kn 
C; 
c; C) C) 
I 
00 
\ýc 
(14 
C; 
00 
Clf) r- ý - kr, ItT r- 
,I I m 
ý W) 
Nt 
-4 
cn u k "' C> r-ý n ý, 0 ri 00 
00 
<:: > 11 c) ý 2 ý Cq '-, clý \, O c> kr) - ý - V) ýe CD cr tT 
ý Pý "0 < rq 
cn (C rý 
ce 
cli 
****ý, 0 ** rn 
(Z) rq (-) -0 l") -t rý c> C-4 re) eýZ: 
) kr) f, ý ý KA -. 
CD c; d c> CD 1 
CD 00 Glý rn <> V) (> - CD 
tr) - <Z r- c, 2 CD v) ý- CD ýt r, ) i 
c3 cý CD (Z 1 
o- 
4ý 
- 
u> 
c"I V'ý rq rf) 
C> 
00 C, 4 
cý <=; rn 
ýn 
C'ý 
CN 
It rq 
CD 
C> 
6 
8 
00 
6 
9- 
Cý4 00 oc 7S 
00 - Cý 00 
krý Cý 
C, 4 
00 
CY a 
C-1 <= C-s ý-- 't 'I', 00 r, ý 
4 cq 
00 
C-4 
Cý CY 5 cy CY 
" "D 00 V) " C7-ý 
rn rn 00 r- re) 
olý 
rn 
00 
00 
Nt C-4 
.j 
CY CY CY 
00 C11 00 
1: T 
00 C-, 
F-ý -T 
00 
cý 'rý Cq ý ý - 
CY CY 
0 -Z: 
g'-, 4 
-0 
40 
-0 r_ 
-0 Z-- 
CIJ C) 
.Z t-- 
>:, 12. 
., Z rn 
u* . - Q) 
=1 .2 
"e a; .- 
>A 
Z. u1 
IZ 
E* 
oc 
oc 
Figure 2.2: Scatter plots and linear - kernel fit regressions lines of symmetric quarterly GARCH-M conditional variance versus past inflation. 
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Local polynomial kernel regressions fit Y, at each value x, by choosing the parameters P to minimise the 
Z N[(yi 2 weighted sum-of-squared residuals: m(x) = -i=l - PO - PI(X-Xi) Pk(X-X i)k] K(x-Xi)/h where N is the 
number of observations, h is the smoothing parameter (bandwidth) and K is a Kernel function that integrates 
to one. In specifying the order of the polynomial to be fitted at each data point, the local linear option, that 
sets k-- I at each x, was selected. The Kernel weighting function employed is the Epanechnicov function. 
The Threshold GARCH (TGARCH) model of Zakoian (1994) and Glosten et al. 
(1993), as given by Eq. (2.29), allows for asymmetric news impact on inflation uncertainty: 
qp 
2 + A'z, aje, + yw, 2 
j=l 
(2.29) 
where, w, =l if e, < 0, and 0 otherwise. With quartely data, estimates of the TGARCH(l, I) 
model in Table 2.5 suggest that the asymmetry parameter y is negative and statistically 
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significant: 'good news' on inflation result in a smaller increase in inflation uncertainty 
than 'bad news'. Joyce (1995) presents collaborating evidence using quarterly UK data. 
Parameter y becomes insignificant in monthly results indicating that in the very short-run, 
both inflationary and deflationary shocks destabilise next period's inflation uncertainty. 
The positive relationship between the level of past inflation and current uncertainty appears 
robust to control for asymmetric effects as A>O and still highly significant. 
IT should manifest itself in lower and more predictable inflation rates. Pre-eliminary 
evidence in Figure 2.1 and Tables 2.2 - 2.4 suggest that over the targeting years inflation 
volatility becomes smaller and its relationship with past inflation less pronounced. Panel 
evidence by Johnson (2002) using survey based measures of expected inflation indicates 
that while IT is successful in anchoring inflation expectations 17 , there is no significant 
effect on the variance of expected inflation apart from the indirect effect of lower inflation. 
Table 2.6 presents estimates of the GARCH(l, l)-M and the TGARCH(l, l)-M conditional 
variance models augmented by the IT dummy variable, Dt. Conditional mean parameters 
obtain values close to the estimates in Table 2.5 and are not presented to save space. The 
estimated dummy-coefficient, ý,, is negative and statistically significant at the 5% 
suggesting that inflation uncertainty has been lower during the IT period. 
In order to examine whether lower uncertainty simply reflects lower average 
inflation as opposed to IT having an extra negative effect on uncertainty, we need to control 
for past inflation. Consequently, we report symmetric and asymmetric GARCH(l, 1) 
models using both I -period lagged inflation and the IT dummy and as conditional variance 
regressors: z, = [D, ; r, -, 
]'. The quarterly results in Table 2.6 indicate that the impact of IT, 
as given by Al, remains negative and significant even after controlling for the standard 
relationship between average inflation and uncertainty. Some puzzle remains though, since 
the aforementioned finding is not verified for higher frequency uncertainty. In monthly 
results the dummy coefficient becomes indistinguishable from zero when past inflation is 
taken into account. 
17 Two alternative approaches are employed in the literature to examine the effect of IT on expected inflation, 
a direct approach and an indirect approach. The indirect approach investigates whether the cost of 
disinflation 
(sacrifice ratio) declines after targeting. For instance, Clifton, Leon and Wong (2001) find that the adoption of 
IT reduces both trend inflation and the sacrifice ratio in a number of OECD countries. They also 
find that the 
improvement in the inflation-unemployment trade-off does not occur immediately after the announcement of 
IT but rather improves over time as the credibility of the new regime is established. The direct approach 
measures expected inflation using survey responses of professional forecasters (see among others 
Bemanke et 
aL, 1999). 
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It appears that the time-horizon employed matters, and that in the very short-run IT 
has no additional impact on inflation variability. Given however, that most of the inflation 
uncertainty costs involves long-run uncertainty and that inflation shocks cannot be reversed 
in the short-run, monetary authorities are more interested in how IT and average inflation 
affect a longer-run measure of uncertainty. 
The Component GARCH (CGARCH) model by Engle and Lee (1993) decomposes 
inflation uncertainty into a short-run and a long-run component by permitting transitory 
deviations of the conditional volatility around a time-varying trend, ýpt. 
ht = ýol + a, (e, ' +A (h, -6 -1 
ýp +, u(e,, -1) 
(2.30) 
(2.31) 
If 1>p> (aj+flj), the transitory component in Eq. (2.30) will decay faster than the 
trend in Eq. (2.3 1), so that the trend will dominate the forecast of the conditional variance 
as the forecasting horizon increases 18. Estimates of the CGARCH-M model in Table 2.6 
support the view that IT reduces long-run inflation uncertainty as the dummy-coefficient in 
the permanent component, A,, is negative and significant. In an uncertain inflation 
environment, firms will be devoting part of their resources to forecast and/or hedge against 
inflation which results to substantial distortions in the efficiency of resource allocation. 
The negative relationship between inflation targeting and uncertainty implies that 
successful targeters enjoy. economic benefits far beyond the ones associated with lower 
level of nominal interest rates (as a result of lower average inflation). Finding a positive 
link between past inflation and long-run uncertainty, APA reinforces the argument for 
lower inflation. Ljung-Box statistics show no remaining serial correlation and ARCH 
effects in the standarised and the squared standarised residuals. The estimate of persistence 
in the permanent CGARCH component, p, is less than one (0.691,0.536 with monthly, 
quarterly data respectively) implying that long-run mean reversion of inflation's conditional 
variance does not occur very slowly. 
18 The Component GARCH model simplifies to the GARCH(I, I) model if p=0, or a, + 0. See Engle 
and Lee (1993) for further discussion of stationarity and non-negativity restrictions. 
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2.7 Conclusions 
This chapters looks at the relationship between average inflation - inflation 
uncertainty and the impact of explicit targeting in the context of the UK economy. The 
significant economic costs of inflation uncertainty are well established in the literature. 
Higher uncertainty implies more frequent negotiations of nominal contracts, undermines the 
economic agents' task to distinguish between nominal and relative price changes, and may 
adversely affect real activity. The results from symmetric, asymmetric and component 
GARCH inflation models indicate a positive relationship between past inflation and 
uncertainty about future inflation, in line with the Friedman-Ball causal link. The policy 
implication for high inflation countries is to aim at low average inflation rates in order to 
reduce the negative consequences of uncertainty. 
The key contribution of this chapter is that the establishment of IT ever since 
October 1992 is explicitly modelled, allowing to examine its effect on inflation dynamics 
and uncertainty. The results show that in the post-targeting period UK inflation is 
substantially less persistent and less variable. Even after we control for the effect of lower 
average inflation throughout that period, we can still identify a direct negative impact from 
IT on long-run uncertainty, suggesting an independent role for formal targets. The 
monetary authorities of non-IT countries should acknowledge the long-run benefits 
associated with the adoption of explicit targeting. Further work should examine the 
inflation - uncertainty relationship with data from other IT countries and using alternative 
specifications for the conditional mean of inflation. 
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Chapter 3 
Monetary Policy and Asset Prices in Empirical 
Reaction Functions 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview and empirical estimates of monetary policy rules 
that take into account the effects of fluctuations in asset prices. We focus on interest rate 
rules since nowadays most central banks implement policy through changes in the level of 
short-term interest rates. Although no CB admits adhering to a simple mechanical rule for 
setting interest rates, Taylor-rule type of reaction functions have been shown to provide a 
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sufficient characterisation of developments in monetary policy in many major economies 
(see e. g. Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1998). In the context of these models, there is an 
operating target for the nominal interest rate based upon the state of the economy, as 
characterised by inflation, and the output gap. Asset prices, in the form of the exchange 
rate, have already been included in the analysis in an effort to explain movements in 
interest rates. Recently however, the focus has moved away from the exchange rate and 
towards two other important asset prices, house prices and stock prices. The increased 
financial volatility throughout the 1990's and the first part of the new decade, along with 
the boom and bust cycle that most industrialized economies experienced, reminded to 
investors and central bankers that movements in asset prices are highly correlated with 
developments in output and inflation. In the last decade, it has been widely recognised that 
asset prices play an important role in determining business cycles conditions. As Bernanke 
and Gertler (2001) emphasise, asset market boom and busts have been important factors 
behind macroeconomic volatility in both industrial and developing countries. 
Following the financial deregulation in the early 1980s and the increased capital 
market globalization, industrial economies have witnessed an upward trend in asset prices. 
Alongside this trend, stock land and property prices have undergone swings around typical 
business cycle frequencies ranging from three to ten years (IMF, 2000). For some countries 
such as Japan and the Scandinavian counties during the late 1980s and the early 1990s, 
these swings had disruptive effects on domestic financial systems and contributed to 
prolonged recessions. In the U. K. case of 1990-92, the financial system withstood the asset 
price collapse but the ensuing recession was anyway severe. Over the last years, the 
housing market has been exhibiting overvaluation patterns analogous to the 'internet 
bubble' stock market of the late 1990's. The Economist (2003) calculates that nominal 
house prices have been more than doubled in the UK, and Netherlands, and tripled in 
Ireland, over the period 1995-2003. Even after adjusting for inflation, house price gains 
have been substantial in the majority of developed economies. 
Many recent theoretical and empirical contributions on the transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy imply that equity and property prices play an important role via wealth 
effects and balance sheet effects. Monetary policy affects asset prices via changes in 
expected future dividends and/or changes in the discount rate, which consequently affect 
aggregate demand and future inflation through balance sheet and wealth effects. Mishkin 
(2001) offers an excellent review of all the related arguments. For example, a rise in stock 
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prices decreases the perceived level of financial distress by households which leads to 
increased consumption spending. The balance sheet channel implies a positive relationship 
between the firms' ability to borrow and their net worth which in turn depends on asset 
valuations. This extra credit can be used to purchase goods and services and thus stimulates 
economic activity (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). Goodhart and Hofmann (2001) find that 
stock price and house price inflation increases raise future aggregate demand in many 
major economies. 
Since banks engage heavily in real estate lending, in which the value of the real 
estate acts as a collateral, swings in property prices lead to increased financial instability. 
The monetary and financial stability objectives are intertwined. Sinclair (2002) reminds us 
that the central bank by setting the interest rate controls an important link between the two 
forms of stability. Borio and Lowe (2002) point out that while a low and stable inflation 
environment promotes financial stability, it also raises the likelihood that excess demand 
pressures will first show up in credit aggregates and asset prices rather than in consumer 
prices. 
Over the last decade the United Kingdom has followed explicit inflation targeting, 
while during the second half of the decade interest rates are set independently by the BoE in 
response to medium term FJPIX inflation forecasts. Apart from inflation, the prospects for 
real activity also matter'. Thus, given the importance of asset price fluctuations for future 
demand and inflation, the main objective of this chapter is to provide some further insight 
into the interest rate setting behavior of the Bank of England, by estimating reaction 
functions that have been augmented to take into account the effect of asset price inflation. 
In addition, we extend previous work by Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2004) and estimate 
asset price augmented Taylor rules for the case of a non-explicit inflation targeting regime, 
namely the one followed in the US. We should point out that the results provide a genuine 
contribution to the literature, since, only recently, did other empirical studies emerge, that 
estimate Taylor rules incorporating house and stock market returns. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section discusses the 
properties of the data. In section 3.3 we provide some empirical evidence on the impact of 
asset price changes on aggregate demand using a small structural model of the UK 
' Although the 1998 Bank of England Act places price stability, defined by the Chancellor's inflation target, 
as the overriding objective of monetary policy, the BoE is also required to support the Government's other 
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economy. Section 3.4 presents a brief overview of monetary policy reaction functions, 
while section 3.5 contains the empirical results for the UK. Section 3.5.1 provides the 
benchmark model results, Section 3.5.2 presents the asset price augmented results, and 
Section 3.5.3 accounts for the effect of BoE independence on the inflation-policy rule 
parameter. Section 3.5.4 compares the historical performance of the benchmark forward- 
looking rule versus the asset price augmented rule. Section 3.6 presents the US results and 
Section 3.7 concludes. 
3.2 Data description 
We employ monthly data on short-term interest rates, industrial production, Retail 
Price Index minus mortgage interest payments (RPIX), stock prices and house prices for the 
United Kingdom from October 1992 to January 2003. All data is obtained from 
Datastream, OECD Historical Statistics series. Our sample period commences with the 
establishment of an explicit inflation targeting regime on October 1992. An inflation target 
of 1-4 % was initially adopted and on June 1995 the target was reset at 2.5% or less. 
The (annualised) output gap, y, , the difference between actual and potential output, 
is calculated via quadratic detrending of the industrial production series, as in Clarida, Gali, 
and Gertler (1998), and Nelson (2000). The 3-month Treasury Bill rate, i,, is employed as a 
measure of the stance of the monetary policy 2. The annual change in stock prices, A 12 St5 
house prices, A12H, , and retail prices, 7rt, are proxied by the 12 
th difference of the natural 
logarithm of the monthly FTSE All Shares stock index, St, the Halifax house price index, 
Ht, and the (seasonally adjusted) RPIX respectively. We used annual, rather than monthly, 
changes for retail prices, stock prices and house prices since year on year changes on these 
variables are much more relevant for monetary policy decisions (Goodhart, 200 1). 
economic goals. As Nikolov (2002) points out, the practical implication is that the BoE has an obligation to 
consider the resulting volatility in real activity when setting interest rates. 
2 The actual interest rate used by the Bank of England as its instrument for money market intervention has 
varied over time, and has included Bank Rate (until 1972), Minimum Lending Rate (1972-1981), the 
Minimum Band One Dealing Rate (1981-1996), and the two-week Repo Rate (since 1997). The 3 month 
Treasury Bill rate has historically moved close with these instruments, and is available for the entire sample 
period. Following Nelson (2000) For August 1992, the only month for which no observation on the bill rate is 
available, a value of 9.7 is used. This figure was obtained by assuming a 20 basis point spread above the 91 - 
day rate (the 91 -day rate was 20 basis points below the bill rate in both July and Sept. 1992. 
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Figure 3.1: Annual UK House Price and Stock Price inflation, 1992: 10-2003: 01. 
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As we see in Figure 3.1 stock prices have been far more volatile as compared to 
house prices. In the aftermath of the burst of the stock market bubble in 2000, the two 
series start diverging significantly, with house price inflation accelerating, while the stock 
market collapsed. The output gap in Figure 3.2 indicates a post-bubble weaker UK 
economy since it is generally declining after peaking in early 2001. Finally, the nominal 
interest rate is consistently above the strikingly stable (as compared to its 1970's 
'rollercoaster' behaviour) inflation rate. 
Figure 3.2: UK Output Gap, Short-term interest rate, RPIX inflation, 1992: 10-2003: 01. 
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Standard Phillips-Perron (PP) tests are employed in order to test for unit roots in 
our data. The results in Table 3.1 clearly indicate the rejection of the unit root null 
hypothesis at the usual levels of significance. Therefore we employ all the aforementioned 
variables at their levels. 
Table 3.1: Unit Root tests, United Kingdom, 1992: 10-2003: 1. 
Variables Phillips Perron t-statistic 
........... it -3.621 
yl -4.529 *** 
7r, -4.001 
A12st 
-3.803 
A12H, 
-3.748 
Note 
(a) In order to correct for serial correlation the Phillips Perron (PP) test uses a non-parametric estimator of the 
variance-covariance matrix. The truncation lag employed is chosen by the Newey-West criterion using the 
Bartlett kernel. An intercept and a linear trend term were included in the PP regressions. 
(b) *, **, *** indicate rejection of the null-unit root hypothesis at 10,5,1 % level of significance 
respectively. 
3.3 Asset prices in an estimated AS/AD model 
As Goodhart and Hofmann (2001) argue, from the early 1990's many countries 
adopted explicit inflation targeting regimes as a response to the instability of the money 
demand function, which made monetary growth rates an unreliable proxy of monetary 
policy and future inflationary pressures. Simplified inflation targeting models include an 
aggregate supply and an aggregate demand equation and are used to derive optimal 
monetary policy reaction functions (see e. g. Svensson, 1997). Following Rudebusch and 
Svensson (1999), we use a model of the UK economy consisting of a aggregate supply, or 
Phillips curve, describing the dynamics of inflation and an aggregate demand, or IS curve, 
characterising the behaviour of the output gap. 
Due to the inconsistencies between purely forward-looking models and actual 
inflation and output data, many researchers (see e. g. the references provided in Clar-ida, 
Gall and Gertler, 1999) suggest the employment of "hybrid" Phillips- and IS-curves, which 
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include both backward and forward-looking elements. We specify a hybrid empirical 
Phillips curve where current inflation depends upon past and expected future inflation and 
on past demand pressures: 
7rt = A'O +A 7rt 
-t 
+ P2Et [7rt+n I+ 
oU3YI-m 
+ 17t (3 1) 
The backward-looking element in Eq. (3.1) reflects inertia in inflation that is 
justified not only empirically, but also theoretically on the assumption that a fixed 
proportion of firms has backward-looking price setting behavior (see Gall and Gertler, 
1999). The forward-looking element derives from the rational expectations staggered- 
contracting models of Taylor (1980), and Calvo (1983). The GMM estimates 3 of the hybrid 
Phillips curve over the period 1992: 10-2003: 01, as given in (3.2), imply that the backward- 
looking component is stronger in UK data, asy, ýý' P2. The estimated magnitude of ul is 
close to the value of 0.8 which has been used as central value by Batini and Haldane (1999) 
in simulations for the UK. The output gap coefficient, 43. is positive and highly significant 
indicating that current demand pressures feed into higher future inflation. 
Zt = -0.00 1+0.8 + 0- 1 57ri+3 + 0*()9Yt-12 +9 
'7rt-3 77t 
(001) (. 04) (. 05) (. 005) 
SE = 0.003, J-stat = 14.25 [0.38] 
(3.2) 
The demand-side of the economy is modelled as a hybrid IS, that is consistent with 
dynamic optimising behaviour by the agents (micro-foundations) and also allows for some 
persistence in output. Thus, Eq. (3.3) allows the output gap to be a function of past and 
expected future output, lagged real interest rate, and lagged values of a vector, X, of 
additional explanatory variables. 
y, +, 12E, [y,,,, + 
A3 + "t-k + Vt (3.3) 
3 GMM estimation with MA(12) autocorrelation correction has been used. The instrument set includes six 
lags of inflation, agricultural commodity prices, and the output gap. The J-statistic indicates that the 
overidentifying restrictions are not rejected. 
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where, r, -7r, _, 
) is the twelve-month average ex post real interest rate. 12 
i=O 
As we already pointed out there are many channels via which, changes in equity 
prices and house prices affect consumer wealth. Direct effects include the change in 
consumption plans as a response to swings in asset prices (Modigliani, 1971), while 
indirect effects operate mainly via households and firms' balance sheets. There is a 
growing consensus that, apart from the conventional explanatory variables, output is also 
determined by changes in consumption and investment demand induced by changes in the 
level of asset prices. Therefore, the aggregate demand function given by Eq. (3.3) is 
estimated with GMM including house price inflation, Eq. (3.4), and stock price inflation, 
Eq. (3.5). 
yt = 0.01 + 0.03Y - 0.30ri-12+ 0.08A v t-3 + 
0*9 'Yt+3 
12HI-12 
+ ^It 
(. 002) (. 03) (. 03) (. 05) (. 01) 
SE = 0.008) J-stat = 18.91 [0.48] 
(3.4) 
The results indicate that, in contrast to the aggregate supply, aggregate demand is 
more affected by its forward-looking component, sinceA2 is positive and significant while 
A, turns out to be insignificant. The one-year lagged real interest rate is negative and 
strongly significant, as expected. Finally, the coefficient of lagged house price changes 
shows that a 10 % increase in house prices boosts current aggregate demand by a factor of 
0.8 %, indicating significant wealth effects. 
- 0.55rt-12+ 0.04A yt = 0.01 + 0.007YI-3 + 0.78YI+3 12St-12 + V2t 
(. 002) (. 04) (. 03) (. 06) (. 01) 
SE = 0.009) J-stat = 16.12 [0.64] 
(3.5) 
The estimated coefficients in (3.5) reveal similar patterns. Future output is strongly 
significant, real interest rate affects output negatively with a lag, and stock price inflation 
exerts a positive impact on aggregate demand. The magnitude of the wealth effect depends 
among other factors on the share of the respective asset in private sector wealth, with 
housing constituting the most significant asset in the households' portfolio in most 
countries. Indeed, we find that the magnitude of the wealth effect due to stock price 
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increases is much smaller than the effect due to house price increases. The coefficient of 
stock price inflation is half the coefficient of stock price inflation (0.04 as compared to 
0.08) a result that is in line with previous evidence by Goodhart and Hofinann (2001) for 
the UK. Using a panel of 14 developed economies Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2001) also 
find that the housing market appears to be more important than the stock market in 
affecting the real economy. 
Having demonstrated that movements in asset prices affect future aggregate demand 
and consequently also future inflation, in the next section we shall focus on the key 
empirical question of this chapter, that is, what has been the response of the monetary 
policy instrument to asset price inflation. 
3.4 Monetary policy reaction functions 
It is generally assumed that the monetary policy interest rate instrument responds 
with fixed, positive weights to deviations of inflation from a pre-specified target, and 
deviations of output from its potential level. Taylor (1993) proposed a simple link between 
the interest rate, inflation, and the output gap which well reflected US monetary policy 
from 1987 to 1992. The Taylor rule reaction function suggests that the nominal interest rate 
is set as follows: 
i, =+ ir* + 1.5(. ir, -,, -r .)+0.5yt (3.6) 
where, r is the long-run equilibrium real interest rate, and7r* is the inflation target. 
The past decade has seen a vast amount of empirical and theoretical work 
considering monetary policy reaction functions. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) present 
econometric estimates of the Taylor rule coefficients for the United States. Nelson (2000) 
provides empirical evidence for the United Kingdom under alternative monetary policy 
regimes, over the period 1972-97, prior to the Bank of England (BoE) receiving operational 
independence. Focusing on the inflation-targeting period 1992-1997, Nelson's results 
suggest that a forward-looking looking Taylor rule outperforms a backward-looking 
specification. His results contradict those of Kuttner and Posen (1999). 
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In contrast with Nelson, who used quarterly data, Kuttner and Posen employed 
monthly data over the period October 1992-December 1997 and found a coefficient of zero 
on inflation. Other important differences with the Nelson study include the use of the 
unemployment rate, instead of the real GDP for the construction of the output gap proxy, 
and the employment of the annualised month-to-month rather than annual inflation rate. As 
Nelson argues though, the use of annual inflation in the estimated rule is crucial for the 
results since the BoE's inflation target has always been expressed in terms of the annual 
(year-ended), rather than the monthly inflation rate. 
Following Clarida et al. (1998) we assume that the central bank has an operating 
target for the nominal short-term interest rate that is based upon the state of the economy. 
In the benchmark model the state of the economy is characterised by the evolution of the 
output gap and expected inflation. This forward-looking behaviour is consistent with a 
central bank that operates in the context of an inflation targeting regime (Kent and Lowe, 
1997). 
i. 1*=i+ 
ß(E, [ir, 
+ 
]- z*) + yy, (3.7) 
where, i, * denotes the target nominal interest rate, 7rt+n is the rate of inflation between 
periods t and t+n, i is the long-run equilibrium nominal rate. It is also intuitive to consider 
the implied target for the ex ante real interest rate, r, = it - E, ]: 
r, = 1)(E, [7r, +,, 
] *- ir) + yy, (3.8) 
where, r is the long-run equilibrium real rate of interest, determined purely by real factors. 
Eq. (3.8) implies that the target real rate, r, -, adjusts relative to its natural rate 
responding to deviations of expected inflation from its target value and deviations of output 
from its potential level. Crucial for the ensuing analysis is the magnitude of the expected 
inflation coefficient, P. The estimated value of fl serves as a yardstick for the evaluation of 
the stance of the monetary authority. If P>1, the target real rate adjustment stabilises 
inflation and output (given that y >0). Larger values of fl are associated with more inflation 
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averse policy. If however, fl < 1, monetary policy accommodates changes in inflation. That 
is, although nominal rates increase in response to an increase in expected inflation, the 
policy tightening is not sufficient to keep real interest rates from falling. As Bemanke and 
Woodford (1997) and Clarida et al. (1998) have emphasised, in such accommodative 
regime, self-fulfilling bursts of inflation and output may occur. 
Policy rules of the type presented in Eq. (3.7) are chosen not only due to 
plausibility, but also due to theoretical arguments. Ball (1997) and Svensson (1997), among 
others, demonstrate how a policy rule of the type employed here is 'optimal' that is, derives 
from the first order optimisation condition for a central bank with quadratic preferences 
over inflation and output. In the next chapter we derive such an optimal rule that takes into 
account indirectly the effect of asset prices. In this chapter however, we focus on empirical 
estimates of monetary policy rules and therefore will not further discuss the optimality 
conditions and their relationship to the underlying structural macroeconomic parameters 
and the weights given to inflation and output volatility in the loss function. 
We further assume that, in each period, the actual interest rate partially adjusts 
towards the target value. This assumption intends to capture the tendency of central banks 
to smooth changes in interest rates (see e. g. Goodfriend, 1991). Svensson (1997) justifies 
the partial adjustment mechanism by including the change in interest rates in the central 
bank's loss function. In the literature we identify four major reasons why the central bank 
4 might prefer small gradual movements in the interest rate instrument . These reasons, 
presented in turn bellow, are uncertainty, policy effectiveness, financial stability, and the 
policymaker's reputation. 
Uncertainty. Monetary policy makers face substantial uncertainty, since the data on 
which interest rate decisions are based upon, in particular the output gap, are available only 
with a lag and are often revised. Orphanides (1998), and Sack and Wieland (2000), among 
others, discuss the effects of data uncertainty on interest rate setting. In addition, 
considerable lags are required till the full impact of interest rate changes on inflation and 
the output gap is revealed, and the reaction may vary over time. Brainard (1967), and Rider 
and Haslem (2000) discuss the effects of this parameter uncertainty. Thus, in the context of 
4 Some economists (see e. g. Rudebusch, 2001) challenge the policy inertia hypothesis of interest rate 
smoothing. Rudebusch argues that smoothing could be present in the data due shocks which monetary policy 
reacts to, but which are not considered in the estimated reaction function. If these omitted variables are 
autocorrelated, interest rate smoothing seemingly arises. Such omitted variables may be financial cnses, and a 
time varying equilibrium real rate. 
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data and parameter uncertainty, policy makers choose a cautious approach by moving 
interest rates gradually in order to assess the impact of policy changes on the target 
variables. Further interest rate changes may follow until the central bank is satisfied with 
the achieved effect. 
Policy effectiveness. This arguments states that monetary policy inertia improve the 
effectiveness of any given policy change due to two reasons. First, as argued by Batini and 
Haldane (1999), and Goodhart (1999) among others, by changing the interest rate several 
times in the same direction (rate smoothing) the central bank generates an 'announcement' 
effect in the case of a policy reversal. For instance, if the (interest rate smoothing) central 
bank announces an increase in rates, following a series of decreases, further tightening is 
expected. Hence, short-term interest rates will also be affected via the expected future path 
of short-tenn rates (term structure) and since monetary policy impacts on the economy 
through short-term rates, interest rate smoothing should enhance policy effectiveneSS5 . The 
second factor linking interest rate smoothing with policy effectiveness is based on the 
following argument. If interest rates are gradually altered, their variance will be lower and 
with it the probability that the zero interest rate bound (bellow which monetary policy 
6 becomes ineffective) will be hit . 
Financial Stability. Some economists point out that interest rate smoothing 
promotes financial stability (see e. g. Goodfriend, 1987). Cukierman (1991) shows that if 
commercial banks pay flexible interest rates on deposits and receive fixed payments for 
loans, highly volatile interest rates may trigger bankruptcies, since the liabilities of 
commercial banks may exceed the available assets. By adjusting rates gradually, the central 
bank allows commercial banks to smoothly adjust their portfolios in response to interest 
rate changes. As Sinclair (2002) points out, a low degree of policy smoothness may cause 
an excess volatility in financial markets, especially when the policy is delayed. 
Reputation. Interest rate smoothing is viewed sometimes as an attempt by 
policymakers to safeguard their reputation (see Eijffinger, Schaling, and Verhagen, 1999; 
Goodhart, 1999). Since outsiders sometimes cannot assess with certainty whether a change 
in policy reflects reaction to new developments or merely the correction of an earlier 
5 Lowe and Ellis (1997) show that in US, UK, and Australia 10-year bond yields react more strongly to 
interest rate reversals, and they attribute this to the announcement effect. 
6 See the discussion in Amato and Laubach (1999), and Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). 
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mistake, policyrnakers may choose to smooth interest rates in order to reduce the need for 
reversals and the subsequent exposure to criticism. 
Combining the target rule (3.7) with the partial adjustment mechanism we obtain 
the following expression for the actual interest rate: 
it =(1-q1)i 
I 
(Piit-i + ot (3.9) 
1 
where, LP, E[0, I]measuring the degree of interest rate smoothing and v, is an exogenous 
i=l 
random Hd shock to the interest rate. 
As Clarid4 et al. (1998) emphasise, vt may indicate a purely random component to 
policyrnaking, or it could be the result of the central bank imperfectly forecasting 
idiosyncratic reserve demand and not immediately supplying reserves to offset the shock. 
In the second case, the interest rate changes responding to unexpected movements in 
reserve demand that are orthogonal to movements in inflation and output. Substituting 
(3.7) in (3.9) and defining a -, 8ir* we obtain 
7 
la+, 6(EIgý+nl-7r*)+YYII+L'Pit-i+t)t (3.10) 
Due to the fact that monetary policymakers cannot observe y, when setting it, we 
replace the actual value of the output gap with its expected level, E, -, 
[y, ]; see McCallum 
and Nelson, 1999, and Orphanides et al., 2000 for a further discussion of the uncertainties 
faced by the policyrnaker with respect to output. Thus, (3.10) becomes: 
[y, + (Pii, -i + 0, =(l- +, YE, 
(3.11) 
7 Note that, since a -)6)T* and ir+ ir* , it is implied that a=r+ 
8)7r We can also get an 
expression for the target inflation: 7r* (r - a) /(, B - 1). As Clarida et al. (1998) point out, if the sample is 
sufficiently long, the sample average real rate can be used to provide an estimate of r. With this estimate, it is 
then possible to construct an estimate of ; r*. 
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We consider an inflation forecast horizon of one year, therefore we set n equal to 12 
in our monthly sample. In order to estimate the model, unknown expected variables are 
)8 replaced with their ex post realised values. This leads us to Eq. (3.12 
= I- 
I )ja I 
it I+ 8(7rt+n - g) + YY, I+L (Pit-i 
i=l i=l 
The set of orthogonality conditions implied by Eq. (3.12) is: 
(3.12) 
E, (p, ta +, 6(7r, - 7r + ry, z =0 (3.13) +n + (, Oi it t 
where, Zt represents all the variables in the central bank's information set available 
at time t when the interest rate is chosen. Zt is a vector of variables that are orthogonal to co, 
These instruments are lagged variables that help forecasting inflation and output, and 
contemporaneous variables that are uncorrelated with the exogenous monetary policy 
shock, ut. The benchmark reaction function given by Eq. (3.12) will be estimated using the 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). The instruments include a constant and six lags 
of the nominal short-term interest rate, inflation, output gap, and a world commodity price 
index (agricultural raw materials). Since the number of instruments is greater than the 
number of elements of the parameter vector [Vi, a, Ay], we test for the validity of the over- 
identifying restrictions using Hansen's J-statistic. Failure to reject orthogonality implies 
that the central bank considers lagged variables in its reaction function, only to the extent 
that they forecast future inflation or output. 
As pointed out in section 3.3, asset prices contain important information about 
future aggregate demand and consequently inflation pressures. Also, there are theoretical 
arguments in favour of including asset price inflation in the reaction function of the central 
bank. Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky, and Wadhwani (2000) find that, on the basis of 
simulations, it would be desirable to include asset inflation in the policy rule. Therefore, we 
8 The disturbance term in Equation (3.12) is a linear combination of the inflation and output gap forecast 
errors and the exogenous monetary policy shock 1),: 04 =-(I -I 
jpj) (, 0 - E, [ir,,,, ]) +, v (y, - E, _, 
[y, ])) + v, 
1=1 
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will also consider alternatives to the benchmark specification, by allowing changes in asset 
prices to enter the reaction function. The augmented reaction functions we shall estimate 
are of the fonn: 
(pi ja +, 8(E, [7r, - 7r) + 7E, 
I 
+n [y, + O'X, + (pit_, + v, (3.14) 
where, X, = [xl, ... xjt I and 0= [01 ... Oj ]I denote the vector ofj-additional 
explanatory variables, and the relevant coefficient vector respectively. In the cases that we 
will examine, X, contains contemporaneous house price and/or stock price inflation. We use 
contemporaneous, and not expected, asset price inflation due to the well known difficulties 
involved in forecasting asset price movements. Also, weak form efficiency implies that the 
current asset price reflects all past history, thus there is no need to incorporate lags. 
3.5 Empirical results: United Kingdom 
3.5.1 Benchmark model 
The GMM estimation results in Table 3.2, column 2, indicate that the benchmark 
specification (3.12) satisfies the dynamic stability criterion since the estimated inflation 
coefficient,, 8, is greater than one (1.02). If P was smaller than the stability threshold of one, 
then this would imply a positively sloped aggregated demand, with output decreasing in 
response to an inflation shock (Taylor, 1999). The output gap coefficient, -Y, is positive and 
statistically significant at the I% level, although quite modest in magnitude (0.03). Its 
estimate implies that, holding expected inflation constant, one-percent increase in the level 
of output gap induces the BoE to raise interest rates by 3 basis points. This result is 
consistent with those reported by Martin and Milas (2002) who employed quarterly UK 
data. Therefore, during the inflation-targeting period that we consider, U. K. monetary 
policy has put more weight on price stability than output stabilisation. The sum of the 
interest rate smoothing parameters is close to one (0.92) indicating a high level of 
persistence in short-term interest rates. This finding supports the view that the Bank of 
England smooth the adjustment of interest rates towards their target values. Finally, the J- 
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statistic indicates that the over-identifying restrictions of the benchmark model are not 
rej ected. 
Table 3.2: GMM Estimates of Forward Looking Taylor Rule, UK, 1992: 10-2003: 1. 
Benchmark 
Model 
xIý 16ý12HJ XI 
16ý 
12SI 
f 
H, 
IA12SI 
Xf ['ýý12 
a 2.59 * 4.00 2.51 4.56 
1.02 * 1.60 1.01 1.82 
0.03 0.04 0.08 0.02 
(pi 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.83 
01 0.15 *** - 0.12 *** 
02 
- - 0.06 *** 0.07 *** 
S. E. of Reg. 0.0023 0.0022 0.023 0.0030 
J- Stat. 14.10 1 17.38 21.19 15.51 
Note: 
(a) Estimates are obtained by GMM estimation with correction for MA(12) autocorrelation. Two-stage least 
squares estimation is employed to obtain the initial estimates of the optimal weighting matrix. 
(b) In the benchmark model the instruments used are a constant and lags I to 6 of the nominal short term 
interest rate, inflation, output gap, and the log difference of a world commodity price index (agricultural raw 
materials). In the models that include asset price inflation, lags I to 6 of the relevant asset price inflation 
variable are also included. 
(c) J-stat denotes the test statistic for overidentifying restrictions. 
(d) *, **, *** indicate level of significance of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
3.5.2 Asset price augmented model 
We now allow annual house price and stock price inflation to enter the reaction 
function. The results are presented in Table 3.2, columns 3-5. Following Bernanke and 
Gertler (1999), in order to help control for the simultaneity bias in the relationship between 
monetary policy and asset returns, we instrument for the contemporaneous value of the 
asset price inflation9. In particular, we add lags 1-6 of the relevant asset inflation variable in 
our instrument list. Hence, our estimates of the responses of policy to asset price changes 
9 Rigobon and Sack (2003) employ an alternative approach to identify the relationship between monetary 
policy and asset prices using a procedure that exploits the heteroskedasticity of shocks to high frequency 
financial series. Using daily and weekly US data over the period 1985-1999, Rigobon and Sack conclude that 
rising stock prices drive short-term interest rates in the same direction, suggestive of a systematic reaction by 
the Fed to stock price movements. Bohl, Siklos, and Werner (2004) modify the Rigobon and Sack 
identification procedure and apply it to Gerinan data over the period 1985-1998. Contrary to Rigobon and 
Sack, they fail to find a statistically significant relationship between stock returns and short-terin interest 
rates. 
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arising from the predictive power of asset prices for output and inflation are fully accounted 
for. In other words, any estimated response of the policy instrument to asset price inflation 
must be above and beyond the part due to the predictive power of stock returns. This 
approach in augmenting the standard Taylor rule with additional variables has been 
suggested Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998, p1041), "... we then proceed to estimate the 
alternative model in the same fashion as the baseline, except that we expand the parameter 
vector to include the coefficient on the additional variable and expand the instrument set to 
include lagged values of that variable. It is then straightforward to evaluate whether the 
direct effect ... on policy is quantitatively important". 
The findings in column 3 indicate that the house price inflation coefficient, 01, is 
positive and highly significant. Monetary policy tightens in response to increases in house 
prices: a one percent rise in house prices increases interest rates by 15 basis points. The 
response to expected inflation is stronger than in the benchmark case, with a smaller 
standard error. The estimated inflation coefficient is 1.6 close to the theoretical value of 
1.5, as suggested by Taylor (1993), thus ensuring that real rates increase in response to 
inflationary pressures. We then add stock price changes in the benchmark model. The 
estimated coefficient, 02, (Table 3.2, column 4) is still positive and statistically significant 
but its value (0.06) is much smaller as compared to house price coefficient. The results 
agree with the findings of Chadha, Sarno, and Valente (2003). Chadha et al. employ an 
augmented forward looking Taylor rule specification and find a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on stock prices. 
Finally, when both asset returns are included (Table 3.2, column 5), the magnitude 
of the coefficients confirms that house prices enter more significantly the monetary policy 
reaction function, since 01>02. Further, the J-statistic for overidentifying restrictions 
suggests that the instrument set is valid. 
3.5.3 Accounting for Bank of England independence 
There is a wide consensus among academics and practitioners that central bank 
independence produces lower average inflation (Cukierman, 1992). Spiegel (1998) finds 
that the BoE independence on May 1997 had a significant negative impact on agents' 
inflationary expectations. In order to account for the change in the underlying regime and 
preferences we allow the expected inflation coefficient to be different post-independence. 
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We therefore introduce a multiplicative dummy variable, D,, in the reaction function, where 
Dt =0 prior to independence and 1 onwards: 
it ýo, 
) ja + (, 8 + pD, )(E, +, YE, -, 
[y, + E)'X, + (Pji, + u, (3.15) 
Table 3.3: GMM Estimates of Forward Looking Taylor Rule adjusted for the Effect of Bank 
of England Independence, 1992: 10-2003: 1. 
Benchmark 
Model 
Xt ý 16ý12H, f Xt 16ý12SII Xt H, --: PL 12 "ýkl A 
a 4.53 5.85 3.27 5.62 
16 1.81 2.35 1.30 2.25 
0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 
0.41 0.47 0.61 0.40 
0.92 0.88 0.89 0.87 
01 0.12 *** - 0.13 *** 
02 
- - 0.04 *** 0.03* 
S. E. of Reg. 0.0022 0.0024 0.0022 0.0025 
J- Stat. 13.30 15.76 23.18 15.78 
Note: 
(a) Estimates are obtained by GMM estimation with correction for MA(12) autocorrelation. Two-stage least 
squares estimation is employed to obtain the initial estimates of the optimal weighting matrix. 
(b) In the benchmark model the instruments used are a constant and lags I to 6 of the nominal short term 
interest rate, inflation, output gap, and the log difference of a world commodity price index (agncultural raw 
materials). In the models that include asset price inflation, lags I to 6 of the relevant asset price inflation 
variable are also included. 
(c) J-stat denotes the test statistic for overidentifying restrictions. 
(d) *, **, *** indicate level of significance of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
We would expect the dummy coefficient, p, to be positive and significant indicating 
that the BoE becomes more inflation-averse, which leads to lower inflation expectations. 
The results from the estimation of the empirical counterpart of Eq. (3.15) in Table 3.3 
confirm our predictions. In the benchmark model, u is equal to 0.41 suggesting that post- 
independence the BoE reacts to one percent increase in expected inflation by raising 
interest rates by an additional 41 basis points. Even when we control for the effect of asset 
prices, the dummy remains positive and significant, reaffirming a higher degree of inflation 
ill 
aversion as a result of independence. We notice that the magnitude of the estimated asset 
inflation coefficients does not change. The monetary policy response to house prices is 
always stronger than the one with respect to stock prices. For instance, in the case of both 
assets entering the reaction function, 01 is equal to 0.13 and significant at the 1% level, 
while 02is equal to 0.03 and significant at the 10%. The coefficient of house price inflation 
in particular is almost double the coefficient of stock price inflation. This supports the 
findings in the previous section where we reported a strong link between house price 
inflation and aggregate demand which induces policy makers to track more closely 
developments in the housing market. 
3.5.4 Historical Performance 
In this section we examine the historical performance of our estimated reaction 
functions against the actual policy setting of the BoE. In Figures 3.3,3.4, we plot the 
implied target rates from the dummy augmented model versus the actual short-term interest 
rate. As Clarida et al. (1998) point out, employment of the target rate as opposed to the 
fitted rate, that includes the lagged interest rate, allows for a better comparison of the 
alternative specifications. Figure 3.3 uses the target interest rate implied by the benchmark 
model, while Figure 3.4 uses the target rate implied by the asset price augmented policy 
rule (using both house price and stock price inflation). 
It is clear that the benchmark target rate underperforms in capturing actual BoE 
behaviour. With the exception of two short periods at the beginning and the end of our 
sample, actual interest rates were consistently higher than the rule predicted value. Thus, 
the BoE was far tighter than the simple benchmark forward-looking model would predict. 
When asset prices are allowed to be one of the state variables monitored by the central 
bank, the picture becomes clearer. As we notice in Figure 3.4 the target rate tracks the 
general trend of the actual interest rate for most of the period under investigation. 
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Figure 3.3: Actual and Target interest rate (benchmark model), UK, 1992: 10-2002: 01. 
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Figure 3.4: Actual and Target interest rate (asset price model), UK, 1992: 10-2002: 01. 
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Indeed, summary statistics presented in Table 3.4 indicate that when asset prices are 
not considered, the target interest rate is on average more than I% lower than the actual 
rate. Thus, the benchmark Taylor rule doesn't seem to explain well interest rate setting in 
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the UK. The alternative specification produces a target rate which is much closer to the 
actual behaviour in terms of both mean and variability. 
Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics of Actual and Taylor Rule Target Interest Rate, UK, 1992: 10- 
2002: 1. 
Actual 
Target 
Benchmark 
Target with Asset 
Prices 
Mean 5.83 4.42 5.92 
Median 5.87 4.57 6.03 
Maximum 7.46 6.04 8.24 
Minimum 3.78 2.25 4.11 
Std. Dev. 0.82 1 0.77 0.85 
During the period of strong stock market performance prior to the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997, actual monetary policy was looser than the model would predict; and then it 
was somewhat tighter during the first years of independence. One possible interpretation of 
these findings is that the BoE was trying to signal its commitment to keep inflation on 
track, even though some would argue that the falling stock market required lower interest 
rates. A notable divergence of the target from the actual occurs after 2001, when the large 
increases in house prices call for much tighter policy than the one followed. 
3.6 Empirical results: United States 
In order to examine whether monetary authorities react to asset price inflation 
irrespective of whether they pursue explicit inflation targeting (like the BoE), or not, we 
will estimate a forward-looking reaction function using monthly data from the United 
Stateslo over the period 1992-2003. Many economists point out that over the recent years of 
Alan Greenspan chairmanship in the Federal Reserve, the US central bank has moved 
gradually and implicitly towards adopting inflation targeting (see e. g. Goodfriend, 2003). 
Implicit targeting is differentiated from its explicit counterpart in that: first, there is no 
10 In the US regressions, we used the Federal funds rate as a measure of monetary policy, while inflation and 
the output gap have been calculated using the Consumer Price Index and the industrial production, 
respectively. The stock index employed is the Dow Jones, while Datastrearn provided the 
house price index. 
The transformation of the raw US data to growth rates and gaps was done using the same methodology as 
described in section 3.2. See Figures A3.1, A3.2 in Appendix III for plots of the US data employed in this 
section. 
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officially announced explicit numerical target, or target zone, for the inflation rate; and 
second the central bank is not officially obliged to act so that to keep inflation at the target 
(or in the range) within some specified time horizon. Other economists, however, strongly 
question the notion that the Fed has been practising implicit targeting (see for instance, 
Kohn, 2003; McCallum, 2003). 
Table 3.5: GMM Estimates of Forward Looking Taylor Rule, US, 1992: 10-2003: 1 
Benchmark 
Model 
Xt' H, f '= 1'ýý 12 X, =[AS 12 X, =[A 12HIIA12SI 
a 3.69 3.58 3.07 2.82 
J6 1.49 1.47 1.22 1.12 
r 0.12 0.11 0.21 0.17 
(pi 0.95 0.96 0.93 0.89 
01 -0.06 -0.02 
02 - - 0.09 *** 0.08 *** 
S. E. of Reg. 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 
J- Stat. 1 16.11 1 16.93 17.28 15.25 
Note: 
(a) Estimates are obtained by GMM estimation with correction for MA(12) autocorrelation. Two-stage least 
squares estimation is employed to obtain the initial estimates of the optimal weighting matrix. 
(b) In the benchmark model the instruments used are a constant and lags I to 6 of the nominal short term 
interest rate, inflation, output gap, and the log difference of a world commodity price index (agricultural raw 
materials). In the models that include asset price inflation, lags I to 6 of the relevant asset price inflation 
variable are also included. 
(c) J-stat denotes the test statistic for overidentifying restrictions. 
(d) *, **, *** indicate level of significance of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
The GMM estimation results of Eq. (3.12)" in Table 3.5, column 2, indicate a 
satisfactory benchmark specification. The estimated inflation coefficient, P, is about 1.5 
indicating stabilising policy by the Fed with respect to inflation. The output coefficient, y, 
is positive and quite larger in magnitude than the corresponding UK benchmark coefficient 
(0.12 as opposed to 0.03) indicating that the Fed has placed more weight on output 
stabilisation. In line with the previous UK findings, a high degree of interest rate 
persistence is also evident in the US data since the sum of the lagged interest rate 
11 For the US case, the inflation target, ; r*, has been set to zero when estimating Eq. (3.12). 
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coefficients is 0.95. The i-statistic accepts the over-identifying restrictions of the 
benchmark specification. 
When asset price inflation is added in the Fed reaction function (columns 3-5 of 
Table 3.5) it appears that only stock market fluctuations have been taken into account by 
the Fed, since 02 is positive and statistically significant, with a magnitude of around 0.1. 
Using a forward-looking Taylor rule model, similar time-period (1990-2003), and a 
different measure of stock market valuation Cecchetti (2003) agrees that there has been a 
significant reaction by the Fed to stock price movements 12 . On the other hand, Bernanke 
and Gertler (1999) fail to find a statistically significant coefficient for stock price inflation 
in an augmented Taylor rule, over the period 1979-1997. The difference between our 
results and Bernanke and Gertler's results may be attributed, among other factors, in the 
different sample periods. 
The house price inflation coefficient, 01, is statistically insignificant in all cases, 
indicating that the Fed has not been as keen as the Bank of England in monitoring house 
market developments. This may reflect the fact that the US housing market has been 
substantially less volatile as compared to the UK market and its pronounced boom and bust 
cycles. As we see in Figure AM in Appendix III, annual house price increases in the US 
have been quite modest, ranging between I to 8 %, while UK house price inflation has 
ranged substantially from -9 % to 26%. Finally, the J-statistic cannot reject the 
overidentifying restrictions. 
3.7 Conclusions 
This chapter examined the empirical reaction of monetary policy to asset prices 
using forward-looking Taylor rule models of interest rates. The intuition for monetary 
policy to consider asset prices lays on the fact that consumption wealth effects and 
12 Cechetti proxies stock price misalignments using the deviation of the implied equity premium from a 20- 
year lagged moving average. The equity risk premium is estimated as the dividend yield minus the risk free 
interest rate plus the growth rate of dividends (adjusted for stock repurchases). The equity premium variable 
in the augmented Taylor rule that Cecchetti estimates, has a negative and statistically significant coefficient. 
This is consistent with the view that stock market overvaluation, leads to lower equity premium, and the Fed 
reacts by tightening monetary policy. Chadha, Samo and Valente (2003) also find a significant reaction by the 
Fed to stock price movements. Cecchetti (2003) provides similar results for Germany (1979-2003) and Japan 
(1979-2001). 
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investment balance sheet effects may destabilise aggregate demand and inflation, the two 
main variables of interest for the CB. Changes in real property prices and stock prices have 
significant impact on households' consumption and firms' investment. Using UK data over 
the period October 1992 to January 2003 we show that movements in asset prices, 
especially house prices, have a significant positive impact on aggregate demand. Demand 
pressures feed into higher future inflation, thus there is scope for an inflation targeting CB 
to consider asset inflation in its forward-looking reaction function. 
The main contribution of this chapter is to find that policymakers in the explicitly 
inflation targeting UK appear to take into account both stock price inflation and house price 
inflation when setting interest rates, with the results suggesting that they are more 
concerned about developments in the property market. When the standard forward-looking 
Taylor rule is augmented by house prices and stock prices, the estimated coefficient of 
house price changes is always greater. The benchmark Taylor rule conditions short-term 
interest rates upon expected inflation and the output gap and fails to provide an accurate 
characterisation of actual policy. When asset prices are included in the reaction function, 
the implied target rate describes the general trends of the actual interest rate much better. 
In addition, we model the effect of central bank independence on the policy preferences 
towards expected inflation. We find that the relationship between asset price inflation and 
interest rates is robust, and that inflation aversion increased post-independence. The result 
that monetary policy reacts to asset price movements appears to be also robust to whether 
an explicit or implicit inflation targeting regime is at work, since the empirical findings for 
the US suggest that the Fed is also concerned about asset prices, in particular equity market 
fluctuations. 
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Chapter 4 
Optimal Interest Rate Rule with Wealth 
Effects 
4.1 Introduction 
The role of asset prices in the monetary policy transmission mechanism has been 
the subject of a growing debate in recent literature. Asset prices could be part of the 
monetary policy objectives, and/or part of the information set that they employ in pursuing 
those objectives (Vickers, 2000). As Bernanke and Gertler (2001, p. 253) point out, in an 
inflation targeting framework the answer to how central banks should respond to asset 
prices is clear: "changes in asset prices should affect monetary policy only to the extent that 
they affect the central bank's forecast of inflation". Some authors favor a pro-active 
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monetary policy response to asset price bubbles. Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky, and 
Waldwani (2000) suggest that the central bank can reduce long-term inflation and output 
volatility by adjusting interest rates in response to asset price misalignments even when 
inflation remains on track. Other authors however take a contrarian view: asset prices are 
too volatile relatively to their information content and any attempt to include them in a 
feedback rule for interest rates would worsen economic outcomes. Bernanke and Gertler 
(1999,200 1) allow for non-deterministic bubble processes and suggest that a too aggressive 
interest rate response increases inflation volatility. Filardo (2000,2001) also explores the 
role of asset prices for monetary policy and finds that if there is no uncertainty about their 
effect on inflation and output, then monetary policy should respond to asset prices. 
It is often argued that the forward-looking nature of asset prices makes them good 
proxies for the information left out of conventional inflation measures. Goodhart (2001) 
stresses that asset price inflation developments are closely associated with general inflation 
trends. Goodhart and Hoffinan (2000) derive financial conditions indices that employ assets 
such as stocks and property in their calculation, and show that they are a useful indicator 
for future consumer price inflation. In any case, as Bdckstr6m (2000, p. 1) argues, "in a 
regime that explicitly targets inflation, asset prices are taken into account via the effects on 
aggregate demand. Rising share prices increase household wealth and that would raise 
consumption for a given level of income if these increases in wealth are considered to be of 
a permanent nature". Thus, the link between asset prices and aggregate demand is crucial in 
the context of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Expansionary monetary 
policy boosts asset prices leading to an increase in aggregate demand which feeds into 
future inflationary pressures. 
This chapter examines the relationship between asset prices and monetary policy in 
the context of optimal policy rules. In particular, following the seminal work by Taylor 
(1993), feedback rules conditioning the interest rate instrument on current or expected 
inflation and the output gap have been extensively analysed in both theoretical and 
empirical literature. Svensson (1997), Clark, Goodhart and Huang (1999), Ellingsen and 
S6destr6m (2001), and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999,2001) among others, show that 
such a feedback rule is optimal in that it derives from the first order condition for the 
optimisation of the central bank's objectives. The standard approach in the literature to 
characterise these objectives by a loss function, which is quadratic in the deviation of 
inflation from target and in the output gap (see e. g. Woodford, 1999), is also taken here. 
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We start from a backward-looking structural macro model where asset prices affect 
future inflation indirectly, through direct wealth effects on aggregate demand. The model 
for asset price dynamics that we initially employ is consistent with reversion of asset prices 
to fundamentals, and no-bubble buildup. The optimal interest rate rule is obtained by 
optimising intertemporally the aforementioned central bank loss function. The derived 
policy rule conditions the current nominal interest rate instrument upon concurrent inflation 
and output gap, with the weight on inflation being lower than in the traditional case of no 
demand-wealth effects. We then relax the assumptions governing the asset price block of 
the model in order to allow for momentum trading situations, where the asset price is 
positively affected by its past rate of change. This is done in an effort to bring some realism 
to the model as, among other historical bubbles, the recent experience of the 1990s implies 
that in an 'irrationally exuberant' economic environment, asset prices can deviate 
significantly from their underlying fundamental value. We show that monetary policy 
should respond to asset price misalignments with the aggressiveness of the response being a 
positive function of the impact of asset prices on aggregate demand. This result has 
important implications for the conduct of monetary policy and contributes crucially to the 
existing literature, as existing work on optimal rules considering asset prices, either fails to 
find a role for asset prices (Bean, 2003), or obtains complex, non linear, and non-intuitive 
interest rate rules (Bordo and Jeanne, 2002; Durre, 2001). 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In the next section we provide the 
theoretical background relating asset prices and real economy. Sections 4.3 and 4.3.1 are 
devoted to the construction of the structural macro model and its solution. Section 4.3.2 
derives the optimal monetary policy rule using stochastic control, while in section 4.3.3 we 
discuss the results. Section 4.3.4 calibrates the model and performs numerical simulations. 
In section 4.4 we relax the assumption that asset prices move on average along with their 
fundamental value, and derive and analyse an alternative optimal feedback rule. Section 4.5 
concludes. 
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4.2 Asset prices and the transmission mechanism to the real economy 
4.2.1 Historical perspective of theoretical developments 
The majority of the theories on the monetary policy transmission mechanism have 
stressed the direct effects of interest rates of on output, and then, indirectly on inflation. 
However, there is also an old tradition in macroeconomics stressing the links between 
financial markets and real activity and the role of asset prices in the transmission 
mechanism. During the Great Depression, some economists, most notably Irving Fisher, 
pointed out that high levels of indebtedness and the resulting financial crisis were the main 
culprits for the sharp output contraction. As Fisher (1933) argued, over-indebtedness of 
firms, due to "new opportunities to invest at a big prospective profit" and "easy money", 
leading to liquidation, results in a contraction of firms' activity and deflation. Deflation 
leads to a higher real debt burden and bankruptcies, and as a result aggregate output 
decreases and the economy is trapped in recession with falling prices. More recently, 
Bemanke (1983b) focused on the importance of financial factors in the Great Depression, 
while Bernanke and Gertler (1999) argue that financial crises can be traced back to the 
origins of many other historical episodes, most notably the recessionary behaviour of the 
Japanese economy in the 1990's. Keynes has also stressed the importance of financial 
markets for real activity prospects, his followers, however, focused on the role of interest 
rates in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy to the investment and the real 
economy. 
Up till quite recently, with a few exceptions', financial market conditions have been 
largely ignored in the standard macroeconomic literature. As Bernanke (1993) emphasizes, 
"in the standard model, factors such as financial conditions of banks and firms play no role 
in affecting investment or other types of spending". A potential explanation for the lack of 
attention to financial markets over the 1950's-1960's involves the prevalence, during that 
period, of the paradigm of perfect information and complete markets (see Alexandre and 
Bacao, 2002). Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed that under competitive markers and 
perfect infonnation, the financial structure of the firm is irrelevant. In the 1970's, however, 
new theories in the economics of imperfect information challenged the results of the 
complete markets literature and pointed out the crucial role of banks and other financial 
' See e. g. Gurley and Shaw (1955). 
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intermediaries in the functioning of credit markets. According to this literature, financial 
markets are characterized by imperfect and asymmetric information, which in turn 
determine the borrower-lender relationship and the financial structure of the firms. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), for instance, argue that with imperfect information and incentive 
problems, external finance is more expensive than internal finance. 
The role of asymmetric information in loans markets has been theoretically 
explored in a series of papers (see e. g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 
1997; Bemanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1998). In the context of these models, households 
and firms may face a borrowing constraint due asymmetric infori-nation in the market for 
bank loans, which produces moral hazard or adverse selection problems. Hence, households 
and firms can only borrow when they offer collateral in exchange. In such an environment, 
the Modigliani-Miller theorem does not hold, and investment demand depends positively 
on the firms' balance-sheet position. A higher net worth has a positive effect on investment 
both directly, by increasing the sources of internal finance, and indirectly, by offering more 
collateral. According to Bernanke and Gertler (1995), a new channel of transmission of 
monetary policy arises due to information imperfection in the financial and credit markets. 
This 'credit channel' constitutes a set of factors that amplify and propagate conventional 
interest rate effects, and can be decomposed into a balance sheet and a bank-lending 
channel. For example, an increase in interest rates, decreases asset prices and consequently 
the value of the firms' collateral leading to a reduction in investment spending as the firms' 
ability to borrow declines. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) provide empirical 
evidence supporting the balance sheet channel. The bank-lending channel points out the 
effect of monetary policy on banks' ability to lend and thus on the amount of external funds 
available for firms' investment 2. 
Goodhart and Hofinann (2003) examine empirically the relationship between credit 
and asset prices using data from ten industrialized economies over the 1972-1998 period. 
Using cointegration techniques they demonstrate a strong positive bi-directional 
relationship between house prices and the credit to GDP ratio. They argue that the 
relationship between credit and asset prices is multifaceted, since credit conditions may 
also affect asset valuations. The role of credit for asset valuations has already been 
emphasized by Kindleberger (1996) and Minsky (1982). This argument has also been 
See Kashyap and Stein (1994) or empirical evidence on the importance of the bank-lending channel. 
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restated in more policy orientated literature (see e. g. Schinasi and Halgraves, 1993). 
However, standard asset pricing models do not claim an explicit direct role for credit 
conditions since they argue that real asset prices depend on the discounted future stream of 
real dividend payments. In such framework, higher liquidity exerts an indirect effect by 
lowering interest rates (and thus decreasing discount factors), or by indicating stronger 
future growth (and thus higher expected dividends). On the other hand, as Goodhart and 
Hofmann (2003) point out, "whether asset prices always obey asset pricing formulae in 
reality is not to be taken for granted, and it may simply be that additional available liquidity 
increases the demand for a (temporarily) fixed supply of assets, which results in higher real 
asset prices. 
4.2.2 Channels of asset price influence to consumption and investment 
In the monetary policy transmission mechanism literature we usually identify three 
types of asset prices, besides those on debt instruments, that provide important channels 
through which monetary policy affects the real economy: stock prices, house prices, and 
exchange rates. Asset price changes affect aggregate spending via changes in consumption 
and investment spending. In light of their overwhelming role in the composition of the 
private sector portfolios the focus here will be on equity and property prices. 
Stockprices 
As Mishkin (2001) points out, transmission mechanisms of monetary policy via the 
stock market can be categorized in four types: stock market effects on investment, firm 
balance-sheet effects, household wealth effects, and household liquidity effects. 
Stock market and investment 
A theory that allows for a mechanism linking changes in stock prices to the 
aggregate economy is Tobin's q-model (Tobin, 1969). Tobin's q is defined as the market 
value of firms divided by the replacement cost of capital. Higher values of q imply that the 
market price of firms is high relative to the replacement cost of capital, and therefore new 
plant and equipment capital is cheap relative to the market value of firms. The companies 
then may issue equity capital and get a high price for it relative to the cost of the 
facilities 
and equipment they are buying. Consequently, investment spending 
increases because firms 
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can now buy a lot of new investment goods with only a small issue of stock. Expansionary 
monetary policy which lowers interest rates makes bonds less attractive relative to stocks 
and results in increased demands for stocks that bids up their price. Chapter I offered 
empirical evidence indicating that stock returns and interest rate changes are inversely 
related. Combining the negative relationship between interest rates and stock prices and the 
positive relationship between stock prices and investment spending, leads to the following 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy: 
Expansionary monetary policy --+ Higher Stock Prices --+ Higher q ---+ increase in 
investment spending --+ increase in aggregate spending 
In addition, when stock prices increase, it becomes cheaper for firms to finance their 
investment by issuing shares instead of bonds, since each new share that is issued produces 
more funds. Thus a rise in stock prices will lead to higher investment spending. Therefore 
the transmission mechanism can also take the following form: 
Expansionary monetary policy --+ Higher Stock Prices ---* lower cost of capital --+ increase 
in investment spending --+ increase in aggregate spending 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) review five main theories concerning the causal 
direction of the underlying positive relationship between stock returns and the investment 
component of output growth. These theories are categorised into those according to which 
stock price movements not reflecting changes in future fundamentals (bubbles) cannot 
predict changes in investment - the 'passive informant' hypothesis and the 'accurate 
informant' hypothesis- and those according to which they can - the 'faulty active 
informant' hypothesis, the 'financing' hypothesis, and the 'stock market pressure on 
managers' hypothesis. Under the 'passive informant' hypothesis, the stock market simply 
captures information that people already know and doesn't play an important role 
in 
allocating investment funds. This hypothesis assumes that the fundamental share price 
reflects the present discounted value of all future dividends, and that dividend growth 
is 
positively related to GDP growth. Thus, if next year's growth is buoyant, news revealed 
this year will typically be positive, resulting in positive stock price movements throughout 
the year. 
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Under the 'accurate active informant' hypothesis, stock price movements convey to 
managers information about the future economic developments. This information is in turn 
employed by the managers to base their investment decisions, thereby justifying the 
market's expectations. In this case the stock market acts as a sunspot bringing about one of 
several possible self-fulfilling equilibria. Thus, under this hypothesis, the stock market 
cannot predict investment, after controlling for future fundamentals, because it is perfectly 
correlated with future fundamentals. From the viewpoint of the above two hypotheses, there 
is no behavioural causal relationship running from asset prices to investment and economic 
activity. The only causal relationship is between current and future output growth, with 
stock markets merely being a "side-show". 
On the other hand lies the more traditional view that asset price changes affect 
investment and output via various channels. The "faulty active informant" hypothesis states 
that managers' investment decisions are influenced by stock price movements, but 
managers cannot distinguish between movements that reflect investor sentiments and 
movements that reflect changes in fundamentals. Under this hypothesis, investor optimism 
(pessimism) may mislead the managers to over-investment (under-investment). Under the 
'financing' hypothesis, based upon Tobin's q theory of investment, the key channel of the 
stock market's influence on investment is through the issuance of new shares. It argues that 
when stock prices are high compared to the replacement cost of capital, managers are more 
likely to invest in new physical capital by issuing new shares of their company. Thus there 
is a direct positive causal link running from high stock returns to high investment and 
output growth. If stock prices are assumed to have an important influence on financing 
decisions then as Fischer and Merton (1984) argue, investor sentiment may affect real 
economic activity. 
Changes in stock prices have been found to exert significant effects on investment 
in most industrialised countries. In the U. S. the impact of changes in stock prices on 
investment appears to have been particularly strong with the Tobin's q having risen by 75 
percent between 1992 and 1998 to reach its highest level since World War II (Barro, 1990). 
Although the predictive performance of q-type investment models has been traditionally 
weak - an interesting exception is the paper by Erickson and 
Whited (2000) - there is little 
dispute that the market drop in the price of capital associated with the late 1990's US 
internet boom in equity markets has contributed importantly to rapid investment growth. 
Studies for other countries also yield a strong relationship between stock prices and 
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investment 3. In France, Germany, and the Netherlands however, the link between asset 
prices and investment is less pronounced (IMF, 2000). 
One potential explanation for the historically smaller role for stock prices in 
continental Europe is the difference in corporate laws and traditions, as witnessed by less 
frequent takeovers, the great importance accorded to employees in decision making and the 
higher gearing ratios. These features imply that managers tend to be less responsive to the 
stock market relative to their counterparts in the Anglo-Saxon countries. On the other hand, 
there is evidence that property prices - rather than stock prices- have a more significant 
effect on investment in continental Europe and Japan, consistent with the more widespread 
use of property collateral against loans. 
Firms balance sheet effects 
As we already argued, the presence of asymmetric information problems in credit 
markets provides another stock market-related transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 
When stock prices decline, the net worth of firms decreases as well inducing more severe 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems associated with lending to these firms. Lower 
net worth is equivalent to lower value for the collateral to be employed for loans. Thus, 
potential losses from adverse selection are higher, leading to a decrease in available 
financing and consequently investment spending. The lower net worth of firms implies also 
more pronounced moral hazard since the owners of the firms have a lower equity stake, 
giving them greater incentives to engage in risky investment projects. Undertaking riskier 
investment projects makes it more likely that lenders will not be paid back, thus a decrease 
in net worth will lead to an decrease in lending and hence in investment spending. Hence, 
monetary policy can affect firms' balance sheets and aggregate spending via the following 
transmission channel: 
Expansionary monetary policy --- ), Higher Stock Prices -+ Increase in net worth offirms --+ 
smaller adverse selection and moral hazard --+ higher lending--+ increase in investment 
spending ---+ increase in aggregate spending 
3 See, among others, Andersen and Subbaraman (1996) and Bayoumi (1999) 
for Australia, the United 
Kingdom, and Japan - 
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Household liquidity effects 
As Mishkin (2001) points out, an alternative way to consider balance-sheet channels 
of monetary policy is by examining household balance sheets, particularly liquidity effects 
on consumer durables and housing expenditures. According to the liquidity effects view, 
balance sheet effects work through their impact on consumer's desire to spend rather than 
on the lender's desire to lend (Mishkin, 1977). Due to asymmetric information about their 
quality, consumer durables and housing are very illiquid assets. Following a negative 
income shock, if consumers need to sell their consumer durables or housing to raise money, 
they would expect a loss because they could not get the full value of these assets in a 
distress sale. In contrast, if they held financial assets (bank deposits, stocks, bonds) they 
could sell them quickly for their full market value and raise the cash. When stock prices 
increase, consumer durable expenditure also increases since consumers have a more secure 
financial position and a lower estimate of the likelihood of financial distress. This leads to 
the following transmission mechanism: 
Expansionary monetary policy --+ Higher Stock Prices --+ higher value offinancial assets 
-* decrease in perceived financial distress --+ higher durable consumption and housing 
spending --+ increase in aggregate spending 
Household wealth effects 
Consumption spending also plays an important role in another balance-sheet-related 
transmission mechanism that involves household wealth effects. According to the life cycle 
model of Modigliani (1971), consumption is determined by the lifetime resources of 
consumers. Financial wealth constitutes a major component of consumers' lifetime 
resources. Hence, expansionary monetary policy which raises stock prices, raises the value 
of household wealth, thereby increasing the lifetime resources of consumers which causes 
consumption to rise. Research has shown that this transmission mechanism is quite strong 
but the size of the wealth effect is still controversial (see e. g. Ludvingson, Steindel, and 
Lettau, 2002; Lettau and Ludvingson, 2001). 
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Expansionary monetary policy --+ Higher Stock Prices --+ higher household wealth 
higher consumption spending --+ increase in aggregate spending 
Propertyprices 
Property prices are another important category of asset prices with active role in the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism. Property price movements have been closely 
related to the business cycle in the most of the industrialised world (IMF, 2000). For some 
countries like Japan the correlation is even stronger. Recessions in Japan since the early 
1980s have been accompanied with falling property prices. Conversely, the strong 
upswings in economic activity in Australia and many EU countries since the mid-1990s 
have been associated with robust growth in property prices. As Mishkin (2001) argues, 
property prices can affect aggregate demand through three channels: direct effects on 
housing expenditure, household wealth, bank balance sheets. 
Direct effects on housing expenditure 
Monetary expansion lowers interest rates and thus decreases the cost of financing 
houses, which bids up their price. As the price of housing relative to its construction cost 
increases, construction finns try to increase the supply of housing and thus housing 
expenditure increases and aggregate spending also increases. This model of housing 
expenditure resembles the Tobin's q theory of investment4. 
Expansionary monetary policy --+ lower cost of financing housing ---+ higher housing 
spending --+ increase in aggregate spending 
Household wealth effects 
Household wealth depends, among other factors, on the value of the property. 
Hence, expansionary monetary policy which raises property prices also raises household 
wealth and therefore consumption spending. The consumption wealth effect from higher 
property prices is expected to be stronger in countries where property ownership is more 
prevalent among households. 
See McCarthy and Peach (2002) for relevant empirical evidence. 
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Expansionary monetary policy --+ higher housing prices --+ higher household wealth 
higher consumption spending --+ increase in aggregate spending 
Bank balance sheets 
Real estate lending constitute a major business for banks, in which the value of the property 
acts as a collateral. Higher real estate prices, due to monetary expansion, lead to lower bank 
loans losses, which increases the bank capital. Higher bank capital allows banks to engage 
in more lending, with the resulting credit expansion leading to higher investment and 
aggregate demand. When the process is inverted and property prices fall, leading to a 
decrease in credit availability and subsequently to smaller investment and output this 
transmission mechanism has often been described as a "capital crunch". Bemanke and 
Lown (1991) point out that a capital crunch was operational in the U. S. in the early 1990's, 
while Mishkin (2001) claims that it has been an important source of stagnation in Japan in 
recent years. 
Expansionary monetary policy--+ higher real estate prices --+ higher bank capital --+ higher 
bank lending --+ increase in investment --+ increase in aggregate spending 
Following our discussion on the literature underlying the wealth effects and their impact on 
investment and consumption, we proceed to the theoretical model. 
4.3 A structural backward-looking model 
We use a structural backward-looking model of a (closed) economy that allows for 
the effect of asset prices on aggregate demand. As Svensson (1997) argues, the main 
simplification of the backward-looking model is that private-sector expectations are 
implicitly treated as adaptive expectations, thereby simplifying considerably the ensuing 
discussion. The model (Model I) is given by the following equations: 
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Model I 
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(4.3) 
where, z, = p, - p, _1 
is the inflation rate at time t (strictly, the deviation from target), pt is 
the natural logarithm of the price level, yt is the deviation of log output from its steady-state 
level (output gap), it is the monetary policy instrument (a nominal short-term interest rate, 
e. g. repo rate), qt is the log real asset price at t. Different interpretations of q, are possible 
(e. g. house price, stock price), in what follows though we mainly treat it is a real stock 
price. Et, t7t, and ut are i. i. d. shocks to inflation, aggregate demand and asset prices with zero 
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means and constant variances: a,, ý all , cyu . The coefficients can be interpreted as partial 
elasticities which have the following properties: a, fl2 , y, ý 
Y2 : ý' 0; 0 "ý- fil ": ý I; fl3 ý! 0. 
Eq. (4.1) is an accelerationist (or backward-looking NAIRU type) Phillips Curve 
where the change in inflation is a positive function of the current output gap and the 
inflation shock. The presence of inflation inertia in the inflation equation implies that 
disinflations will be costly in terms of output losses, thus there is a short-run trade-off 
between inflation and the output. However, since lagged inflation enters Eq. (4.1) with 
unity coefficient, this specification implies a vertical long-run Phillips Curve, i. e. there is 
no long-run relationship between the output and inflation5. Eq. (4.1) resembles the inflation 
equation employed by Svensson (1997) and Rudesbusch and Svensson (1999) in that the 
role of expected future inflation in the inflation adjustment equation is being ignored 
6. 
Fuhrer (1997) employed US data and argued that forward looking expectations are 
unimportant empirically in inflation adjustment equations. The parameter a is a positive 
constant which measures the sensitivity of inflation to excess demand 
7. 
' We should note, however, that as McCallum (1997) argues, the use of Eq. (4.1) in which lagged actual 
inflation obtains a unity coefficient, can lead to problems of instability that would not arise if expectations of 
current of future inflation were included. 
6 Svensson (1997) employs a variant of Eq. (1) in which inflation depends on the one-penod lagged, rather 
than concurrent, output gap. 
7 As Clark, Goodhart, and Huang (1999) point out, there are good reasons to believe that a is not constant (see 
also Clark et al., 1996; Laxton et al. (1995). The assumption of linearity in the Phillips curve helps to obtain a 
closed-form solution for the optimal feedback rule. Bean (1996) discusses the implications of nonlinearity in 
the Phillips curve for optimal monetary policy in a model which does not utilize rational expectations. 
130 
The demand side, as given by Eq. (4.2), is based upon previous work by Walsh 
(1998), Ball (1997), and Svensson (1997), with one important difference: aggregate 
demand at time t+1 not only is serially correlated and negatively related to the lagged real 
interest rate, i, - E, [7r,,, ], but also depends upon past real asset prices (wealth effects), 
which themselves are a negative function of the real interest rate and a positive function of 
output. The presence of lagged variables in the aggregate demand equation intends to 
capture the dynamics in the data which call for a lagged response of output to policy 
changes. 
Monetary policy will affect aggregated demand via changes in the real interest rate, 
therefore in a specification like the one given by Eqs. (4.1)-(4.3), current interest rate 
actions will affect next period output. This is consistent with the result of a number of VAR 
studies 8. As indicated by Eq. (4.2) expected future output gap is not included in the 
aggregate demand equation. The presence of expected future output derives from models 
consistent with optimising agents (see e. g. McCallum and Nelson, 1999a). Unless, lagged 
output gap proxies expected future output gap, the interrelationship between current 
demand and expected future output, as predicted by optimal consumption choice models, is 
not reflected in Eq. (4.2). Parameter fi3 in the aggregate demand indicates wealth effects 
which have a positive impact on the aggregate demand. If there are no wealth effects and 
fl3= 0 then Eq. (4.2) resembles a traditional dynamic AD. The value of, 83depends, among 
other factors, upon the amount of wealth that is locked in the stock market. We would 
expect that in a market-based economy the value of fl3is higher than a bank-based economy 
with a smaller portion of wealth invested in capital markets. 
The third equation describes the behaviour of the stock market. In line with the 
present value model of equity valuation, the real asset price is negatively related to current 
real interest rate and positively to current output9. This is supported by the majority of 
empirical studies examining the effect of macroeconomic variables on the stock marketlo. 
Financial theory posits that stock prices equal the expected present value of future net cash 
8 See for example Leeper, Sims, Zha (1996). 
9 Note that Eq. (43) relates the real asset price, q,, with the expected value of the output gap. Strictly 
speaking, the asset price should be a function of expected output. Since, however, output is the sum of the 
output gap plus the potential output, it is implied that higher output gap is associated with higher output and 
hence higher asset price. 
10 See among others Fama (198 1), Conover Jensen and Johnson (1999). 
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flows". Holding everything else equal, higher interest rates are associated with lower stock 
prices, given the higher discount rate for the expected stream of cash flows. The 
conventional view suggests that a restrictive monetary policy environment serves as bad 
news for the stock as it is generally associated with higher future interest rates and lower 
level of economic activity. In contrast, an expansive monetary environment signals higher 
average real equity returns, as these periods are usually associated with lower future interest 
rates and increases in economic activity. The empirical findings in chapter I verified the 
aforementioned conventional view since we showed that stock returns in a number of 
countries are significantly lower following a monetary policy tightening. The stochastic 
error term in Eq. (4.3), u,,,, represents the non-fundamental component of the asset price. 
Here, for simplicity, it is assumed to have zero mean and constant variance, (: ru 2. Thus, for 
the moment we assume that, on average, asset prices move in line with their fundamentals 
and we don't allow for bubble-type events. 
The structure of the model implies that the monetary policy instrument affects the 
stock market contemporaneously, and inflation and output with one period lag. In the 
context of an annual model, the monetary policy instrument could be interpreted as a one- 
year interest rate that is controlled by the central bank, or alternatively as a 2-week repo 
rate that must be held constant throughout each year. At time t the central bank chooses it 
which affects current period's real asset price and next period's inflation and output; 
however, contemporaneous inflation and output gap, 7rt, yj are predetermined by previous 
decisions and current exogenous shocks. 
4.3.1 Solution of model I 
Substituting for the lagged real asset price, qt, in the aggregate demand Eq. (4.2) and 
using the expectational version of Eq. (4.1) to eliminate E, [7r,,, ] we get: 
Yt+l --": 
(A+ fl3r2 )yt - 
(P2 + 83r, )(it - ir, - aE, [y, +, 
]) + v,,, (4.4) 
where, V, +l ý-/33UI + ? 7t+l 
" it is assumed that capital gains in the stock market are positively related to expected future dividends which 
are themselves proportional to current output. 
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Taking expectations on both sides of Eq. (4.4), conditional upon time t information, gives: 
o5ly, - 
g2 Ot 
- Zt 
) 
where, 91 =_ 181 
+AY2 
I-a(, 82 +, 83r, ) 
'52 162 
+, 8371 
a(, 82+, 83y, ) 
Using the above expression to eliminate E, [y,,, ] from (4.4) and rearranging, yields: 
Yt+i ..: [(A+ 
A r2 )+ 682 + 83, v, )aS, lyt - (, B, + fl3rý)(l + a82 
)Q, 
- 7r, 
)+ vt+l 
Following Walsh (1998), since 7r, , yt are predetermined when il is chosen we can define ý0' 
as the control variable of the central bank, where (pt is given by: 
ýot -,,,: [(A+ 183 dy 2)+ 
('82 + 83, vl)ai5l ]y, - (, 82+, 83, vl)(I + a52)(it -; r) (4.5) 
Using the definition of (pt the Phillips Curve and the AD Eqs. (4.1) and (4.2) can be re- 
written as: 
. ir, ,I= ; r, +a (p, co, +I 
Yt +I (Pt + Vt +I 
where, o), +, -, t+l + avt+l 
4.3.2 Optimal interest rate rule I 
1)' 
(4.2)' 
The central bank objective is to solve the following stochastic control problem: 
choose an infinite sequence of controls to minimise the expected discounted value of the 
intertemporal quadratic loss function that penalizes both inflation and output gap volatility: 
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00 
min IE Bipr2 i+ ýIY2 j (p, ) III 
=D 02t 
t+ t+ 
subject to the transition Eqs. (4.1)' and (4.2)' 
(4.6) 
where, ýt ý! 0 is the relative weight attached by the central bank on output gap stabilisation . 
P is the discount factor, 0<P <1. In the absence of discounting, the postulated loss function 
is a weighted average of conditional volatility of inflation (deviations from target) and the 
output gap. It is evident from (4.2)' that at time t, when the interest rate (and consequently 
(pt) is chosen the only state variable is 7rt. Therefore, the value function is defined in terms 
of 7rt only, V(7rt). Applying Bellman's dynamic programming principle, and substituting for 
the two constraints (4.1)' and (4.2)' in the value function, we obtain: 
V(ir, ) =min E, ffl(ir, + a(p, + co, +, 
)' +, u((P, + v, +, 
)'] +, OV(7r, + a(, o, + ct), +, 
)) (4.7) 2 
(Pt 
The first order condition with respect to ýp, and the envelope theorem allow to derive an 
expression for the optimal path of the control variable 12 : 
a + Et (tot 2+ 7rt 2+ pf (4.8) 
Since we have a linear-quadratic structure in the stochastic control problem the solution 
will be of the fonn 
(Pt --.,: cirt 
(4.9) 
Thus the optimal control will be linear function of the state variable. Updating one period 
ahead and taking expectations at time t of (4.9) yields: 
Et [opt, j cEt [7r,,, ]= cEt [7r, +aog+co, +, 
]=c(; r, +airp, )=(p, +caýot 
Et [(p, 
+, 
] (1 + ca)(p, (4.10) 
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Substitution of (4.9) and (4.10) in (4.8) yields the following quadratic whose solution gives 
the optimal c value: 
(, u, Ba)c' + (, u, 6 - a' -, u)c -a= (4.11) 
The solution we accept has to fulfil the inflation process stability criterion. This condition 
implies that only the negative c-root is accepted 13 . Hence, c is a negative parameter 
depending on the model's structural parameters and on the central bank's preferences. 
Finally, we obtain the optimal interest rate, it, by using Eq. (4.5) and Eq. (4.9), and 
substituting for 61 and 62 : 
it = f, )T, + fyyt 
where) fr =I-c+ ca A+A 
*V I 
inflation, and the output gap. 
(4.12) 
fy = 
A+ A r2. 
, are the respective interest rate weights on A+A rl 
Eq. (4.12) resembles a Taylor rule where the nominal interest rate is a linear function of 
inflation and the output gap. The inflation coefficient, f, , should exceed the value of one, 
to ensure a real interest rate response that will lead to lower inflation (Taylor principle). 
Sf 
14: This, in turn, imposes the condition that the slope of the Phillips curve, a, should sati y 
I 
a< In Giannoni and Woodford's (2002) tenninology, the policy rule in Eq. A +AY1 
(4.12) is an direct explicit instrument rule since it provides a forinula for the setting of 
policy instrument that specifies feedback only from predetermined target variables (; r,, y, ), 
without involving any 'intermediate target' variables. 
12 See A4.1 in Appendix IV for more details. 
13 See A4.2 in Appendix IV for more details. 
14 
fj 
C+ 
ca >0 <=: > c +a >0. 
Taldng also into account that only negative c-values are >I <=> 
+ 3YI 182 
+ Arl -72 ' '8 
accepted we obtain the Phillips curve slope restriction. 
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4.3.3 Analysis of the results I 
In the standard case of the no wealth effects, 83 is equal to zero in Eq. (4.2) and the 
system would be formed by a typical AS/AD model. In this benchmark specification the 
optimal weights on inflation and output would be: 
f,, =I-c +ca and 
182 
fy" 
Comparing the standard case (A= 0) with the wealth effects case (, 6, >0), we 
notice that the optimal response of monetary policy to inflation when aggregate demand is 
affected by wealth, should be smaller (f, < r, since c< 0). The intuition behind this finding, 
is that the negative impact on inflation from a monetary tightening would be amplified 
when there are significant wealth effects on aggregate demand and consequently on 
inflation. With respect to the output gap coefficient we notice that the final result depends 
upon the relative effects of interest rates and output on the real asset price, (, Y, and Y,, 
andA> 82 then f<f*; This implies a weight on output lower respectively). 
If 
IVI 
> V2 
YY 
than the benchmark case. On the other hand, if 71 ": ý 72 and fl, <, 82 then fy >Y; When 
asset prices are more sensitive to output rather than interest rates, the model suggests that, 
in the presence of wealth effects, the central bank should adopt more aggressive interest 
policy with respect to output. 
We now examine the effect of the underlying structure of the model on the policy 
parameters, by calculating the partial derivatives of f, and f, with respect to 71,72,, 63, 
Table 4.1: Partial Derivatives, Model I. 
f aflar, L9f 
/272 af /L9ß3 
fl 
Cß3 
_<0 
02 + ß3 YI)2 
- 
0 
cil- 
<0 
(ß2 + ß3 71)2 
72 (A + ß3 72 ) 71 
fy _. 
(ßl+ß3Y2)ß3 
0 
(ß2 + ß3 YI)2 
ß3_ 
> 
ß2 + ß3 
/VI 
-0 
02 + ß371) (ß2 + ß3 YI)2 
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The results in Table 4.1 lead to the following propositions: 
Proposition 1: In the presence of wealth effects (, 83 > 0), the higher the elasticity of asset 
prices to the real interest rate, y, the smaller is the optimal interest rate weight on 
inflation and the output gap. 
(+ )2 > 0, it is implied that L9f Proof: (i) Since c<0,83 ý: 0, '82 '83 rl r/ av, :50 
(H) Since A tý! 0, (fil +A r2 
)ý>Oý ( )62 +Arl)2 > 0, it is implied that aflav, :50 
This result can be interpreted on the basis that central bank actions exert a double effect on 
real economy. This happens because an increase in interest rates not only exerts a direct 
negative impact on the firms' level of investment but will also depress consumption via a 
reduction in realised capital gains, leading to a greater-than-before decrease in aggregate 
demand and inflation. Thus, an increased sensitivity of asset prices to interest rates allows 
the monetary transmission mechanism to work through the financial market, but on the 
same time puts some downward constraints on the central bank's responses to inflation and 
the output gap. 
Proposition 2: In the presence of wealth effects (A> 0 ), the more procyclical asset price 
are (i. e. higher 72 
), the higher is the optimal interest rate weight on the output gap. 
Proof: SinceA ý! 0, (, 82 +Ayl) > 0, it is implied that afy 
/'OdV2 ý! 0 
The intuition behind proposition 2 is that, according to Model I, output expansion is 
associated with asset price increases that feed into even higher output. Therefore, in order 
to achieve output stabilisation in the presence of a strong link between output and asset 
prices, a stronger response is required from the central bank. 
Proposition 3: The stronger the wealth effect, 83 , the smaller is the optimal interest rate 
weight on inflation. 
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Proof: Since c<0, y, > 0, (, 82 +, 83r, )' > 0, it is implied that L9f; r 
I M3 <0 
When the role of capital markets as creator of wealth and collateral is taken into account, 
the magnitude of the inflation related-interest rate adjustment should be smaller. This does 
not imply that the central bank intervenes less frequently. In fact, if the true data generation 
process for aggregate demand is given by the augmented IS, Eq. (4.2), then monetary policy 
may have to be more frequently adjusted. Proposition 4.3 suggests that as wealth effects 
build up, a too aggressive interest rate response to inflation will lead to recession and will 
threaten the price stability objective' 5. 
4.3.4. Calibrating model I 
In order to examine the properties of the model we conduct simulation analysis. To 
do so, we need to calibrate the behavioural parameters in Eqs. (4.1)-(4.3). For the 
benchmark model coefficients (a, fil, fl2) we employ the values from Ball's (1997) model. 
The lag structure of the model is more appropriate for annual data' 6 therefore we used a 
discount factor #=0.96. We assign a value of 0.1 for the elasticity of aggregate demand 
with respect to wealth effects (fl3). According to the Bank of England's model for 
consumption expenditure, a one percent rise in real net financial wealth and real gross 
housing wealth boosts aggregate spending by 0.12 percent in the long-run (Gramlich, 
2002). 
For the parameter values given in Table 4.2 and equal weight on inflation and 
output in the loss function (q = 1) we obtain the following benchmark optimal policy rule: 
i, = 1.4; r, + 0.8y, (4.12) 
15 On the other hand no clear result emerges with respect to the weight attached on output since 
ýG 
>0 
if 
a, 81 
Ar2 > filyl , and 16fy 0 
if 82/V2 < Arl 
M3 
"The evidence in Batini and Nelson (2001) suggests that it takes a year 
before monetary policy actions have 
their peak effect on inflation. 
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Table 4.2: Baseline parameter values, Model I. 
Coefficient Benchmark 
Model 
Wealth effect 
Model 
a 0.4 0.4 
fil 0.8 
. 
0.8 
Jfl2 
1 1 
fl3 
- 
0.1 
71 1 
Y2 0.7 
The coefficients in Eq. (4.12) have magnitudes similar to those reported by Taylor 
(1993) and Ball (1997). The nominal interest rate is increased more than proportionally 
with respect to ipflation, ensuring a real interest rate adjustment that will lead to lower 
inflation, while the output gap coefficient is higher than the standard Taylor rule response 
of 0.5. Inclusion of the wealth effect in the AD results into the following rule: 
i, = 1. I; r, + 0.76y, (4.13) 
The inflation coefficient is sensibly smaller while the output gap coefficient is not 
substantially altered. This type of response by the central bank ensures that output gap and 
inflation are stabilised at a lower interest rate as compared to the standard case of no wealth 
effects. Figure 4.1 shows the inflation coefficient as a function of the relative weight on 
output gap fluctuations (a). We plot both f* (fpb) and f (fpw) and notice that the optimal 
inflation coefficient is decreasing in y and that when wealth effects are taken into 
consideration, the optimal weight on inflation is lower in general. This result certifies the 
predictions in Table 4.1. Since monetary policy can act not only directly on the level of 
inflation but also indirectly through the wealth channel, the interest rate response does not 
have to be as large as in the traditional case. 
Taylor (1996) has argued that there is a trade-off between the variability, rather than 
the average levels, of inflation and output. Figure 4.2 plots the output gap-inflation 
volatility frontier deriving from the minimisation of the objective function of the model; it 
is negatively sloped indicating the presence of trade-offs in optimal policy choice. We 
present two alternative volatility frontiers; spb corresponds to the benchmark case, while 
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Figure 4.1: Optimal inflation coefficient as a function of the weight on output gap variance. 
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Figure 4.2: Volatility frontier for the wealth effects and benchmark case. 
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spw derives from the model taking into account asset prices. An efficient policy should 
minimise inflation variability for each given realisation of output variability, generating an 
efficient frontier. Comparing the variance frontiers the policy choices given by spw are 
more efficient. Therefore, if the central bank acknowledges that asset prices enter the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism, then the implied optimal policy produces lower 
inflation and output variability with apparent economic benefits. 
4.4 Momentum trading, reversion to fundamentals and optimal rule 
So far, we have hypothesised that observed asset prices move along their 
fundamental value on average, thus excluding from the analysis cases of run-ups to asset 
prices, 'momentum trading', or bubbles formation. However, the recent experience of the 
late 1990s stock market bubble, as well as other historical episodes of 'irrational 
exuberance' in financial markets imply that, the assumption that asset prices do not 
significantly deviate from their fundamental value, may not be quite realistic. We shall 
therefore relax the above assumption by postulating two alternative equations to describe 
asset price dynamics. In this section, we employ a partial adjustment mechanism of actual 
asset prices towards their fundamental value that does not rule out the appearance of a 
bubble buildup, as presented in Eqs. (4.3.1) and (4.3.2) 17 . The aforementioned equations 
along with Eqs. (4.1), (4.2) that describe inflation and the output gap, respectively, form 
Model 11 that we will be using in this section. Model II is a modified version of the model 
employed by Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2003). 
Model II 
ir, == ; r, + ay, +, c,,, 
y,,, =Ay, -, 82(i, -E, 
[7r,,, + 83q, + 77,,., (4.2) 
q, = bAq, -, - 
(q, 
-, - q: 
) (4.3.1) 
q, -71 (il - El [,, 7r, +, 
1) + 
/V2Et lyl+l I+ Ut (4.3.2) 
141 
As Eq. (4.3.1) indicates, investors may feel that positive realised returns (Aq, -l > 
0) 
may continue in the future therefore inducing a positive 'momentum' effect on the current 
level of the real asset price (b > 0). In essence, investors bid up the demand for asset 
holdings in expectation that past capital gains will persist in the future. The higher the value 
of b the stronger the effect from past asset price changes and therefore q, can diverge 
significantly from its fundamental value, qt*, albeit not permanently 18 . In addition, the asset 
price specification that we employ allows for reversion to fundamentals since following a 
decrease in fundamentals (qt* < qt-I ) there is a negative pressure on qt. Eq. (4.3.2) describes 
fundamental asset prices in line with the standard dividend model of asset pricing. There is 
a positive effect from expected future dividends (assumed to depend on expected output) 
and a negative effect from real interest rates. We also allow for uncertainty in the 
fundamentals' process by including the random disturbance term, ut. 
4.4.1 Solution of model II 
As we shall show the model's solution in terms of inflation and the output gap 
exhibits a form similar to Eqs. (4.1)', (4.2)'. We begin by substituting for fundamentals, q:, 
in Eq. (4.3.1) in order to get an alternative expression for real asset prices: 
q, = bAq, -I qt-l +, Yl (it - 
EI[7rt+l 1) - y2EI lyt+l I- Ut I (4.14) 
We then use Eq. (4.14) and the expectational version of Eq. (4.1) to eliminate qt, E, 
from the aggregate demand Eq. (4.2): 
y,,, =, 6, y, -(Ari+fl2)(i, - 7r) + 
[a(Arl+, 62)+Ay2] E, [y,,, ]+A(bAq, 
-, -q, -, 
)+v, 
+, 
(4.15) 
where, the composite error term, vt , is again defined as: v, -,, =, 
fl3U, +77,.,., 
" We would like to thank Charles Goodhart for his useful suggestions regarding Model 11. 
18 We do not regard the divergence of q, ftom q, * as an explicit bubble because we do not assign any 
probabilistic structure to its evolution. 
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Taking expectations on both sides of the above expression, conditional upon time t 
infonnation, yields the following expression for E, [y, ]: 
E, [y,,, I =, ýy, - 
A2 (i, 
- 7r, 
) +, A3(bAq, -, - q, -, 
) 
where, 
A 
[a(Av, + '82 + 183 *V2 
(4.16) 
83YI + 
182 #83 
[a(, 63 r, +A)+ 163 Y2 1- [a(Ay, +, 82)+, 83y2 
Using Eq. (4.16) to eliminate E, [y,,, ] from Eq. (4.15) and rearranging, yields: 
Y,, =, ýy, -A2 
Q, 
- 7c, 
)+ A3(bAq, 
-, - q, -, 
) + v,.,, (4.17) 
We define ýpt as the control variable of the central bank since 7rt, yt 
predetermined when it is chosen (see also Walsh, 1998). 
ýp, = ýy, -, ý (i, -7r, 
) A3(bAq, 
-, - q, -, 
) (4.18) 
Thus, the system of Eqs (4.1), (4.2), (4.3.1), (4.3.2) can be expressed in terms of (pt : 
irl+l : irt + a(p, + co, 
Yt+l ..: (Pt + Vt+l 
where, o-)t+, -= -, t+l + av, +, 
4.4.2 Optimal interest rate rule 11 
(4.1)' 
(4.2)' 
are 
As in the previous section, and as standard in the literature, the monetary 
authorities are assumed to have an objective function, like Eq. (4.6), that is quadratic in the 
deviation of inflation from the target and in the output gap. The technical procedure to 
derive the optimal interest rate feedback rule, as given by Eqs. (4.7) to (4.11) of the 
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previous section, remains the same. Also, we utilise again the results in Appendix A4.1, 
and A4.2. 
The optimal path for the interest rate is obtained using Eqs. (4.18) and (4.9), 
substituting for ý, A2 , A3 , and re-arranging. 
C[I-A] 
Irt +A yl + 
183 (bAq, - q, -, 
) 
. 
83 r, + 182 . 
83 rl + 182 183 YI + J82 
where, A= a(Ay, +, 82) +Ay2 , is a positive constant. 
(4.19) 
Eq. (4.19) can be transformed into a more intuitive expression by recalling that according to 
the asset price Eq. (4.3.1): 
q, = bAq, -, - q, 
: <= -q -q* -1 + q, * 
bAq, j 1-1 = q, I 
Hence, via Eq. (4.20), the final expression for the optimal interest rate rule is: 
., 
yt +f . 
[q, 
-q*] it = f'rKt +f q-q t 
where, f, =1-- 
fy A>0, fq-q 
A 71 +A P371 +Ar, + 
182 
(4.20) 
(4.21) 
are the respective 
interest rate weights on inflation, output gap, and asset price misalignments from 
fundamentals. The inflation coefficient, f, , should exceed the value of one, to ensure a real 
interest rate response that will lead to lower inflation 19 . 
4.4.3 Analysis of the results 11 
The rule for adjusting nominal interest rates shown in Eq. (4.2 1), signifies a genuine 
result in the interest rates rules literature, since we show that the central bank should not 
only take into consideration inflation and output when setting interest rates, but should also 
As we show in A4.3 in Appendix IV, this condition is consistent with A<1. 
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react to asset price misalignments. Durre (2001) and Bean (2003) also assume wealth 
effects augmented demand curves in their analyses, but the results that they obtain for 
optimal policy differ significantly from the ones presented in this section. In particular, 
Durre derives an interest rate rule conditioned upon the shocks to, and not the levels of, 
aggregate demand, aggregate supply and asset prices, while Bean finds no role for asset 
prices in the commitment and discretionary equilibrium. Bean's optimality conditions 
contain neither the policy instrument, nor anything to do with the demand side of the 
economy. 
In our results, the aggressiveness of the reaction to asset price misalignments 
depends upon the impact of wealth effects in aggregate demand. If there are significant 
wealth effects, A>O, then the central bank should raise interest rates in response to 
increasing asset price misalignments (f > 0). In the next chapter we simulate a forward- q-q 
looking variant of the macroeconomic model presented here, and find that a mild response 
to misalignments (f .=0.1 ) promotes overall macroeconomic stability. Such a pro-active q-q 
response has also been advocated by Cecchetti et al. (2000) using the Bemake and Gertler 
(1999) new keynesian sticky wages - financial accelerator mode120 .A common feature in 
the aforementioned studies is that they assume, rather than derive, a rule for interest rate 
setting and then examine the effect on macroeconomic volatility from reacting or not 
reacting to asset prices. Our main focus however, was to show that in the context of optimal 
central bank behavior, asset price misalignments should be an element in the monetary 
authority's feedback rule. Hence, this chapter extends the literature that obtains analytical 
expressions for interest rates based up6n optimization of the central banks' objectives. The 
augmented Taylor rule depicted in Eq. (4.2 1) points out explicitly that the financial and real 
instability associated with growing financial imbalances should not be tolerated by the 
central bank. 
In the absence of a link between aggregate demand and asset prices, i. e. A =0, 
there is no scope for monetary policy to react to asset prices (f .= 0), and the feedback q-q 
rule which implements the optimal policy takes the form of a standard Taylor rule (see 
20 We should point out that as Cecchetti et a]. (2000) emphasize, policy makers should react to and not target 
asset prices. Quoting from Cecchetti et a]. (2003, p. 428): "It is our view that central banks can improve 
macroeconomic performance by reacting to asset price misalignments. We are not now saying, nor have we 
ever said, that policyrnakers should target asset prices". 
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Taylor, 1993) with interest rates being an increasing function of inflation and the output 
gap. This rule is presented bellow: 
it = fr* 7rt + fx* Yt (4.22) 
where, the inflation and output gap weights are given by the same expressions as in section 
c 4.3.3, that is: + ca . fy, 
In order to examine the impact of asset prices on the behaviour of the central bank, 
we calculate the partial derivative of the interest rate reaction coefficients with respect to 
the magnitude of wealth effects,, 83 . The results, presented in Table 4.3, lead to 
Propositions 4 to 6. 
Table 4.3: Partial Derivatives, Model 11. 
f af / L9,8 3 
f c(l - 
A), vl 0 2 
Ir 032 +)6371 ) 
fy -- Arý <0 662 +Aiyl)2 
fq-q* 
A>0 
'fl2 
+ 
J83 
71)2 
Proposition 4: Ae stronger the wealth effect, 83 , the smaller is the optimal 
interest rate 
weight on inflation. 
Proof: Since yj ý 
('83 rl + )62)2 >0, c<0, A< 1, it is implied that: 
af; 
r 
/ a)03 <0* 
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Proposition 5: Ae stronger the wealth effect, 83 , the smaller is the optimal interest rate 
weight on output gap. 
Proof: Since 8,, V1, (, 83y, +, 82)' > 0, it is implied that: afy 
/ M3 
": ý 0* 
Thus, as Proposition 4 indicates, the result obtained in the previous section (Proposition 3) 
that the monetary policy response to inflation should be less aggressive when there are 
significant wealth effects, is robust to the alternative specification that we used to model 
asset price dynamics. In addition, Proposition 5 calls for a less pronounced response to the 
output gap in the presence of significant correlation between asset prices and aggregate 
demand.. 
Proposition 4.6: The stronger the wealth effect, 63 , the larger is the optimal interest rate 
weight on assetprice misalignmentsfrom fundamentals. 
Proof: Since 62, (A'VI +A )2 > 0, it is implied that: o3f * 
la)63 >0 
q-q 
The intuition and policy implications of Propositions 4 and 5 become clearer when 
considered in combination with Proposition 6. In essence, Model II implies that if 
aggregate demand is affected by the evolution of asset prices then monetary authorities 
should include asset price misalignments in their optimal feedback rule and there should be 
a change in the distribution of the relevant interest rate weights. Particularly, the interest 
rate weight on inflation and output decreases while the weight attached to asset price 
misalignments increases. This allows asset prices to be considered as an element of the 
authorities' reaction function without necessarily implying overall tighter, than before, 
policy since the response to inflation and output will be less aggressive. In other words, our 
optimal analysis results imply that first, asset price misalignments should have an 
independent role and not only be considered as instruments to help forecast output and 
inflation; and second, there should be a shift in the magnitude of reaction, away from the 
traditional variables, i. e. inflation and the output gap, and towards a direct response to 
financial imbalances. 
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4.5 Conclusions 
Although there is still no widespread agreement among economists on whether 
central banks should explicitly target, or react to, asset price inflation, in addition to 
conventional consumer price targets, a vast consensus that emerges states that the financial- 
market channel plays an important role in the transmission of the monetary policy. Starting 
from these considerations, this chapter builds a backward-looking structural macro model 
where asset price fluctuations have an impact on aggregate demand and consequently on 
inflation. Initially, we assume that asset prices move on average in line with their 
fundamental value. In order to construct the optimal interest rate rule, we assume that the 
central bank solves a stochastic control problem to minimise intertemporally the variance of 
the output gap and inflation. The derived optimal reaction function conditions interest rates 
on inflation and the output gap. Comparing our results with the standard Taylor rule, we 
find that optimal policy in the presence of wealth effects attaches less interest rate weight 
on inflation. Furthermore, the higher the sensitivity of asset markets with respect to interest 
rates, the lower is the optimal response by the monetary authorities to deviations of output 
and inflation ftom their long term trends. This is alleged to be the result of a double effect 
of monetary policy on the real economy. In essence, along with the traditional interest rate 
channel, monetary policy affects aggregate spending via changes in asset prices. In the 
optimal interest rate rule, the inflation coefficient is negatively related to the magnitude of 
the wealth effects and to the preference for output stabilisation. An important result from 
the simulation evidence is that, if the central bank ignores wealth effects when setting 
interest rates, the implied policy leads to higher inflation and output volatility. 
We then extended the asset price dynamics block of the model to allow for potential 
bubble buildup, in addition to the standard feature of reversion towards fundamentals. This 
change was important as it brings the model closer to the reality and it also implies a drastic 
change in the conduct of monetary policy. In this case, the derived optimal policy rule 
conditions the monetary policy instrument not only on inflation and demand pressures but 
also on financial imbalances, as represented by asset price misalignments from 
fundamentals. The magnitude of the interest rate reaction depends, among other factors, on 
the relative importance of wealth effects for aggregate demand. The response to asset price 
deviations from fundamentals becomes more aggressive as wealth effects build up. Thus, 
this chapter's main contribution was to extend the optimal monetary policy literature 
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towards recognising that, in the presence of wealth effects, monetary authorities should 
grant an independent role to asset price misalignments and not only regard them as 
instruments to forecast inflation and output. Future work should consider an open economy 
model, where the firms' financing and the households' capital gains derive not only from 
domestic but also from foreign capital markets. 
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Chapter 5 
Monetary Policy and Asset Price 
Misalignments 
5.1 Introduction 
The exuberant bull stock market associated with the 'new economy' and the 'dot 
com' boom of the 1990s came into an abrupt halt in early 2000. Since then, stock price 
indices have fallen and are far bellow the levels they reached in the late 1990s. Economic 
history provides plenty examples of asset price bubbles beginning as early as the 
seventeenth century'. Apart from the 'internet bubble', the previous century witnessed two 
' See Garber (2000) for a discussion on the tulip mania in the early seventeenth century as well as other 
famous bubbles. 
150 
other major episodes of sudden asset price reversals after long periods of sustained rises: 
the 1929 US stock market crash and the Japanese experience of the late 1980s and early 
1990s. Both episodes exhibited a regular characteristic of asset price boom-bust cycles, that 
is, the decline in asset prices was followed by a slowdown in economic activity as well as 
increased financial and banking sectors instability. Recent work by Detken and Smets 
(2003) on a large sample of industrial countries indicates that the boom phase typically 
features rising money, output and credit gaps, and low interest rates relative to a Taylor rule 
benchmark. It has been argued that the widespread financial deregulation of asset markets 
that began in the 1980s may have contributed to an increase in the frequency of such 
episodes (IMF, 2003). 
As Bordo and Jeanne (2002) point out, during the boom period the domestic private 
sector accumulates high levels of debt on the expectation of further rises in asset prices, 
whilst the assets themselves serve as a collateral. When asset prices fall, the decline in the 
value of the collateral induces consumers to cut back expenditure and firms to reduce 
investment spending. In essence, the deterioration of balance sheets, following large asset 
price reductions, further exacerbates the negative 'wealth effect' on spending, leading to 
additional negative effects on asset prices, bank lending and economic output (collateral- 
induced credit crunch). In a number of articles, Charles Goodhart and Boris Hofinann 
establish empirically the link between output growth, credit aggregates, and asset price 
movements in a number of major economies 2. A recent study by the IMF (2003) analyses 
the after-effects of sharp asset price reversals and finds that equity prices reductions are 
quite frequent and are associated with heavy GDP losses. In addition, Borio and Lowe 
(2002) stress that swings in asset prices have historically accompanied episodes of financial 
instability. In particular, there is concern that asset price boom and busts could create 
systemic financial risk 3. 
An important issue related to the above concerns is the establishment of the 
appropriate monetary policy response to asset price fluctuations. Should the central bank 
care about financial instability? Nowadays, everyone recognizes price level stability as the 
' See Goodhart and Hofinann (2000,2001,2003). See also Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), 
for a theoretical 
model that exhibits a crucial interaction between collateral values, asset prices, credit and economic activity. 
Kocherlakota (2000) shows that in the presence of credit constraints which depend upon the collateral value, 
shocks to income may be amplified and produce asymmetric effects in that, negative shocks 
have larger 
effects than positive ones. 
3 We should mention, however, that the empirical evidence linking asset price reversals with 
banking crises is 
rather limited and inconclusive. See, among others, the paper by Vila 
(2000). 
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primary objective of monetary policy. Indeed, as Issing (2003) emphasizes, price stability 
and financial stability tend to mutually reinforce each other in the long-run. However, as 
the examples of the US in the 1920s and 1990s and Japan in the late 1980s demonstrate, 
financial imbalances may build up even in an environment of stable prices (Borio and 
Lowe, 2002). Exponents of the 'new environment' hypothesis argue that low and stable 
rates of inflation may even foster asset price bubbles, due e. g. to excessively optimistic 
expectations about future economic development. Thus, price stability is not a sufficient 
condition for financial stability. If, in fact, financial stability is defined narrowly, as the 
degree of interest rate smoothness in the economy, and not widely, as the prevalence of a 
financial system that continuously ensures the efficient allocation of savings to investment 
opportunities, then a trade-off between monetary (or price) stability and financial stability 
4 may arise . 
The monetary policy response to asset price developments can take two fornis, 
either proactive, or reactive. A reactive approach is consistent with an inflation targeting 
policy regime focusing on price stability and according to it, the monetary authorities 
should wait and see whether the asset price reversal occurs, and if it does, to react 
accordingly to the extent that there are implications for inflation and output stability. 
Hence, the reactive approach is consistent with an accomodative ex post response to asset 
price changes. Bernanke and Gertler (1999,2001) simulate alternative variants of the 
Taylor rule in the context of the new keynesian model with sticky wages and a financial 
accelerator and find that a central bank dedicated to price stability should pay no attention 
to asset prices per se, except insofar as they signal changes to expected inflation 5. They 
also argue that trying to stabilise asset prices is problematic since it is nearly impossible to 
know for sure whether a given change in asset values results from fundamental factors, 
non-fundamental factors, or both. Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) employ three alternative 
dynamic general equilibrium models and, in agreement with Bernanke and Gertler, reach 
the conclusion that asset prices should not be included in the monetary policy rule. They 
argue that policies which respond to inflation and output deviations will encompass most of 
the gains from responding to asset prices. 
4 For instance, in the presence aggregate demand shocks, the trade-off derives from the fact that the central 
bank would have to decide to which degree it prefers interest rate stabilisation over inflation and output 
stabilisation. 
5 See Appendix A5.1 for more details on the Bernanke and Gertler model 
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Against this, Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani (2000), using the same 
theoretical model as Bemake and Gertler (1999), claim that "a central bank concerned with 
both hitting an inflation target at a given time horizon, and achieving as smooth a path as 
possible for inflation, is likely to achieve superior performance by adjusting its policy 
instruments not only to inflation (or to its inflation forecast) and the output gap, but to asset 
prices as well" (p. 2). Ceccheti et al. argue that such a proactive response will reduce the 
likelihood of asset price bubbles forming, thus reducing the risk of boom-bust investment 
cycles. Bemanke and Gertler (2001) attribute their findings to, among other factors, the use 
of a misleading metric in the comparison between policy rules. 
In this chapter we take another look at the interaction between monetary policy and 
asset prices using a small rational expectations model that takes into account the effect of 
asset prices on aggregate demand in order to capture investment and consumption wealth 
effects. Using stochastic simulations, we then examine how inflation, output, interest rates, 
and asset prices behave under alternative policy rules. Our results confirm previous 
findings by Cecchetti et al. (2000) in that, macroeconomic volatility can be reduced with a 
mild reaction of interest rates to asset price misalignments from fundamentals. Our main 
contribution lies in the fact that in our simulations we employ two alternative monetary 
policy rules, inflation forecast targeting, and the standard Taylor rule, with the main 
conclusions for the role of monetary policy with respect to asset prices remaining 
unchanged. We also incorporate an alternative partial adjustment mechanism of asset prices 
towards their fundamental value that allows for both 'momentum trading' and 
'fundamentals pull'. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section discusses the 
issue of financial instability deriving from asset price boom-bust cycles, as well as the 
reactive versus proactive view of monetary policy response. Section 5.3 describes the 
theoretical model that will be employed in the simulations. In Section 5.3.1 we calibrate the 
model's structural parameters on the basis of previous econometric evidence for the UK 
economy. Section 5.3.2 presents the results from impulse response analysis, and section 
5.4 compares the effect on macroeconomic uncertainty from alternative monetary policy 
choices. Section 5.5 provides conclusions. 
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5.2 Asset price fluctuations, financial stability and monetary policy 
Over the last decade, inflation targeting has been adopted by a growing number of 
central banks. The experience of the inflationary 1970s induced policyMakers to put 
institutional safeguards against monetary instability by endowing central banks with clear 
mandates to maintain price stability and with the necessary autonomy to pursue them. 
Compared to the 1970s and early 1980s, inflation rates (actual as well as expected) have 
6 become lower and less variable . The 
disinflation process has been a global phenomenon 
since it is observed both in countries where formal inflation targets are in use, and in non- 
targeting countries. As we showed in chapter 2 though, the reduction in inflation 
uncertainty is more pronounced when an explicit target is announced. The decline in 
inflation has gone hand in hand with a similar decline in interest rates. In many countries, 
both short-term and long-term interest rates are close to, or even bellow, post-war lows. As 
Bean (2003) argues, price stability has not been achieved at the expense of the real 
economy, as unemployment has been decreasing in a number of countries, while growth 
has also been relatively stable. Borio, English and Filardo (2003) point out that since the 
mid 1980s lower and more stable inflation has coincided with lower output volatility 
(measured either by the size of output gaps, or the variability in growth rates). Borio et al. 
(2003) examine the aggregate (PPP-weighted) G7 GDP growth and find that, if the recent 
sharp global slowdown is excluded, output growth has been considerably less volatile, even 
7 in comparison with the 1960s 
Despite the good macroeconomic record of the past decade, there has been a 
growing concern among academics and policyrnakers that the achievement of price stability 
may be associated with an increased risk of financial instability. Some commentators claim 
that the lower cost of capital, due to lower interest rates, along with exuberant growth 
projections have boosted the late 1990s stock market bubble. Borio and Lowe (2002) argue 
that booms and busts in asset prices - which may reflect the presence of bubbles, 
but may 
also reflect shifts in assessments of the underlying fundamentals - should be considered as 
part of a broader set of symptoms that typically also include a build-up of debt and 
high 
rate of capital accumulation. Rising asset prices and debt accumulation lead to stretched 
household and corporate balance sheets, vulnerable to sharp corrections of the type 
See Kontonikas (2004) for UK evidence and Johnson (2002) for international evidence. 
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witnessed recently in global equity markets. During the boom period, balance sheets may 
look healthy as the increase in asset prices, and consequently the value of the collateral, 
offsets the build-up of debt. However, when optimism about further increases in asset 
values turns to pessimism, leading to a decrease in the net worth of households and firms, 
then financial distress may be the result of financial imbalances unwinding. 
Borio and Lowe (2002) claim that, although low and stable inflation may promote 
financial stability in general, financial imbalances of the type described above can build up 
in a low inflation environment. As a matter of fact, positive supply shocks, resulting either 
from increases in productivity or structural / institutional reforms, are likely to reduce 
inflationary pressures, therefore encouraging the build up of such imbalances. As Bean 
(2003) argues, when monetary policy exhibits a high degree of credibility in keeping 
inflation low and stable, an expansion of aggregate demand beyond the natural rate of 
output may only have limited impact on inflationary pressures and as a result interest rates 
are lower and financial imbalances are likely to proceed further. All these arguments have 
resulted in a new view for the conduct of monetary policy that questions the current 
consensus. The current consensus stresses that monetary policy should be directed 
exclusively at achieving price stability, and its role in promoting financial stability should 
be restricted to restricted to minimising the negative effects from bubbles bursting and 
financial imbalances unwinding. This conventional view, has clearly been enunciated by 
Alan Greenspan (2002): 
"The notion that a well-timed incremental tightening could have been calibrated to 
prevent the late 1990s bubble is almost surely an illusion. Instead, we ... need to focus on 
policies to mitigate the fallout when it occurs and, hopefully, ease the transition to the next 
expansion. " Ms Hesius (1999) from the Sveriges Risksbank also believes that the central 
bank response to asset price movements should be reactive, not proactive: ...... the general 
view nowadays is that the central banks should not try to use interest rate policy to control 
asset price trends by seeking to burst any bubbles that may form. The normal strategy is 
rather to seek, firmly with the help of a great variety of instruments, to restore stability on 
the few occasions when asset markets collapse. " 
The, so called, continuity view implies that despite the recent experience of longer 
output expansions, more volatile financial markets, and possible increases in the growth 
For supportive cross-country evidence, see Dalsgaard et a]. (2002), and Blanchard and Simon (2001). 
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rate of underlying productivity, these events should be seen as exogenous idiosyncratic 
shocks hitting economies against the background of largely invariant structural 
relationships. In the context of the continuity argument, the role of financial developments 
in policy decisions is rather limited. For instance, potential financial imbalances due to 
rapid growth of credit and debt might be seen as suggesting risks to the economic outlook 
but they would not generally be expected to play a central role, since these developments 
are likely to regarded as episodic or exceptional. 
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) argue that a central bank dedicated to a policy of 
flexible inflation targeting should pay little attention to asset inflation, since a proper setting 
of interest rates to achieve the desired inflation target will also stabilise asset prices. They 
(p. 18) 44view price stability and financial stability as highly complementary and mutually 
consistent objectives to be pursued within a unified policy framework". The intuition 
behind the sufficiency of inflation targeting is as follows. As Hayford and Malliaris (2002) 
argue, inflation targeting guides the central bank to act appropriately, either by doing 
nothing in the case where the bubble has no effect on aggregate demand, or by tightening in 
the case that the bubble is expected to increase future aggregate demand and inflation. 
Blanchard (2000) argues that the relative merits of inflation targeting are 
conditional upon the bubble in asset prices affecting some components of spending more 
than others. For example, if the bubble increases consumption, via the wealth effect, that 
puts pressure on inflation, and policy tightening by the monetary authority may be optimal. 
What happens, however, if the bubble results in over-investment by the publicly-traded 
firms whose equity value has increased? Blanchard, Rhee and Summers (1993) provide 
evidence suggesting that firms may well increase investment beyond what is justified by 
fundamentals when there is a bubble. Since inflation targeting implies maintaining current 
and actual inflation at a constant level, it is equivalent to keeping output at its natural level. 
Hence, with output at its natural level, higher investment is associated with a corresponding 
decrease in consumption. Thus, inflation targeting may result in a change in the 
composition of output in favour of investment, thereby leading to excessive capital 
accumulation. When asset prices eventually correct, the excessive capital accumulation 
deters firms from investing and hence poses a threat to economic growth. Blanchard points 
out that inflation targeting does not address issues related to the impact of a bubble on the 
composition of output and the long-run impact of the bubble on capital accumulation and 
growth. 
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Bullard and Schalling (2002) examine the effects of introducing asset prices in the 
monetary policy block of a simple, small scale, micro-foundations based economic model. 
They argue that a policy that reacts to equity prices can be counterproductive since it may 
interfere with the policyrnaker's ability to minimise inflation and output volatility. They 
show that including asset prices in a Taylor-type policy rule will degrade economic 
performance by creating indeterminacy of the rational expectations equilibrium and hence 
more unpredictable volatility, than if asset prices were ignored. 
The new environment view claims that many of the recent economic and financial 
developments are interrelated, forming a new background upon which monetary policy 
operates, and should not be treated as exogenous shocks 8. In particular, liberalised financial 
markets, along with low and stable inflation, and positive supply-side developments 
produce a financial system that can accommodate and reinforce output fluctuations. As 
Borio et al. (2003, p. 27) argue, "during the boom phase, virtuous cycles may develop, 
consisting of higher asset prices, muted risk perceptions, weakening external finance 
constraints, greater capital deepening rising productivity and higher profits. These 
processes then go into reverse during contractions". In such an environment, the absence of 
inflationary pressures adds to the sustainability of the boom, by removing the threat of 
interest rate increases. Therefore, from this perspective, the central bank by achieving 
credibility for its anti-inflation commitment may contribute to changes in the underlying 
economic structure that can mask the new risks facing the economy. The main risk 
generated by financial unbalances unwinding is a weak economy, which, along with low 
inflation, may lead to deflation. 
The new heterodox view nicely summarised by Crockett (2003): "In a monetary 
regime in which the central bank's operational objective is expressed exclusively in terms 
of short-term inflation, there may be insufficient protection against the build up of financial 
imbalances that lies at the root of much of the financial instability we observe. This could 
be so if the focus on short-term inflation control meant that the authorities did not tighten 
monetary policy sufficiently pre-emptively to lean against excessive credit expansion and 
asset price increases. In jargon, if the monetary policy reaction function 
does not 
See among others, Borio and Lowe (2002), Borio, Furfine and Lowe (2001). We should mention that 
although the new environment view has recently been formalized, its roots are quite old, starting with the 
Austrian school. The Austrian School stresses the role of credit and deviations of interest rate 
from its 
equilibrium level (natural rate), in generating unsustainable booms through their 
interaction with capital 
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incorporate financial imbalances, the monetary anchor may fail to deliver financial 
stability". 
Continuity viewpolicy implicationsfor the boom period 
The two competing views, continuity vs. new environment suggest different 
monetary policy responses to financial imbalances, especially during the build-up stage. 
According to the continuity argument, if inflationary pressures remain subdued, following a 
boom in financial markets due e. g. to well anchored inflation expectations and strong 
productivity growth, then monetary policy should not be tightened as long as growth and 
expected inflation remain on track. Borio et al. (2003) identify three factors than may 
explain the reluctance to respond to financial imbalances by tightening policy. First, it is 
very difficult for'Central banks to identify imbalances and bubbles with a sufficient degree 
of confidence. Second, there is some concern about the effects of a pre-emptive tightening, 
specifically about causing more economic volatility rather than reducing it. Strong 
speculative pressures and high expected returns may partially insulate the build-up of 
imbalances from any attempts to restrain them, while at the same time other expenditure- 
sensitive sectors of the economy may be driven to recession. Third, there are some serious 
political economy issues raised by a tighter monetary policy. The decision to increase 
interest rates while inflation remains low is difficult to justify to the public. In essence, the 
central bank does not want to be seen as wealth destroyer. This has been suggested as an 
explanation for the inaction of the Fed to substantially increase interest rates during the first 
stage of the US equity bubble on 1996-97 9. It is also consistent with the idea explored in 
the paper by Miller et al. (2002), that investors expected that the central bank would take 
decisive action to prevent the stock market from falling but not from rising, and believed 
that such intervention would be successftil. They argue that the belief in the existence of an 
insurance against the possibility of a market crash reduced the estimated risk premium and 
pushed up equity prices. 
formation (see e. g. Wicksell, 1907; von Mises, 1912; Hayek, 1933). More recently, Kindleberger (1996) and 
Minsky (1982) further emphasized the potential destabilizing role of finance. 
9 As Baker (2002) argues, a likely explanation for the Fed's inaction is that Mr Greenspan and his colleagues 
may simply have felt constrained by their public mandate. The Fed, though operationally independent of 
political control, it derives its authority from Congress, which dictates the goals it should pursue through 
legislation. Another explanation suggested is that at the initial stages of the bubble Greenspan believed that 
the share price overvaluation reflected permanent increases in US labour productivity. Note however, that 
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New environment viewpolicy impUcationsfor the boom period 
The new environment view policy implications for the period while financial 
imbalances are developing are quite different, since imbalances are considered a serious 
threat to economic stability. While acknowledging that the identification of imbalances may 
be difficult, and that serious political economist constraints on a more pre-emptive 
monetary policy may continue to exist for some time, exponents of the new environment 
stress that policymakers, already have to deal with substantial uncertainty when estimating 
output gaps, and that a pre-emptive tightening to limit the build-up of imbalances will help 
avoid future volatility. 
The policy implications for the bust period, when financial imbalances start to 
unwind, are rather similar in both views since they call for a monetary policy easing in 
order to offset the adverse effects of declines in asset prices and tightening credit 
conditions. In fact, the policy response may be stronger in the case a new environment 
central bank, since the unwinding of financial imbalances will not be seen as a one-off 
negative shock but rather will be related to a broad set of adjustments in financial and 
goods & services markets. Thus, a rapid and more substantial easing, as compared to the 
continuity view, may result, in order to protect the economy from the perceived future 
risks. 
Towards a newpolicyframework? 
A practical issue that arises from the discussion above is whether financial stability 
should be an explicit central bank objective in line with price stability and sustainable 
economic growth. According to the continuity view, no changes in central bank policy are 
necessary, while according to the new environment view it should be made clear that a pre- 
emptive tightening of policy to counter growing financial imbalances is allowed even in the 
absence of obvious inflationary pressures. Most commentators agree that the new 
environment policy prescription is feasible without requiring a redefinition of policy 
objectives. As Ferguson (2003) argues, the Fed has always found it useful to focus on 
financial stability primarily through the lens of its two main macroeconomic goals, price 
stability and sustainable long-run growth. 
Davis and Madsen (2001), by employing a century of data for OECD countries show that capital rather than 
labour productivity is indeed the productivity measure that is most closely link to stock returns. 
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There are many arguments pointing out that a redefinition of objectives would not 
be necessary or indeed desirable. First, if the central bank adopts an explicit financial 
stability objective then hard choices may arise at times in judging how much weight should 
be attached to it versus other central bank objectives and also in deciding the degree of 
activism to be employed in pursuing financial stability. In fact, a redefinition of policy 
objectives creates the risk that the central bank will deviate too much from its 
macroeconomic goals in order to address financial imbalances that may have only limited 
impact on inflation and output. This could in turn encourage imprudent behaviour, hence 
generating a moral hazard problem. 
Second, a redefinition is not necessary since the traditional central bank objectives 
can accommodate a response to financial imbalances. If we follow Ferguson (2003) and 
define financial' instability as a set of events characterised by: asset prices diverging 
significantly from fundamentals, distorted market functioning and credit availability, and 
aggregate demand deviating (or likely to deviate) significantly from potential output, then 
this definition of instability would be sufficient to ensure a pre-emptive monetary policy 
response, since financial imbalances would be seen as containing important information 
about the future prospects of inflation and output. 
The third reason against redefining the traditional objectives is that central banks 
have long had a keen interest in maintaining financial stability, that in fact predates their 
focus on price stability especially ever since the highly inflationary 1970slo. Concerns 
about financial instability are historically associated with early evolution of central banks. 
The critical role of central banks as lenders of last resort in financial crises has long been 
recognised, dating back to Bagehot in the early 19 th century. Central banks are expected to 
provide emergency liquidity assistance to the markets (via open market operations) or to 
particular institutions (via discount window lending) thereby requiring central banks to 
monitor markets for signs of financial instability. Finally, central banks are interested in 
financial stability due to their role of oversighting the payments system, and due to the fact 
that monetary policy is largely implemented via financial markets operations and therefore 
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy depends on the smooth functioning of 
financial markets and institutions. 
10 As Borio et al. (2003) point out, the importance of price stability started to develop 
during the inter-war 
period with the gradual emergence of flat-money standards. With the 
Great Inflation of the post-war era, price 
stability became an overriding policy objective. 
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All these concerns have been fully or partially incorporated in the chapters of the 
central banks. For instance, in the case of the United States, the creation of the Federal 
Reserve system was a response to the financial instability of the US economy in the I 9th 
and early 20 th century. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 states that the Federal Reserve was 
created "to provide for the establishment of Federal Reserve banks, to furnish an elastic 
currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper, to establish a more effective 
supervision of banking in the United States, and for other purposes. " As Ferguson (2003) 
points out, such references implicitly embodied financial stability as an objective for the 
Federal Reserve since they reflect concerns about financial market liquidity, and the need to 
develop an institutional framework that can deal with banking crises. During the Great 
Depression, revisions of the Federal Reserve Act awarded the Fed emergency lending 
powers. Apart from the Fed, other central banks' chapters also provide implicit or explicit 
references to financial stability. For instance, the ECB chapter states that: "the European 
System of Central Banks shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the 
competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the 
stability of the financial system. " The Bank of England states that "There is a memorandum 
of understanding between the Bank of England and the government that delineates the 
Bank's responsibilities in the area of financial stability. It assigns the Bank of England 
responsibility in three broad areas including stability of the monetary system, stability of 
financial system infrastructure particularly in the area of payment systems, and monitoring 
of the financial system as a whole. " Hence, central banks already take into account 
financial stability especially as far as banking and the efficient operation of the payment 
system are concerned. 
Following the discussion on the links between financial stability and central bank 
policy, we proceed with the description of our theoretical model. 
5.3 A forward-looking model 
We use a structural model of the economy that allows for the effect of asset prices 
on aggregate demand and monetary policy. The model augments the standard three sectoi 
macro model (aggregate demand, aggregate supply, monetary policy rule) 
by taking int( 
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account asset prices, which themselves are assumed to stochastically evolve influenced by 
both fundamentals and bubbles. The model is given by the following equations: 
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where, yt is the deviation of log output from its steady-state level (output gap), 
7r, = pt - pt-, is the inflation rate, pt is (log) price level, it is the monetary policy instrument 
(one-period nominal interest rate, e. g. repo rate, r is the equilibrium real interest rate and7r* 
is the inflation target. q, denotes (log) real asset prices and qt* the fundamentals. Different 
interpretations of qt are possible (e. g. house prices, stock prices or the value of a portfolio 
containing both housing and equity investment), in what follows though we mainly treat it 
is an equity index. i7t, . 6, Ot, u, represent exogenous random shocks to output gap, 
inflation, nominal interest rates and asset price fundamentals. For simplicity, we assume 
that they are mutually uncorrelated LLd. processes with zero means and constant variances: 
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Eq. (5.1) represents the demand side of the economy as an optimizing IS-type of 
relationship where current output gap depends positively on its expected future value and 
negatively on the lagged real interest rate, i, -, -E, -, 
[; r, ]. The forward-looking nature of IS 
intends to capture the effect of expected income on current spending and is theoretically 
justified by McCallum and Nelson (1999), among others, in the context of an optimizing 
general equilibrium model". 
11 The expectational aggregate demand equation can be derived from the first order Eul er condition for the 
representative household's optimal consumption choice problem assuming constant relative risk aversion and 
separability between consumption and leisure. 
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Aggregate demand depends positively on the past level of asset prices via 
consumption wealth effects and investment balance sheet effects. For example, a persistent 
decrease in the level of stock prices increases the perceived level of households' financial 
distress causing a reduction in consumption spending. The balance sheet channel implies a 
positive relationship between the firms' ability to borrow and their net worth which in turn 
depends on asset valuations. There is a vast amount of empirical evidence indicating that 
stock and house price movements are strongly correlated with aggregate demand in most 
major economies 12 . In our model, the central bank takes into account the effect of wealth on 
aggregate demand, that is, it is fully aware of the effect of qt-I on yt and its magnitude. 
Eq. (5.2) depicts the price adjustment relation taking the form of a hybrid Phillips 
curve where current inflation is positively affected by its past and expected future value as 
well as the output gap. Hybrid Phillips have been developed in the literature in an effort to 
reduce the inconsistencies between purely forward-looking models and actual inflation data 
(see e. g. Clarida, Gall and Gertler, 1999). 
Eqs. (5.3) and (5.4) represent the dynamic evolution of asset prices and their 
underlying fundamentals, respectively. We assume a partial adjustment mechanism of 
actual asset prices towards their fundamental value that allows for the appearance of a 
bubble buildup. As Eq. (5.3) indi cates, if asset prices have increased in the past (Aq, l > 0) 
there is a positive 'momentum' effect on their current level (b, > 0). The higher the value of 
b, the stronger the effect from past capital gains/losses and therefore qt can diverge 
significantly from its fiindamental value, qt*, albeit not permanently. But once asset prices 
revert, at an unknown future date, the downward effect on aggregate demand could be 
large. We allow for reversion to fundamentals since if there is an decrease in the 
fundamentals (qt* < qt-I ) there is a negative pressure on qt. The higher is b2, the closer will 
be the co-movement between observed prices and the underlying fundamentals. Kontonikas 
and Ioannidis (2003) employ a similar asset price specification. 
Eq. (5.4) describes fundamental asset prices in line with the standard dividend 
model of asset pricing. There is a positive effect from expected future dividends (assumed 
to depend on expected OUtpUtI3 ) and a negative effect from real interest rates. The time 
12 See among others, Goodhart and Hoffmann (2000,200 1). 
13 Note that Eq. (5.4) relates the fundamental real asset price with the expected value of the output gap. 
Strictly speaking, the asset price should be a function of expected output. Since, however, output is the sum of 
the output gap plus the potential output, it is implied that higher output gap is associated with higher output 
and hence higher fundamental asset price. 
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series process of the fundamental asset price is augmented for uncertainty by including the 
random disturbance term, ut. 
In order to complete the model we need another equation describing the behaviour 
of the central bank. We will consider two types of rules for the period-by-period setting of 
the monetary policy instrument, it. Eq. (5.5) depicts a monetary policy rule that conditions 
the interest rate on concurrent inflation deviations from the target, the output gap 14 , as well 
0 as on asset price misalignments, q, - q, . If there is no response to the asset price 
misalignments, r3= 0, then Eq. (5.5) reduces to the standard Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993). In 
addition, we examine the case of an augmented inflation-forecast targeting rule, as given by 
Eq. (5.5'). In pure inflation-forecast based rules, r2 = v3= 0, and the only feedback 
variable for monetary policy is the deviation of inflation forecast from the target, 
E, [; r,,, ] -; r* 
15. In this case, the authorities' policy choice variables are the parameter triplet 
f, vl 
., 
r4j). Parameter y; has to be greater than one to satisfy the stability condition that real 
rates increase in response to expected inflation, with higher values implying a more 
aggressive response 16 . Parameters v, andj indicate the degree of interest rate smoothing by 
the central bank, and the horizon of the inflation forecast. 
The system of equations (5.1-5.5) can be expressed compactly as: 
AE, [X,., ]= BX, + CZ, (5.6) 
where, the (I 2x 1) endogenous variables vector 
X -": [ Y, ; rt i, qt qt Et[Yt+l] E t+J Et-111T contains seven tt 
17r 
II qI-I qt-2 1TI-I 
'I-I II 
variables non-predetennined at time t, and five predetermined variables (4 lags of 
endogenous variables and one backward looking expectation). Zt is a (5xl) vector of 
" We should point out that McCallum and Nelson (1999), and Orphanides et al. (2000) among others, 
question the usual presumption that policyrnakers can actually observe y, when setting i, . In an effort to 
enhance realism in the model, we replaced y, with E, -, 
[y, ] in the Taylor rule. The effect of this change on 
the simulation results, however, was quite small, as in McCallum (2001b). The results are not presented here, 
but are available upon request from the authors. 
15 In some inflation targeting countries, e. g. United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, actual monetary policy is 
linked to explicit (and often published) inflation forecasts. In other targeting countries though, e. g. Australia, 
inflation forecasts are less explicitly used in policy formulation. See Batini and Haldane (1999) for simulation 
evidence using forward-looking rules in a calibrated model of the UK economy. 
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exogenous vana les containing the four stipulated random processes (17, -C, 0, u, ) plus a 
constant 17 ., B and C represent (12xl2), (12xl2) and (12x5) matrices of coefficients, 
respectively. 
5.3.1 Calibrating the model 
Prior to using stochasfic simulations, we need to calibrate the model's behavioural 
parameters and perform impulse response analysis to ensure the plausibility of the chosen 
system. 
Table 5.1: Model Calibration. 
Parameter 
a, 0.4 v 0.8 
a 2 0.1 71 3 
(P 0.8 -Y 2 0.1 
P 0.1 73 0.1 
(51 0.4 r4 0.85 
452 0.8 r 0.035 
bý 0.5 )r 0.025 
b2 0.3 
In the aggregate demand Eq. (5.1), the interest rate slope, al , is set to 0.4 while the 
demand elasticity with respect to the past level of asset prices, a2 , 
is 0- 1. In Eq. (5.2), we 
assume a strong effect from the backward-looking component of inflation by setting 
(p = 0.8, while the slope of the Phillips curve, fl, is 0.1. The asset price adjustment Eq. (5.3) 
allows both for 'momentum trading' and 'fundamental pull' since bl, 
b2 :ý0, with the 
16 Similarly, yj has to be greater than zero in Eq. (5.5) to ensure inflation stabilisation in the Taylor rule. 
17 See A5.2 in Appendix V for more technical details. 
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former effect being rather stronger (0-5, as opposed to 0.3). In Eq. (5.4), the expected 
output effect on current fundamentals, 92, is assumed to be twice as large as the interest rate 
effect, 31, (0.8 as opposed to 0.4). 
The baseline monetary policy rule parameters in Eqs. (5.5) and (5.5') posit a strong 
response to inflation, expected inflation 18 (yj = 0.8, yj *= 3), a mild response to output gap 
and asset price misalignments (y2 = y3 = 0.1), and a high level of interest rate persistence (Y4 
= 0.95). The long-run real interest rate, r, is 3.5 %, and the inflation target, ir 0 is set to 
2.5%19. The standard deviations of the random shocks: a,,, o-0, or,, c,, are 0.015,0.003,0.002, 
0.1 respectively (secý also McCallum, 2001b). This configuration of standard deviations 
allows asset price volatility to exceed output gap volatility by a factor of about 7, and 
inflation volatility by a factor of 50. Hence, the asset price, via the influence of the shocks 
to fundamentals, tit, is assumed to be the most volatile variable, in line with actual financial 
market behavioar, wbile inflation is the least volatile variable, capturing the price stability 
environment iiri which most central banks operate nowadays. 
5.3.2 Impulse respoinse functioins 
The results from the theoretical impulse response functions are presented in Figures 
20 5.1-5.4 . Figuire 5.1 plots the responses of output, inflation, interest rate, asset prices to a 
monetary policy shocIc Following an increase in interest rates, inflation, output and asset 
prices decrease, a result consistent with a number of VAR studies (see e. g. Thorbecke, 
1997). Figure 5.2 shows the impulse responses after a negative supply shock. Output and 
asset prices decline, while inflation and interest rates increase. In the case of positive 
demand s1hock (Figure 5.3), the initial response of all four variables is positive. 
18 In the iinflation-foTecast targeting rule we employj = 2, that is we allow for 2 year ahead forecast horizon. 
This is weakly consistent with actual behaviour by the Bank of England, since as Batini and Haldane (1999, 
P. 9)pOintMt, "... j defines the feedback horizon under the rule, whereas in practice in the United Kingdom, 
two years refers to the policy horizon (the point at which expected inflation and the inflation target are in 
line). " 
" 7he average norninal interest rate in the United Kingdom over the inflation targeting period 1992: 10- 
2002: 01 was about 61/o. 
'o Figures 5.1-5.4 plot the impulse responses for the asset price-augmented Taylor rule case. Similar patterned 
results, were -obtained using inflation-forecast targeting monetary policy rule. 
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Figure 5.1: Impulse responses to unit shock to the interest rate. 
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Finally, as Figure 5.4 indicates, a positive shock in fundamentals leads to higher 
inflation and tighter monetary policy, while the initial impact on output and asset prices is 
positive. In summary, the economic system that we employ appears to be well specified, 
since we establish the Presence of a monetary policy transmission mechanism that runs 
from interest rates to output, inflation and asset prices, without 'price-puzzle' in the 
21 inflation response, and negative effect from inflation to asset prices 
5.4 Simulation analysis: Alternative monetary policy choices 
We now t-um our atte-ntion to the focal point of our analysis, that is, what are the 
welfare gains (or losses) when monetary policy chooses to react to asset price 
misalignments from the fundamentals. In the context of our model since there are wealth 
effects in aggregate demand, monetary policy already takes into account asset prices 
indirectly (and with lag) by responding to output movements. The question that then arises 
is whether an extra direct reaction to deviations from fundamentals is stabilizing the 
economic system or inot. 
Bemanke and Gertler's (1999,2001) simulation evidence suggests that an 
aggressive infi ation- forecast targeting rule (, vl* = 3) clearly dominates both 
'accommodative' rules (rl* = 1.01), and rules that have been augmented by a variable 
expressing the level of asset prices. They also show that, in agreement with the view that 
inflation targeting should be applied 'flexibly', policy should also respond to the output gap 
as well (, v, > 0). Tbus, monetary policy should respond to movements in asset prices only 
insofar as they affect the inflation forecast. Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadbwani 
(2000) reach strikingly different conclusions using the same model as Bemanke and Gertler 
(1999). They suggest that the central bank can reduce inflation and output volatility by 
adjusting interest rates in response to asset price misaligmrnents even when inflation 
remains on track. The differences in their results can be attributed to the simulation 
procedures employed 
22 
. Filardo (2000,2001) also explores the role of monetary policy 
in 
21 See among others, Canova and De Nicolo (1997) for relevant empirical evidence. 
n As Bernanke and Gerd er(2001, p. 257) comment on the divergent findings, while the models used are much 
the same, the nature of the shock processes for non-fundarnental stock prices is significantly different. In 
effect Ceccetti et a]. (2000) assume that the policyrnaker knows with certainty that the observed stock price 
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an economy with asset bubbles by developing and simulating a small-scale macroeconomic 
model. He finds that if the monetary autbority is uncertain about the impact of asset prices 
on inflation and output, then it is preferable to remain neutral. 
Representative simulation results using the Taylor rule and the inflation forecast- 
targeting rule are shown in Tables 5.2-5.3, respectively. The first column of Tables 5.1-5.3 
presents the response of the nominal interest rate to asset price misalignments, q, - q, *. The 
second to fourth column show the unconditional variances (in percentage points) of output 
gap, o-Y , inflation, cr, interest rates, cT, , and asset prices, c, 7 . 
In the absence of 
discounting, quadratic losses for alternative policy rules can be calculated as linear 
combinations of the unconditional variances of these variables: 
acr ,, 
+ bcy + cor, + dc)rq (5.7) 
where, (a, b, c, d) denote the respective weights that the central bank attaches on inflation, 
3 
output gap, interest rate and asset price volatili 
We consider four alternative sets of weights: 
(a, b, c, d) = (1,0.5,0.3,0), (1,0.5,0.3,0.1), (1,1,0.3,0)ý (1,1 ý 0.3,0.1), via which we 
obtain the alternative loss functions LI, LZ L3 and L4 respectively. L, and L3 Put zero 
weight on asset price volatility, while L2 and L4 penalise asset price volatility with a factor 
of 0.1. L3 and L4 correspond to the case of equal weight on inflation and output gap 
volatility, while L, and L2 recognise price stability as the primary objective of monetary 
policy, as the weight on inflation volatility is double the weight on output volatility. 
Penalising inflation and output volatility reflects a wide agreement that they represent 
important concerns for monetary policyrnakers 24 . Inclusion of asset price volatility in L2 
and L4 stems from the arguments put forth in Borio, and Lowe (2002), where it is 
acknowledged that apart from monetary stability (defined mainly as price stability), 
financial stability is also crucial and should be taken into account explicitly by 
movements are not fundamental in nature and, importantly, when the exogenous bubble is going to burst. 
Bernanke and Gertler (2001) argue that these conditions are unlikely to hold in actual economies. 
23 We should point out that as McCallum (2001 b) argues, no actual central bank has yet publicly disclosed an 
explicit objective/loss function and the weights given to each variable. Hence, in arialysing the effects of 
monetary policy rules on macroeconomic volatility, McCallum opts for the evaluation of alternative rules that 
are not necessarily derived from optimisation subject to a loss/objective function of the monetary authority. 
24 See for instance the discussion in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). 
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policymakers, since price stability doesn't necessarily guarantee or promote financial 
stability. All the above specifications penalise instrument (interest rate) volatility with a 
25 factor of 0.3 
The results in Tables 5.2,5.3 indicate a mild response to asset price misalignments, 
i-e- Y3 0-1) is successful in reducing overall macroeconomic volatility using all the 
alternative loss functions and monetary policy rules under investigation. Using both the 
Taylor rule and the inflation-forecast targeting rule, we notice that if the monetary authority 
reacts too strongly to asset prices (Y3 ýý' 0.1), aggregate welfare losses, as indicated by all the 
loss functions, increase due to the higher inflation, output and interest rate volatility, despite 
the decrease in asset price volatility (in the case of L, andL4 )- Our results differ fiom the 
findings of Bernanke and Gertler (2001) since, as we show in Table 5.3, there is an 
incentive for the central bank to take into account asset prices even conditional to a strong 
response to expected inflation, as the inflation-forecast targeting suggests. The differences 
may derive, among other factors, from the fact that in our policy rules we consider asset 
price deviations from fundamentals, instead of the price of capital (Tobin's q) as in 
Bernanke and Gertler. Our results agree with Cecchetti et al. (2000) in that there are 
26 
welfare gains from responding to asset price misalignments . 
Table 5.2: Standard deviations of output gap, inflation, interest rates, asset prices,, 
using the Taylor rule. 
Y3 Cry ax 0', Gq L, L2 L3 L4 
0 2.13 0.89 0.84 11.06 2.21 3.31 3.27 4.38 
0.1 1.93 0.94 0.83 10.17 2.15 3.17 3.12 4.14 
0.5 1.95 1.45 1.31 8.60 2.79 3.65 3. 4.59 
1 2.14 2.08 2.11 7.62 3.78 4.55 4.85 5.62 
Note: 
(a) The standard deviations have been calculated using the baseline parameter values from Table 5.1. 
(b) L I, L2 , L3, L4denote the value of the Loss 
function, L= aq, + buy + cc-, + daq , for (a, bx, d) = (1,0.5,0.3,0), 
(1,0.5,0.3,0.1), (1,1,0.3,0), (1,1,0.3,0.1) respectively. 
25 Woodford (1999) provides an incentive for considering instrument volatility by stressing that more variable 
interest rates may undermine the central bank's credibility. 
26 Our results agree also with Dupor (2002), who builds a sticky price model in which firms over-invest in 
physical capital when stocks become overvalued. The optimal monetary policy response in his model is to 
raise interest rates to drive down employment, thereby reducing the marginal product of capital and its price. 
His approach differs from Bernanke and Gertler in that the monetary authority can distinguish fundamental 
from non-fundamental changes. Also, in Dupor's simulations, the policy rule does not respond to asset prices 
directly, but instead to the underlying shock that drives asset price movements. 
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Table 5.3: Standard deviations of output gap, inflation, interest rates, asset prices, 
using the inflation-forecast targeting rule. 
73 ITY O"r C7, O-q L, L2 L3 L4 
0 1.93 0.77 0.82 10.81 1.98 3.06 2.95 4.03 
0.1 1.70 0.84 0.88 10.59 1.95 3.01 2.80 3.86 
0.5 1.74 1.08 1.18 8.81 2.30 3.19 3.17 4.06 
1 1.95 1.39 1.75 7.90 2.89 3.68 3.87 4.66 
Note: 
(a) The standard deviations have been calculated using the parameter values from Table 5.1. 
(b) LI, L2, L3, L4 denote the value of the Loss function, L= ao-,, + bay + co-j + daq , for (a, h, c, d) = (1,0.5,0.3,0) (1,0.5,0.3,0.1), (1,1,0.3,0), (1,1,0.3,0.1) respectively. 
The reduction in welfare losses that we obtain with our preferred rule 03 ý 0.1) 
derives from the lower asset price and output gap volatility, as compared to the baseliine 
rule 03 : -: 0). The increased inflation and interest rate variability has been more than 
compensated from the sbarp, decreases in output and asset price volatility. For example, in 
the inflation-forecast targeting case, cTy declines from 1.93 to 1.70, and uq from 10.81 to 
10.59. 
In Tables 5.4,5.5 we evaluate the behaviour of the economic system by varying 
simultaneously the parameter responding to inflation and the parameter associated 
with asset price misalignments (r, ). Specifically, we are postulating two regimes regarding 
the response of interest rates to inflation: an accommodating regi . me (r, =0.05, yj* =1.05), 
and an aggressive regime (y, = 2, y, * =3), while with each of the Tegimes we allow two 
different values of the parameter associated with asset price misalignments: y, =0, and 
r, = In addition, we allow for three instances where the parameter associated with the 
output gap, Y2, assumes a value of 0.5. This value was chosen because it was advocated by 
Taylor (1993) as the appropriate response of the central bank to the output gap, 
independently of its attitude towards inflation. The simulation evidence reveals the 
existence of inflation-output gap volatility frontiers, since when Y2 increases 
from 0 to 0.5, 
output gap volatility declines and inflation volatility increases, for any given yl. For 
instance, in the case of the accommodative rule (first & second row of Table 5.4) with 
Y3 ý 0.1, o-ydeclines from 2.42 to 2.03, while o-,, increases 
from 1.64 to 2.36. 
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When, however, the monetary authority becomes more averse with respect to 
inflation, not only inflation but also output gap volatility declines in agreement with 
previous work of McCallum (2001b). For example, switching from (Yh, Y2) Y3) .. : (0.05,0,0), 
to (2,0,0) reduces cr, , 
by 50 % and cy by about 20 %. Considering the reaction to asset 
prices, we find that when monetary policy responds to misalignments, asset market and 
output volatility always decline leading to lower L's, conditional upon non-inflation 
accommodation, i. e. yl> 0.05. The smallest realisations of the alternative loss functions 
occur at (yi, y2, y3) = (2,0.5,0.1). 
As we see in Table 5.5, using the inflation-forecast based rule, there are welfare 
gains from monetary policy reaction to misaligmnents only when yj* > 1.05, that is, 
aggressive inflation-forecast targeting. The stronger the reaction to expected inflation the 
greater the reduction in macroeconomic volatility. Comparing the last row of Tables 5.4 
and 5.5 respectively, that correspond to the inflation-averse case, we notice that the Taylor 
rule that includes both asset price misalignments and the output gap leads to lower 
aggregate volatility as compared to the augmented (by asset price misalignments) inflation- 
forecast rule. Hence, we agree with Bernanke and Gertler (2001) that inflation targeting 
should be 'flexible' with an independent role for the output gap. 
5.5 Conclusions 
This chapter examined the relationship between monetary policy and asset prices 
using a structural model of the economy that allows for the effect of asset prices on 
aggregate demand. The sharp reduction in stock prices on early 2000, and the continuing 
worldwide increases in house prices have resulted in growing interest among academics 
and policyrnakers to study the links between monetary policy, asset market developments 
and the real economy. Financial imbalances and the economic instability associated with 
pronounced asset price misalignments pose important challenges for monetary 
policyrnakers. Concentrating on price stability alone, as a growing number of inflation 
targeting countries do, is no guarantee that financial instability and the serious after-effects 
of bubbles bursting can be avoided. Taking these arguments into consideration, we start 
from a small-scale rational expectations macro model where, in line with recent empirical 
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findings and theoretical intuition, the current level of output is positively related to lagged 
real asset prices. In this study, we contribute to the existing literature by employing an 
alternative model for the dynamic evolution of asset prices. We assume that asset prices 
follow a partial adjustment mechanism in the context of which, they are positively affected 
by past changes, while at the same time we also allow for reversion towards their 
fundamental value. 
Analyzing whether the central bank should take into account asset price 
misalignments when setting interest rates, we consider both the inflation-forecast targeting 
rule and the standard Taylor rule.. The main result of our simulations is that a mild response 
to asset price deviations from fundamentals promotes overall macroeconomic stability. This 
result is robust to all alternative loss functions and policy rules. Monetary policy should not 
only react strongly to inflation (or its forecast) but should also take into account output 
developments and asset price misalignments. We acknowledge that it may be difficult to 
interpret asset price movements and distinguish between fundamental and non-fundamental 
components, but the same type of uncertainty exists when policy makers are faced with 
stochastic trend output. Hence, there is scope for the monetary authorities to take into 
account asset price misalignments in the conduct of monetary policy despite the 
measurement errors that they might face. 
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Conclusions 
The purpose of this thesis was to provide a thorough analysis of the interaction 
between monetary policy, inflation, and asset prices. This area of the literature is related to 
the monetary economics and financial economics disciplines and has important 
implications for the conduct of monetary policy and investor behaviour, given the crucial 
changes in the underlying financial and macroeconomic framework over the 1990s. During 
that decade, inflation targeting, either explicit or implicit, became the monetary policy 
regime of choice for many central banks. Compared with the inflationary 1970s, inflation 
rates became lower and less volatile reducing the significant economic costs associated 
with high and variable inflation. However, greater price stability did not bring along 
smaller financial volatility, as after the mid-1990s stock prices and house prices appreciated 
to record levels in many advanced economies. The stock market 'dot com' bubble 
eventually burst in early 2000, while house prices continue to rally creating concerns to 
policyrnakers about the macroeconomic effects of a possible correction in the property 
market. 
The recent volatility in financial markets has drawn academics and monetary 
policymakers, in an intense debate on whether monetary policy should respond to asset 
price misalignments. Asset prices play an important role in the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy via their effect on consumption spending (consumption wealth effects) and 
investment spending (investment balance sheet effects). The 'new environment' hypothesis 
stresses that in a macroeconomic environment characterised by low inflation, low interest 
rates and exuberant growth projections, financial imbalances can easily build up. However, 
when optimism about finther increases in asset price turns to pessimism, financial 
imbalances unwind and the result may be financial distress. The new view for the conduct 
of monetary policy acknowledges the benefits brought by inflation targeting, pointing out, 
though, that central banks should be more proactive in their effort to preserve financial 
stability. This thesis was motivated by the aforementioned developments and attempted to 
investigate the impact of inflation targeting and the feedback relationship between 
monetary policy and asset prices using a variety of econometric and theoretical 
frameworks. We now present a synopsis of our findings and the related policy implications. 
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Chapter 1 examined the impact of monetary conditions on stock market returns in 
the context of the present value model of equity valuation. According to it, monetary policy 
plays an important role in determining equity returns either by altering the discount rate 
used by market participants or by influencing market participants' expectations of future 
economic activity. In chapter 1 we focused on the discount rate link and utilised proxies for 
shifis in monetary policy that were based on interest rate variables, including the change in 
the short-term Treasury Bill rate and a dummy variable reflecting changes in the central 
bank discount rate. Our dataset comprised of 13 OECD countries over the period 1972- 
2002, covering the crucial period of the recent boom-bust cycle in international stock 
markets. Our main contributions to the existing empirical literature were that we took into 
account the non-normal distribution of stock returns, through bootstrap analysis, as well as 
the co-movement in international stock markets, via SUR system estimation. The results 
suggested that in the ma ority of the countries under investigation, periods of tight money 
were associated with contemporaneous declines in stock market value. We also showed 
that shifts in interest rates contain significant information that can be used to forecast 
expected stock returns. Specifically, we found that a restrictive (expansive) monetary 
policy stance decreases (increases) expected stock returns in most sample countries. 
Such shifts in expected returns do not run against the paradigm of market efficiency, 
since monetary authorities typically turn to expansive policies when there is concern about 
the prospects of economic growth. Hence, it may be reasonable to expect that during such 
periods, investors may require a higher rate of return in order to invest in the stock market. 
The results in chapter I verified the existence of a link between monetary policy decisions 
and stock market wealth. This has important implications for both stock market participants 
and central bankers, since the former are interested in the broader topic of stock market 
determination and portfolio formation, while the latter are interested in whether monetary 
policy actions are transmitted through financial markets. Our findings suggest that investors 
should be aware of the international diversification opportunities across countries with 
different monetary environments, while central bankers should keep in mind that, in case 
they need to, they have the ability to affect the stock market through interest rate changes. 
In Chapter 2 we turned our attention to the relationship between average inflation- 
inflation uncertainty and the impact of explicit targeting in the context of the UK economy. 
The 'new environment' hypothesis suggests that the increased aversion of monetary 
authorities to inflation and its volatility brought credibility gains and allowed 
for lower 
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interest rates, which had bad a positive impact on stock market capitalisation. Using a 
variety of GARCH models for the mean and the variance of inflation, the empirical results 
in chapter 2 suggested a positive relationship between past price changes and uncertainty 
about future changes. Hence, the decrease in average inflation over the 1990s reduced the 
negative consequences of inflation uncertainty. They key contribution of chapter 2 was that 
we modelled explicitly the establishment of inflation targeting in the UK., which allowed us 
to examine its effects on inflationary dynamics and uncertainty. Estimates from symmetric 
and threshold-GARCH models indicated that post-targeting UK inflation was less 
persistent and less variable. Most interestingly, evidence from component-GARCH 
estimation showed that a direct negative impact on long-run uncertainty could still be 
identified, even after we controlled for the indirect effect of lower average inflation 
throughout the period 1992-2002. These findings have important implications for monetary 
policy design. Monetary authorities of high inflation countries should consider the long-run 
benefits associated with explicit inflation targeting, keeping in mind, though, that focusing 
on consumer price stability alone does not necessarily guarantee financial stability. 
Following the examination of the stabilisation properties exhibited by inflation 
targeting monetary policy regimes, in chapter 3 we took a look at the operational aspects of 
such frameworks. Simplified inflation targeting models typically include an aggregate 
supply and an aggregate demand equation, as well as a rule for the monetary policy setting. 
We innovated, though, by augmenting the standard framework to take into account the role 
of asset prices. The intuition for monetary policy to consider asset prices lays on the fact 
that asset price fluctuations may destabilise aggregate demand and inflation, through their 
effect on consumption and investment. Indeed, empirical evidence from the UK over the 
inflation targeting period 1992-2003 indicated that movements in asset prices, especially 
house prices, exert a significant positive effect on aggregate demand, that feeds into higher 
future inflation. Hence, there is scope for an inflation targeting central bank, like the Bank 
of England, to include asset prices in its reaction function. 
Based on those arguments, we extended the standard forward-looking Taylor rule to 
incorporate measures of house price and stock price inflation. Using data from the UK and 
the US, we found that US monetary policymakers appear to be more concerned about stock 
market developments, while their UK counterparts assign a 
higher weight on house price 
inflation. In addition, we modelled the effect of Bank of England independence on policy 
preferences towards expected inflation and found that post-independence 
inflation aversion 
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increased, while the relationship between interest rates and asset price changes remained 
unaffected. Hence, our key contribution to the empirical Taylor rules literature was to show 
that monetary policy has reacted to asset price movements, with the result being robust to 
whether an explicit or implicit inflation targeting regime was at work and to the impact of 
central bank independence. In the last two chapters of the thesis we revisited the 
relationship between monetary policy and asset prices from the perspective of whether 
policy makers should respond to asset price misalignments. 
In chapter 4 we utilised a backward-looking structural macro model where a 
positive effect was postulated from asset price increases on aggregate demand and 
consequently on inflation. Central bank preferences were characterised by a quadratic loss 
function penalising deviations of inflation from its target value and output from its potential 
level. In order to derive the optimal interest rate rule, we solved the model and then used 
stochastic control techniques to minimise intertemporally the central bank's loss function. 
The functional form of the implied optimal reaction function depended on the assumption 
underlying the dynamic evolution of asset prices. In the simple case where asset prices are 
always equal their fundamental value the optimal rule conditioned short-term nominal 
interest rates on inflation and the output gap. 
Our main contribution to the literature on optimal rules stemmed from extending the 
asset price block of the model to allow for potential bubble build-up, in addition to 
reversion towards fundamentals. This modification, apart from bringing the model closer to 
reality, implied a drastic change in the optimal interest rate rule, since it conditioned the 
monetary policy instrument not only on inflation and demand pressures but also on asset 
price misalignments. We also showed that the magnitude of the interest rate reaction to 
financial imbalances depends on the relative importance of wealth effects for aggregate 
demand. The greater the impact of asset price fluctuations on the demand side of the 
economy, the more aggressive should be the response of interest rates to asset price 
misalignments. These results have important policy implications given the sustained 
deviations from fundamental values often exhibited by stock markets and property markets. 
Monetary authorities should acknowledge that the role of asset prices goes far beyond their 
use as instruments to forecast inflation and output. 
Given the prevalence of microfoundations consistent New Keynesian models in the 
recent literature, in chapter 5 we took a final look at the 
interaction between monetary 
policy and asset price misalignments in the context of a small-scale macroeconomic model 
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that incorporates forward-looking elements and an impact from asset prices on output. 
Aggregate demand was represented by an optimising IS type of relationship, inflation by a 
hybrid Phillips curve, while asset prices were assumed to be affected both by momentum 
trading and reversion towards fundamentals. We then resorted to stochastic simulations to 
analyse whether the central bank should respond to asset price misalignments when setting 
interest rates. Doing so, we employed two alternative interest rate rules, the forward- 
looking Taylor rule and the inflation-forecast targeting rule, in order to examine the 
robustness of our findings to the rule specification. Our simulation evidence indicated that, 
given reasonable values for the calibration of the behavioural coefficients, a mild reaction 
to asset price misalignments promotes overall macroeconomic stability. This result holds 
across all the alternative loss functions that we employed, under the condition that the 
central bank is not accommodating inflation. Hence, monetary policy should not only 
respond to inflation (or its forecast) but should also take into account output developments 
and asset price misalignments, despite the measurement errors associated with proxying 
trend output and asset price fundamentals. 
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APPENDIX CHAPTER I 
Table ALI: Correlation of local three month Treasury BW rates with local central 
bank discount rates, 1972: 01- 2002.07. 
Country Correlation Coefficient 
Belgium 0.94 
Canada 0.97 
Finland 0.97 
France 0.94 
Germany 0.90 
Italy 0.85 
Japan, 0.96 
Sweden 0.95 
Switzerland 0.58 
United Kingdom 0.98 
United States 0.96 
Note: The discount rate data for Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Italy (Euro members) ends on 
December 1998. Thereafter, we used the ECB refinancing rate. Netherlands and Spain have not been 
included due to the lack of adequate number of discount rate observations in the Datastream. series. 
Table A1.2: Local monetary policy environments, 1972: 01- 2002.07. 
Belgium 
Expansive 
Periods 
Date of first rate 
change 
Duration in 
months 
Restrictive 
Periods 
Date of first rate 
change 
Duration in 
months 
1 1972.02 9 1 1972.11 26 
2 1975.01 14 2 1976.03 10 
3 1977.01 11 3 1978.07 24 
4 1978.01 6 4 1982.04 3 
5 1980.07 8 5 1983.11 18 
6 1981.04 8 6 1985.12 4 
7 1982.01 3 7 1988.06 5 
8 1982.07 16 8 1988.12 30 
9 1985.09 3 9 1991.08 13 
10 1986.04 9 10 1997.10 15 
11 1987.03 15 
12 1992.09 12 
13 1993.10 48 11 
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Canada 
Expansive 
Periods 
Date of first rate 
change 
Duration in 
months 
Restrictive 
Periods 
Date of first rate 
change 
Duration in 
months 
1 1974.11 10 1 1973.04 19 
2 1976.11 16 2 1975.09 14 
3 1994.07 3 3 1978.03 24 
4 1995.04 5 4 1994.02 5 
5 1995.11 3 5 1994.10 6 
6 1996.03 16 6 1997.07 15 
7 1998.10 13 7 1999.11 14 
8 2001-01 15 8 2002.04 4 
Finland 
Expansive 
Periods 
Date of first rate 
change 
Duration in 
months 
Restrictive 
Periods 
Date of first rate 
change 
Duration in 
months 
1 1977.10 25 1 1973.07 51 
2 1982.06 13 2 1979.11 31 
3 1985.02 39 3 1983.07 19 
4 1989.01 10 4 1988.05 8 
5 1993.01 72 5 1989.11 38 
France 
Expansive 
Periods 
Date of first rate 
change 
Duration in 
months 
Restrictive 
Periods 
Date of first rate 
change 
Duration in 
months 
1 1975.01 15 1 1972.09 28 
2 1977.09 21 2 1976.04 17 
3 1980.04 11 3 1979.06 10 
4 1981.07 90 4 1981.03 4 
5 1990.04 20 5 1989.01 15 
6 1992.05 7 6 1991.12 5 
7 1993.04 17 7 1992.12 4 
8 1995.11 24 8 1994.10 12 
9 1997.11 14 
Germany 
Expansive 
Periods 
Date of first rate 
change 
Duration in 
months 
Restrictive 
Periods 
Date of first rate 
change 
Duration in 
months 
1 1974.10 53 1 1972.10 24 
2 1982.08 22 2 1979-03 41 
3 1985.08 35 3 1984.06 14 
1992.09 76 4 1988.07 50 
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Italy 
Expansive 
Periods 
Date of first rate 
change 
Duration in 
months 
Restrictive 
Periods 
Date of first rate 
change 
Duration in 
months 
1 1972.04 17 1 1973.09 15 
2 1974.12 14 2 1976.02 16 
3 1977.06 28 3 1979.10 34 
4 1982.08 25 4 1984.09 4 
5 1985.01 31 5 1987.08 34 
6 1990.05 19 6 1991.12 8 
7 1992.10 22 7 1994.08 23 
8 1996.07 30 
Japan 
Expansive 
Periods 
Date of first rate 
change 
Duration in months Restrictive 
Periods 
Date of first rate 
change 
Duration in 
months 
1 1972.06 10 1 1973.04 24 
2 1975.04 48 2 1979.04 16 
3 1980.08 105 3 1989.05 26 
4 1991.07 133 
Sweden 
Expansive 
Periods 
Date of first rate 
change 
Duration in 
months 
Restrictive 
Periods 
Date of first rate 
change 
Duration in 
months 
1 1975.08 10 1 1974.04 16 
2 1978.02 18 2 1976.06 20 
3 1981.10 32 3 1979.07 27 
4 1985.07 33 4 1984.06 13 
5 1990.05 6 5 1988.04 25 
6 1991.02 11 6 1990.11 3 
7 1993.01 18 7 1992.01 12 
8 1995.10 48 8 1994.07 15 
9 2000.06 13 9 1999.10 8 
10 2002.01 3 10 2001.07 6 
11 2002.04 4 
Switzerland 
Expansive 
Periods 
Date of first rate 
change 
Duration in 
months 
Restrictive 
Periods 
Date of first rate 
change 
Duration in 
months 
1 1975.03 56 1 1973.01 26 
2 1982.03 77 2 1979.11 28 
1992.09 88 3 1988.08 49 
2001-09 5 4 2000.01 4 
2002.03 5 5 2000.06 4 
6 2000.11 4 
7 2001.05 4 
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United States 
Expansive 
Periods 
Date of first rate 
change 
Duration in 
months 
Restrictive 
Periods 
Date of first rate 
change 
Duration in 
months 
1 1974.12 32 1 1973.01 23 
2 1980.05 4 2 1977.08 33 
3 1981.11 29 3 1980.09 14 
4 1984.11 34 4 1984.04 7 
5 1990.12 41 5 1987.09 39 
6 1996.01 43 6 1994.05 20 
7 2001.01 19 7 1999.08 17 
United Kingdom 
Expansive 
Periods 
Date of first rate 
change 
Duration in 
months 
Restrictive 
Periods 
Date of first rate 
change 
Duration in 
months 
1 1973.01 6 1 1972.06 7 
2 1974.01 16 2 1973.07 6 
3 1975.11 5 3 1975.05 6 
4 1976.11 12 4 1976.04 7 
5 1978.01 3 5 1978.04 11 
6 1979.03 3 6 1979.06 13 
7 1980.07 13 7 1981.08 3 
8 1981.11 12 8 1982.11 4 
9 1983.03 14 9 1986.10 5 
10 1984.08 5 10 1988.06 15 
11 1985.03 10 11 1989.10 10 
12 1986.03 7 12 1994.09 15 
13 1987.03 5 13 1996.10 24 
14 1987.10 4 14 1999.09 17 
15 1988.03 3 
16 1990.10 47 
17 1995.12 10 
18 1998.10 11 
19 2001.02 18 
European Central Bank 
Expansive 
Periods 
Date of first rate 
change 
Duration in 
months 
Restrictive 
Periods 
Date of first rate 
change 
Duration in 
months 
1 1999.04 7 1 1999.11 18 
2 2001.05 15 
Note: 
(a) The monetary policy environment is classified as expansive (restrictive) if the previous discount rate 
change was a decrease (increase). 
(b) The data excludes months when the central bank discount rate was pegged to a market rate than being 
set by the central bank itself This results in elimination of data for Canada from March 1980 to 
December 1993. The discount rate data for Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Italy (Euro members) 
ends on December 1998. The ECB refimancing rate is effective from January 1999. 
186 
0 
16o 
.W ci 
0 
rA 
16w 
6 
rA 
4.0 
rA 
161 
E-4 
1-4 elf, 
0-4 in "t "rý ýo 'I rl .*r? 
cn 110 
Ci 
cn 
41 cl; 00 C'- - 06 r- 
C', eq 
Cc ýo en r- 
;. "o (Jý --4 rý CN Cý ;. T, C'i ', 6 r- en 6 r, 
"o ***** 
CN 
00 cý 
r- 00 
r. ý r- en r,: r- 
a ý, o -. N- --, 
4 C? r-: rn rn 06 rn 
Z] u 
CA 
=u l 
z 
00 cl 00 
U 
00 
00 
r,; od 0 
oo 
f? CJ ýö 
uu 
w "f9 u. u r12 
"Zi u 
rli t-ý lf, ri t--: vý wU 4-4 
0 
M 
> 
00 t l IZ cu er ri c q oo r4 f ý oo j 
-w ce 
,2 , -, 0 "0 
= 
Z 0 
ce 0 --4 ýo 
ýo r, . u2 uw 
. 5; < 
, 
c4 
Lz e 
7c ýc C> 00 
\Z --4 
- -: 
s u ý2, Z r, cý r ýc 
t- CN 00 8 " 
- rn . ce u 91 0 r - 0. ýmo 
gj ? rz 1 -4 C-: 0 4 -4 . u . 
m -d- UuZu 
Z 
=0u'Cý 
2 ., -j 
04 Gn 4 (A , 
t. Z . 
o i 0 
0 
v 4. 
ý 8- * u0 -V 
< cu 00uu Z (A 
coc 
oc 
. +. d 
W. W 
Ici 
Ici 
9.1 
4) 
P-W 
PC m 
E-4 
clq 
en .ý r- 
C. "0 r-4 
-4 
06 
_4 
ci *** 
= CN "0 00 
IC3 *** 
00 00 C\ 
C, ý 00 
kn Cý 
-L" --I "S q. wm 06 "D 
Ic-) 
-- 
en .,, r- 'I- ýc 0ý 
-i ý, 0 -ý 
1 cd 'z 
00 
00 
c. '1 ** 
-4 
Iv- 
C*% ý10 SO 
od 
moo 1-11 
a. 
> 
Z .. 
0 11 ý. - m 
00 
00 Z. 
.0< 
oo u cn - cu 
00 cu (U U 
c5 oý od Cý > 
le 0 44 u 91 
ýr) rn 00 
ýD N ýZO 00 (1 '. m oý -d- "e 
k2 
. 
'A u 
u 
ri r-4 Z 
-+W llt I: vý 
cn 
rr; ý vý r? C. S. 4 ,1 --1 r- --, -Z u 
> 
er rý 
"0 ci ý't r--ý 
9u 
'a h--4 lid ;2u ýc CD. 9 
ký 
CL --; 
IN \z --; 
-Z cn u 44 
1 _f r--: , -. 3 0-§ 0e 
uaj 
"Ci 
s 
; t-. - 13 U cn *- 6- (4-4 
j . lý ., 5 u , wo ('? r. ý -. r- --, 16.. - cu 1111 
.-= En , -C -, Z U uu 
40. 
"Ci 0 CD u. ý. e 
cu u 
rei -e -1: 3 cu . 
ß. %... r- r. ý. 0 ýt * 
ýT4 
42 
clý 
00 
&0 
Z 
J4 
b 
jw 
&M 
E-0 
a. 
k4 
C'! v) 
oc 
oc 
C? 06 ýc I -, 
2 \z - r, ý 
93 
- 
; &0 
cc M 
(7N 00 
110 Cý 00 
r- 
C, 6 'jý 
*x 
**x 
* 11 
rfý 00 
rn 
00 
00 
rn tr 
rn oc 
00 
rn 
r, - --4 00 
\ýo -, 
CN 
r- r- t"ý 
RT 
10 
ri 
w. 
M 
c 
rJ) 
CID 
- 
'I 
4 
C13 
co m = C'I 
.u 
sý 14= 
06 
00 
as u9 M m 00 rn 00 It= > 
m r--: 00 
CN 
=3 
m 
7: 1 
r- l 
00 
110 C14 t- 
00 
ON u 0 C. " U r - r- 
ffi (, 6 C"i 
I-- ý r, 06 1 1 -ý4 ý -0 U 
C, 3 
tr) 
r,: tn r) t'ý W) ;F .6 V. pW 
co "tý 
- 
Q 
"0 N 
ý 
.-' > 
ý: 
Cn 
r- C) 00 
CN Ei 1,4 0o : 
., 5-5 
. U C) 
oZ 6-4 , 2e 7ý v 7ý Z) (U ý: 0 e cd 
cl Omm 
, ý 0 0ý00 
(U 
pU -0 ý 
- a -. E! 00 00 o 
V 
o 
= 4) Iz: 
. -. Ei = 
0 
o 
0 
t. 
IýA " -u0 M= *a 
v 
! 4Z4 
*-, 0 "a , C4- . 
Uu 
0-4 
7) 
(U U 
0 
&-4 U C4 -6 o .0 Cý * 
44 
'm 
C\ -- x 06. EU 
Table A1.4: Bootstrap results for nominal stock returns equation. 
Country Lower Bound Upper Bound OLS t-statistic 
Belgium -1.969 1.967 -3.642 
Canada -2.091 1.810 -2.923 
Finland -1.975 1.805 -0.509 
France -1.855 1.829 -3.032 
Germany -1.901 2.035 -1.928 
Italy -1.874 2.100 -2.283 
Japan -1.919 2.013 -1.327 
Netherlands -1.933 1.840 -2.251 
Spain -1.991 2.096 0.99 
Sweden -1.928 1.952 -2.286 
Switzerland -1.922 1.988 -1.95 
United Kingdom -2.040 1.770 -5.406 
United States -1.999 1.955 -2.302 
Note: 
(a) Upper bound and lower bound denote the 5% bootstrap critical values using the 
residuals of the regression equation AS, =a+ flAi, + u, where a is the monthly nominal 
stock return and Ai, is the change in the short-term interest rate. 
(b) The critical values are averages obtained from 100 repetitions of 1000 iterations. At 
each repetition, the 1000 test statistics are sorted and the 5% critical values are selected as 
the 25h (upper bound) and 975th (upper bound) values of the series. 
Table AI. 5: Bootstrap results for real stock returns equation. 
Country Lower Bound Upper Bound OLS t-statistic 
Belgium -2.057 1.733 -3.77 
Canada -2.042 1.975 -2.972 
Finland -2.128 2.017 -0.689 
France -2.011 1.929 -3.161 
Gen-nany -1.912 1.925 -1.941 
Italy -1.954 1.960 -2.476 
Japan -1.843 1.978 -1.806 
Netherlands -2.037 2.041 -2.563 
Spain -1.959 1.907 0.896 
Sweden -1.998 1.984 -2.627 
Switzerland -1.801 1.954 -1.915 
United Kingdom -2.129 1.999 -5.416 
United States -1.767 1.993 -2.194 
Note: 
(a) Upper bound and lower bound denote the 5% bootstrap critical values using the 
residuals of the regression As, =a+ flAi, + u, where As, is the monthly ex post real stock 
return and Ai, is the change in the short-term interest rate. 
(b) The critical values are averages obtained from 100 repetitions of 1000 iterations. At 
each repetition, the 1000 test statistics are sorted and the 5% critical values are selected as 
the 25h (upper bound) and 975th (upper bound) values of the series. 
190 
Table A1.6: Bootstrap results for dividend adjusted nominal stock returns equation. 
Country Lower Bound Upper Bound OLS t-stabstic 
Belgium 
Canada 
-2.048 
-1.901 
1.839 
1.909 
-4-505 
-3.956 Finland -2.025 2.181 -1.836 France -1.962 1.958 -2.98 Germany -1.809 1.911 -1.898 Italy -1-954 1.991 -2.478 Japan -1.998 1.962 -1.573 
Netherlands -2.043 2.061 -2.249 
Spain -2.079 1.886 -0.035 
Sweden -1.980 1.931 -2.221 
Switzerland -2.139 2.013 -1.658 
United Kingdom -2.116 1.920 -4.702 
United States -2.042 1.881 -2.064 
Note: 
(a) Upper bound and lower bound denote the 5% bootstrap critical values using the 
residuals of the regression equation AS, D=a+, BAi, + u, where AS, D is the monthly dividend 
adjusted nominal stock return and Ai, is the change in the short-term interest rate. 
(b) The critical values are averages obtained from 100 repetitions of 1000 iterations. At 
each repetition, the 1000 test statistics are sorted and the 5% critical values are selected as 
the 25'h (lower bound) and 975th (upper bound) values of the series. 
Table A1.7: Bootstrap results for dividend adjusted real stock returns equation. 
Country Lower Bound Upper Bound OLS t-statistic 
Belgium -2.042 2.051 -4.536 
Canada -2.019 1.973 -2.99 
Finland -1.881 1.944 -1.874 
France -2.070 1.867 -3.107 
Germany -2.051 1.976 -2.22 
Italy -1.866 1.978 -2.67 
Japan -2.036 1.957 -1.896 
Netherlands -1.910 1.989 -2.155 
Spain -1.825 2.005 -0.041 
Sweden -2.007 1.897 -2.267 
Switzerland -2.073 2.031 -1.609 
United Kingdom -2.018 1.923 -4.709 
United States -1.941 
2.031 -2.146 
Note: 
(a) Upper bound and lower bound denote the 5% bootstrap critical values using the 
residuals of the regression equation As, 
D=a+ flAi, + u, where As, D is the monthly dividend 
adjusted ex post real stock return and Ai, is the change 
in the short-term interest rate. 
(b) The critical values are averages obtained from 100 repetitions of 
1000 iterations. At 
each repetition, the 1000 test statistics are sorted and the 
5% critical values are selected as 
the 25'h (lower bound) and 975'h (upper bound) values of the series. 
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Table A2.1: Studies on the relationship between the inflation rate and its conditional 
variance. 
Study Sample Price index Model Major rindings 
Time varying inflation 
Engle (1982) U. K. CPI ARCH uncertainty; higher in the 1958Q2 - 1977Q2 1970's than in the late 
1960's. 
Time varying inflation 
uncertainty; slightly 
Engle (1983) U. S. CPI, PPI, ARCH higher in the 1970's than 1947Q4 - 1979Q4 GNP deflator in the late 1960's, and 
bellow the 1940's and 
early 1950's levels. 
Bollerslev (1986) U. S. 1948Q2 - 1983Q4 GNP deflator 
GARCH Similar to Engle (1983). 
Evans(1991) U. S. GARCH with Positive link between 
1960MI - 1988M6 
CPI time-varying long-run uncertainty and 
parameters the level of inflation. 
Asymmetric effects in 
Bruner and Hess U. S. 
State-dependent inflation uncertainty; 
(1993) 1947QI - 1992Q4 CPI 
model significant relationship 
EGARCH between inflation and 
short-run uncertainty. 
GARCH Asymmetric effects; 
Joyce (1995) 
U. K. AGARCH Positive relationship 
1950QI - 1994QI RPI EGARCH between uncertainty and 
TGARCH lagged inflation. 
Canada GARCH No asymmetric effects; 
Crawford and 
Kasurnovich (1996) 
1916Q2 - 1994Q3 CPI AGARCH 
Positive relationship 
between uncertainty and 1963Q3 - 1994Q3 CPLNFET TGARCH lagged inflation. 
Positive bi-directional 
G7 plus Argentina, Fractionally relationship 
between 
Baillie (1996) Brazil, Israel CPI 
Integrated inflation and uncertainty 
only in U. K., and the 1948M1 - 1990M12 GARCH-M three high inflation 
countries. 
GARCH 
Grier and Perry (1998) 
G7 countries CPI 
TGARCH Inflation Granger-causes 
i fl i 1948MI - 1993M12 Component n at on uncertainty. GARCH 
Positive bi-directional 
Fountas et al. (2000) 
U. S. CPI GARCH-M relationship between 1960MI - 1999M2 inflation and uncertainty. 
Note: 
CPLXFET denotes CPI excluding food, energy and the effect of indirect taxes 
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Figure A3.1: Annual US House Price and Stock Price inflation, 1992: 10-2003: 01. 
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Figure A3.2: US Output Gap, Short term interest rate, inflation, 1992: 10-2003: 01. 
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A4-1: Deriving the optimal path for the control variable, (p,. 
The first order condition that yields the optimal response is: 
a 
V(7r, ) =0 (a' +, u)ýp, + ar, +, 8aEV'(7r, +, 
) 
aýo, (A4.1.1) 
We employ the envelope theorem in order to derive an expression for EV'(ir,,, ): 
dV(; r, ) = E, 
aI(, 
T2 + ýIY2 
a 7ri ý-T t+l t+ 
V'(7rt ) d; r, = Et 7r, +I 
ý--rt+ 
1+p yt +I++ )6 
V'(7rt 
+Id 7r, QQ aA 
I 
Irt ir, ir, 
I 
V(ný) = E, 
IýTt+l + 8v, (7rt+l )] 
Using (4.1)' we obtain: 
V'(7r, ) = 7r, + aýo, +, BE, V'(7r,,, ) 
Multiplying (A4.1.2) by a, and adding it to (A4.1.1) we get: 
a V'(; rt )= -p(p, . 
(A4.1.2) 
(A4.1.3) 
If we multiply this expression by P lead it by one period and take expectations based in 
information at time t we get: flaEV'(ir,,., ) = -, u, 8E, [(p, -,, 
]. 
Thus, (A4.1.1) can be re-written as: 
(a 2+ U)(p, + a7r, - pflE, [op,,, ]=0 <* 
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a (Pt 
a2+ ju 
7r, +a2+p) Et rýpl+j (A4.1.4) 
A4.2: Stability criterion. 
The quadratic equation whose solution gives the optimal c value is: 
(, u, 8a)c' + (, u, 8 - a' -, u)c -a=0 (A4.2.1) 
The two roots of (A4.2.1) are given by 
2+ VU 2, g 22U2,8 2ý1 +, U2 u, 8 +a+, u + 2, u, 8 a-2 +a'+2a (A4.2.2) 
2p, 8a 
Recalling that according to Eq. (4.1)' inflation is given by: 
)r,,, -= 7r, + ag + co,,, = 7r, + a(cir) + co,, <* ; r, +, = 
(I + a, c)7r, + o),,, 
Therefore, stability of the inflation process requires that 
I+acl<l <* -1<1+ac<l <* 
-2 <c<O (A4.2.3) 
a 
Since a>0 it implies that only the negative c-root is accepted. 
A4.3: Inflation coefficient restriction. 
', , 
has to be The inflation parameter in the interest rate reaction function, f 
greater than one in order to satisfy the stability condition that real rates increase in 
response to inflation, with higher values implying a more aggressive response: 
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fir =1- 
C[l - A] >1 (A4.3.1) AYI +)02 
This condition can be re-expressed as: 
C[ 
<0 (A4.3.2) 
AYI +A 
As we showed in Appendix A4.2, only negative values of parameter c are accepted. 
Since 83r, +, 82> 0, it is implied that: 
I-A>O <* A<l (A4.3.3) 
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A5.1: Bernanke and Gertler model. 
The Bernanke and Gertler (1999,2001) model is an extension of the Bernanke, 
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996,1998) model, allowing for exogenous bubbles in asset 
prices. The model is a standard dynamic new Keynesian model, modified to allow for 
financial accelerator effects. In the context of this model, there are important links 
between asset prices and the real economy, operating through the 'balance sheet' 
channel. That is, contrary to the assumptions of the benchmark neoclassical model, 
credit markets are not frictionless and credit can be extended more freely and at a lower 
cost to borrowers who already have a strong financial position. Hence, borrowing ability 
is determined by cash flows and the condition of balance sheets. Following a decline in 
asset prices, deteriorating balance sheets and reduced credit flows affect negatively 
spending and aggregate demand in the short-run, although the may also have important 
adverse long-run effects on aggregate supply by inhibiting capital formation and 
reducing working capital. As Bernanke and Gertler (1999, p. 20) argue, "there are also 
likely to be significant feedback and magnification effects". 
The decline in aggregate sales and employment, following a decrease e. g. in 
home equity value, imply further deterioration of cash flows and collateral and hence, 
further decreases in spending. This magnification effect constitutes the 'financial 
accelerator' analysed in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996). A key implication of 
the model is that the degree to which asset price fluctuations affect the real economy is 
dependent upon the initial financial conditions. In particular, it depends on the initial 
state state of household, firms, and financial intermediaries balance sheets. Thus, the 
effect of asset prices on spending is highly non-linear (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). If 
balance sheets are initially weak with high levels of debt and inadequate cash flows, 
then even small decreases in asset prices are likely to put firms and households in a state 
of financial distress, or lead to capital problems for the banking system. 
On the other 
hand, if balance sheets are initially strong, then even large declines in asset prices are 
less likely to have real economic effects. 
The main difference between the Bernanke and Gertler (1999,2001) and the 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996,1998) models is that while the latter assumes 
that only fundamentals drive asset prices, so that the financial accelerator amplifies only 
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fundamental shocks (such as shocks to productivity or spending), the former allows for 
the effect of non-fundamental changes in asset prices on the real economy, via the 
financial accelerator. The crucial underlying assumption is that the market price of 
capital, may be different from its fundamental value, leading to the creation of bubbles. 
The consumption of firms' owners and the quality of firms' balance sheets is assumed 
to depend on the market values of their assets, rather than the fundamental values. It is 
implied therefore that a bubble in asset prices affects f=s' financial positions and the 
premium for external finance. 
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A5.2: Simulation technical details. 
Using the fact that the asset price Eq. (5.3) can be re-written as: 
q, = (b, - b2)q, -, - 
blq, 
-2 + 
b2q, * 
Equations (5.1-5.5) can be compactly expressed as: 
AE, [X,,, ]= BX, + CZ, 
where 
xt H 
Yt 
9t 
it 
q 
E1[7r1] 
q, -, 
q, 
-2 
E1[X+1] =I 
E, [y,., 11 
E [7r, 1 
tlit+II 
Ej, ql] 
E, [, q,., 1] 
Et[Yt+21 
Et Igt+2 1 
E, [; r,. 11 
q, 
q, -, 
9t 
it 
17t 
Et 
zt = Ot 
ut 
-1 - 
(6.3)' 
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A=l 
B=l 
00000 
000 
00 
01 
00 
00 
00 
0 0.0 
00 
00 
01 
00 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
-1 
0 0 0 0 1 0 a, a2 0 0 -a, 
18 
0 0 0 0 0 1-(0 0 0 0 ýo 0 
(l-r4)r2 (l-Y4)('+rl) 0 (l-r4)Y3 -(l-Y4)r3 0 
0 0 0 0 0 r4 
0 0 0 0 b2 0 0 0 bl-b2 -bl 0 0 
0 0 _C5, o -1 
82 
05 1 
0 0 0 0 0 
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C=l 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
The above multivariate linear rational expectations (RE) model is solved in Matlab 
using the generalized Schur form. The core algorithm that we used to calculate 
numerical solutions is solvek. m, whose more detailed analysis may be found in 
McCallum (1998). It is a modified version of the Klein (2000) algorithm. 
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